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Campaign-finance reform is currently stalled.  A series of recent Supreme 
Court decisions culminating in Citizens United v. FEC, which rejected limits 
on corporate and union spending on electioneering communications,1 
undermined the bipartisan campaign-finance-reform legislation that the Court 
largely approved less than a decade ago in McConnell v. FCC.2  Both public3 
and scholarly4 reaction to Citizens United has been sharply negative, with 
critics viewing the decision as an invitation to electoral domination by 
corporate money and special interests.5  For many, Citizens United has become 
a worrisome symbol of the Court’s overall turn toward deregulation of 
campaign finance.6  Although the 2010 midterm elections—the most expensive 
                                                 
 1. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
 2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 
(2003) (upholding most of the 2002 BCRA’s provisions, including the “electioneering 
communication” provisions and the “soft money” ban), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. at 913. 
 3. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON 
ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 17–22 (2011), available  
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/citizens-united-20110113.pdf; Dan Eggen, Corporate 
Sponsorship Is a Campaign Issue on Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, 
at A15; Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts Court 
Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2242557.  
 4. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, 57 N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS 63, 63 (2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United 
Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 650 (2011); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE 
L.J. 978, 1025 (2011); Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign 
Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 660–61 (2011); Richard L. 
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 582–83 (2011); 
Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (2011); 
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829474; Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (2010); Justin J. Wert, Ronald 
Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of Benedick and Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign 
of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 719–20 (2011); Molly J. Walker 
Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO. L. 
REV. 2365, 2368–69 (2010).  But see Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 935, 935 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court properly protected citizens’ civil 
liberties in Citizens United). 
 6. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 643–44 (stating the decision “crystallized for many 
people the concern that corporate money dominates American politics”). 
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in recent history7—do not appear to have confirmed critics’ most hyperbolic 
predictions about corporate domination of political advertising,8 the data do 
suggest a striking post-Citizens United political picture.9  Many of the 
independent political ads that aired after Citizens United did not include any 
meaningful donor identification, and there is little reason to believe this will 
change.10  Simply put, the 2012 presidential election season will likely feature 
extensive and largely negative “independent” advertising, sponsored by 
shadowy third-party organizations sporting identity-concealing names and 
funded by undisclosed partisan donors.11   
 This is the feared “Citizens United effect”: Non-candidate groups, carefully 
structured to take advantage of the limits to election-law disclosure 
requirements, spending potentially unlimited funds to air veiled partisan 
political ads without accountability to voters.12   
This environment of disguised advertising is at odds with Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s political vision in Citizens United itself—a vision of balance, in 
which the accountability promoted by effective public disclosure would 
neutralize the potential electoral harms of unlimited corporate expenditures.13  
However, according to election-law authority Professor Richard Hasen, 
“Justice Kennedy’s utopian information-flowing vision of the U.S.  
campaign-finance system is now no more than a dream.”14   
                                                 
 7. See Paul Blumenthal, The Citizens United Effect: 40 Percent of Outside Money Made 
Possible by Supreme Court Ruling, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 4, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://sunlight 
foundation.com/blog/2010/11/04/the-citizens-united-effect-40-percent-of-outside-money-made-
possible-by-supreme-court-ruling/; Kathleen Ronayne, OpenSecrets.org Unveils 2010 ‘Big 
Picture’ Analysis, OPENSECRETS.ORG (July 26, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org 
/news/2011/07/2010-election-big-picture.html. 
 8. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 643–44 (noting the satirical aftereffect of 
corporations running in a congressional election); Walker Wilson, supra note 5, at 2366–67 & 
nn.8, 12 (identifying the critical prediction that Citizens United will lead to foreign entities 
bankrolling elections and will have a destructive effect on the system). 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See infra notes 107–22 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part I.C; see also Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super PACs and Dark  
Money: ProPublica’s Guide to the New World of Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11, 
2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/super PACs-propublicas-guide-to-the-new-
world-of-campaign-finance (predicting that the 2012 election season will set a new record for 
election spending due to a wide array of organizations capable of hiding funding sources). 
 12. See, e.g., BILL DE BLASIO, THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
CITIZENS UNITED AND THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTIONS 26 (2010), available at http://advocate 
.nyc.gov/files/12-06-10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf; see also CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776482 (discussing corporations’ and unions’ ability to be involved in 
elections by spending through intermediaries, which does not require disclosure following 
Citizens United). 
 13. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010). 
 14. Richard L. Hasen, Justice Kennedy’s Mistaken Citizens United Vision and the Lurch 
Toward Campaign Finance Deregulation, ACSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acs 
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The fear of a political landscape distorted by massive amounts of veiled 
advertising has led opponents of Citizens United to seek help from Congress, 
the states, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), the courts, and the White House.15  Abandoning efforts to 
achieve wide-ranging reform of the electoral system, many campaign 
reformers have shifted their focus to the mitigating effects of mandated 
disclosure requirements.16  The remainder has turned its attention away from 
traditional campaign-finance regulation to alternative reformist strategies, such 
as lobbying regulation.17  
Yet, the efforts of post-Citizens United reformers, which thus far have been 
directed toward influencing a predictable group of decision makers,18 have 
either failed or are still pending, subject to delay.19  In the meantime, the 2012 
presidential election season is already in full swing.20  American politics has 
switched to an electoral mode of “permanent campaign,”21 and money is 
already flowing into third-party political advertisements.22  Therefore, 
policymakers should aggressively explore alternative avenues to mitigate the 
negative consequences of Citizens United. 
Because expenditures for political advertising are still principally focused on 
television and cable,23 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation 
could help realize the speech-and-disclosure-based vision of electoral 
democracy in Citizens United.24  Indeed, having recognized this possibility, the 
                                                                                                                 
blog/justice-kennedy’s-mistaken-citizens-united-vision-and-the-lurch-toward-campaign-finance-
dere. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. See infra Part I.C.  Congress considered legislation that required increased donor 
disclosure, and state legislators passed similar statutes.  See infra notes 181–89. 
 17. See Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1155, 1159, 1161–65 (2011); Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4, 43–45); 
see also Michael S. Kang, The Campaign Finance Debated After Citizens United, 27 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1142, 1153 (2011) (“Citizens United . . . leaves no promising avenue to reform for those 
concerned about the influence of money in politics.”). 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. Gerken, supra note 17, at 1155 (“Citizens United . . . cut off most of the traditional 
pathways for campaign finance reform.”); see infra notes 190–97 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Matea Gold & Melanie Mason, Independent Groups Getting a Head Start on 2012 
Campaign, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/nation/la-na-
outside-spending-20110717. 
 21. See Jeanne Cummings, Don’t Adjust Your Set: Now Campaign Ads Never End, 
POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2011, 4:38 AM), www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51535.html (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For arguments that a clear distinction between governance and 
campaigning no longer exists, see generally THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE 
(Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000). 
 22. See Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (noting the early start of independent-group political 
ads for the 2012 presidential election). 
 23. See, e.g., id. 
 24. See infra Parts II–III. 
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advocacy group Media Access Project (MAP) recently filed a petition with the 
FCC requesting that the agency expand its current sponsorship disclosure rules 
for political ads to include the disclosure of funding sources for independent 
electoral advertisements.25 
This Article argues that the FCC can use communications law to regulate 
electoral advertising by independent advocacy groups.  First, the FCC has the 
statutory authority to require third-party purchasers of airtime for political and 
advocacy advertising to disclose their major direct and indirect funding sources 
and principal directors, officers, or operators.26  Extra-governmental 
approaches can also be developed to promote voluntary adoption of disclosure 
rules by electronic media.27  
Second, the FCC can adopt a rule grounded on a dormant FCC  
doctrine—colloquially known as the “Zapple doctrine” or the “quasi-public 
opportunities rule”28—to constrain broadcaster partisanship in airtime sales to 
third-party advocacy groups.29  Thus, the FCC can deploy regulatory precedent 
to mandate overall broadcaster evenhandedness in airing non-candidate 
political advertising.30  Moreover, if the FCC reaffirms its prior view that 
broadcasters airing political advertisements by supporters or opponents of 
candidates are not immune from liability for defamation, as they would be with 
respect to ads by candidates themselves, broadcasters might voluntarily engage 
in more searching review of non-candidate political ads. 
Although the Zapple doctrine has been associated with the now-defunct 
fairness doctrine,31 the legitimacy of such a quasi-equal opportunities 
regulation does not depend on the fairness doctrine.32  Nor must the equal 
opportunities provision under section 315 of the Communications Act of 
                                                 
 25. Petition for Rulemaking at 1, Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n filed Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://ecfsdocs.fcc.gov/filings/2011/03/22/ 
6016374308.html (hereinafter MAP Petition); see also Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs and Secret 
Money: The Unregulated Shadow Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:49 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26. 
/super PACs-secret-money-campaign-finance_n_977699.html; John Yoo & David W. Marston, 
Overruling Citizens United with Chicago-Style Politics: Federal Contract Bidders Must Disclose 
Political Giving, LEGAL OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., Wash., D.C.), July 
2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/LO-2011-07-No-2-g.pdf (noting the 
significance of the proposed rule change and positing that its implementation would unduly 
expand current FEC disclosure requirements, chill political speech, and provide a powerful new 
tool for the FCC). 
 26. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 27. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 28. See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 30. See infra Part II.B. 
 31. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Political Advertisements in the Era of Fleeting Indecent Images 
and Utterances, 84 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 199, 212 (2010) (noting the survival of the Zapple 
doctrine). 
 32. See infra Part II. 
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193433 be read to incorporate ads by independent third-party groups.  Rather, 
the FCC can adapt Zapple to the modern electoral picture under its ancillary 
authority.34  Particularly when exercise of ancillary authority would 
specifically promote the congressional values behind the political-advertising 
provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, an FCC revival and adaptation 
of the Zapple principle would avoid the critiques of ancillary authority that the 
agency has encountered in the past.  
This is not to say, as some skeptics of disclosure might contend, that the 
FCC should affirmatively require broadcasters and perhaps even cable 
companies to air a rich array of political programming choices to mitigate the 
purported ill effects of manipulative advocacy advertising.  It would be both 
unwise and constitutionally questionable for the FCC to adopt affirmative 
programming obligations to induce enhanced commitments to political 
programming by broadcasters and cable operators, regardless of the repeated 
trope of television as a “vast wasteland.”35 
Part I.A provides an overview of Citizens United and its legal context. Part  
I.B discusses attempts to cabin campaign reform after Citizens United.  Part I.C 
describes the “Citizens United effect” in election contests, summarizing current 
empirical findings about the 2010 elections and describing several harms 
(other than electoral outcomes) that can be attributed to the Court’s  
campaign-finance deregulation, and addressing the 2012 presidential contest.  
Part I.D reviews the various approaches proposed by campaign-finance-reform 
advocates in response to the Citizens United line of campaign-finance cases.   
Part II describes the statutes and FCC regulations applicable to political 
advertising, addressing both legislative history and the policy question raised 
by further involving the FCC in campaign-finance matters.  Part II.A describes 
the FCC’s political advertising rules.  Part II.B focuses on the  
sponsorship-identification requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 317.  It addresses what 
an FCC-based disclosure regime might look like, tackles the desirability of an 
FCC-based donor-disclosure regime from constitutional and policy 
standpoints, and discusses the arguments to induce broadcasters’ voluntary 
adoption of donor disclosure rules.  Part II.C looks at the possible revival of an 
antidiscrimination rule like the FCC’s Zapple doctrine as a way of ensuring 
roughly equal airtime opportunities to supporters and opponents of candidates. 
It also explores whether FCC action should be grounded in § 315 itself or 
under the FCC’s ancillary authority.   
Part III.A raises the question of institutional choice, concluding that the 
Commission is an appropriate participant in the attempt to improve campaigns.  
                                                 
 33. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)). 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. See James Warren, Never Mind the ‘Vast Wasteland.’ Minow Has More to Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/us/08cncwarren.html (referring to former 
FCC Chairman Newton Minow’s now-iconic description of television). 
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Finally, Part III.B discusses the limits of FCC intervention, concluding that it 
would be unwise for the agency to impose an affirmative political-
programming obligation on broadcasters or cable operators to mitigate the 
potential skewing effects of Citizens United and the judicial rejection of 
campaign-finance reform. 
I.  CITIZENS UNITED AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Citizens United unleashed a passionate debate and apocalyptic predictions 
about the future of American politics and democracy.36  In response to the 
decision, critics predicted the expenditure of vast sums of corporate money that 
would dominate political debate and steamroll electoral outcomes.37  Many 
scholars worried that Citizens United and other developments in election law 
would result in various democratic harms arising from the hidden uses of 
concentrated wealth for partisan political purposes.38  Although some 
commentators see Citizens United as simply an incremental element in the 
Court’s dismantling of campaign-finance reform,39 most recognize that “[e]ven 
if Citizens United’s incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless has the feel of a 
final straw.”40  As summarized by election-law expert Professor Michael Kang, 
“Citizens United marks the end of campaign-finance law as we knew it.”41  
                                                 
 36. See, e.g., Donna F. Edwards, A Call to Bold Action, BOS. REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, at  
23–24 (“The Citizens United ruling will go down in history as one of the Supreme Court’s worst 
decisions—the Dred Scott of our time.”); see also Briffault, supra note 5, at 643 (characterizing 
most of the popular and academic commentary on Citizens United as “critical”). 
 37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A New 
Law to Offset Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.scotus-
blog.com/2010/01/analysis-a-new-law-to-offset-citizens-united/ (quoting President Barak 
Obama’s assertion that Citizens United “has given a green light to a new stampede of special 
interest money in our politics”); see also Michael Malone, Report: O & Os Big Beneficiaries  
of ‘10 Political Cash, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 26, 2010), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/445944-Report_O_Os_Big_Beneficiaries_of_10_Poli-
tical_Cash.php (quoting the comment that “[a]fter Citizens United, [2010] will be a highly-
caffeinated political season” that is expected to generate as much as $3 billion in political 
spending). 
 38. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text. 
 39. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 644 (“[T]he impact of Citizens United may 
ultimately have less to do with corporate spending and more with the changes the decision could 
lead to in other areas of campaign finance . . . .”). 
 40. See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
217, 217 (2010); cf. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 14) (observing that the consequences of 
the decision reach beyond the protection of corporate speech and have resulted in a new 
campaign-finance landscape). 
 41. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 14). 
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A.  Citizens United in Its Legal Context 
Federal law has regulated campaign finance in American elections since the 
early twentieth century.42  Since the 1970s, campaign finance has received 
particularly intense congressional attention,43 which resulted in two major 
statutes: the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)44 and the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which significantly 
amended the FECA.45  The BCRA, principally designed to close perceived 
gaps in the FECA,46 banned soft money fund-raising by national parties, 
federal candidates, and officeholders in federal elections, and also restricted 
issue advocacy before elections.47  A sharply divided Supreme Court upheld 
most of the BCRA’s provisions against a facial constitutional challenge in its 
2003 McConnell v. FEC decision.48 
Soon after, in a series of decisions preceding Citizens United, the Supreme 
Court began striking down various aspects of the BCRA as applied.49  In 2006, 
the Court struck down the expenditure and contribution limits in Vermont’s 
campaign-finance system in Randall v. Sorrell.50  One year later, in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), the Court reviewed an as-applied 
challenge to the BCRA’s electioneering-communication ban and issued a 
plurality opinion, which held that corporations could spend money to air  
pre-election advertisements if the ads could be interpreted as something other 
than “express advocacy” to vote for or against candidates.51  WRTL 
“effectively eviscerated McConnell” and subverted the BCRA’s ban on 
electioneering communications.52  In the 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC, the 
                                                 
 42. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 & n.1 (2011) 
(describing the 1907 Tillman Act, which Congress enacted to prohibit federally created campaign 
contributions from banks and corporations). 
 43. Id. at 3 (“[A]pproximately 900 campaign finance measures have been introduced since 
the 93[rd] Congress . . . .”). 
 44. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–435 (2006)). 
 45. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.  
§§ 431–456 (2006)); GARRETT, supra note 42, at 3. 
 46. S. REP. NO. 105–167, at 4468 (1998) (“[S]oft money spending by political party 
committees eviscerates the ability of the FECA to limit the funds contributed by individuals, 
corporations, or unions for the defect or benefit of specific candidates.”). 
 47. BCRA, sec. 101, § 323, 116 Stat. at 82–84; id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88–90. 
 48. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“In the main we uphold BCRA’s two principal, 
complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering 
communications.”), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 49. See Levitt, supra note 40, at 219–20 (discussing cases leading up to Citizens United). 
 50. 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006). 
 51. 551 U.S. 449, 456, 476 (2007). 
 52. Briffault, supra note 5, at 649–50 (“So long as they paid a little attention to the wording 
of their messages, corporations and unions were once again free to spend as much as they wanted 
on broadcast ads intended to help or harm candidates in the pre-election period.”). 
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Court rejected the BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Amendment,” which had permitted 
additional fundraising for congressional candidates competing against self-
financed opponents to help level the financial playing field.53 
Citizens United, the fourth case in this series,54 concerned section 203 of the 
BCRA, which prohibited corporations and unions from making independent 
expenditures of general treasury funds for broadcast, cable, and satellite 
“electioneering communications”55 that explicitly mentioned candidates for 
federal office and aired within thirty days of a primary election or caucus or 
within sixty days of a general election or caucus.56  In an opinion filled with 
sweeping constitutional pronouncements,57 Justice Kennedy, speaking for the 
eight-person majority, found that the BCRA’s restrictions on such independent 
                                                 
 53. 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744–49 (2008). 
 54. For the fifth decision in this series, see Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (striking down the matching-funds provision in Arizona’s 
Citizens Clean Elections Act on First Amendment grounds). 
 55. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).  
The BCRA defines an “independent expenditure” as an expenditure “expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . that is not made in concert or cooperation 
with or at the request or suggestion of such candidates, the candidate’s authorized political 
committee, as their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”  BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, sec. 211, § 301(17), 116 Stat. 81, 92–93 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 
(2006)). 
     The facts of Citizens United are as follows.  Citizens United, an ideological nonprofit group, 
produced a feature-length film called Hillary: The Movie criticizing Hillary Clinton, which the 
group sought to show in theaters during the 2008 primaries and on cable, specifically video-on-
demand.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87.  Although the movie did not explicitly advocate 
voting against Senator Clinton, it contained many negative statements, which the FEC considered, 
and the Court later held, to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy.  Id. at 890.  In 
Citizens United’s ensuing suit against the FEC, the district court sided with the FEC and held that 
the statements triggered the BCRA electioneering-communication limits on express advocacy.  
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275, 279–80 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  The Supreme Court dismissed Citizens United’s appeal 
of the district court’s denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction.  Citizens United v. FEC, 
552 U.S. 1278, 1278 (2008).  Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for the 
FEC based on the same reasoning used to denying the preliminary injunction.  Citizens United v. 
FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  The case returned to the Supreme Court in 2008.  Citizens United v. FEC, 
555 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2008).  In 2009, the Court requested supplemental briefing on whether the 
disposition of the case would require overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
which held that Michigan could ban the use of corporate funds for independent political 
expenditures, or McConnell to the extent that it upheld the facial validity of BCRA’s section 203.  
Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 654, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.  The Court issued 
its final decision on the issue in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 56. BCRA, sec. 201, § 304(f)(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 88–89 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.  
§ 434 (2006)).    
 57. See Bezanson, supra note 5, at 649–51 (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s sweeping 
pronouncements about the First Amendment were unnecessary to the result). 
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expenditures violated corporations’ First Amendment rights.58  Nevertheless, 
the Court concluded, using “exacting” scrutiny, that the BCRA’s disclaimer 
and disclosure provisions passed constitutional muster as applied because 
“disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations 
of speech.”59  Justice Kennedy’s opinion envisioned a marketplace of political 
information in which anyone—corporation or individual—might speak, and 
everyone listening would have efficient access to sufficient information to 
weigh the credibility of what was said.60   
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its view, previously articulated in the iconic 
Buckley v. Valeo, that “disclosure could be justified based on a governmental 
interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of 
election-related spending.”61  Such information “would help citizens ‘make 
                                                 
 58. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.  The majority declared that, “[w]e return to the 
principle . . . that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
corporate identity.  No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of 
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”  Id. at 913.  In reaching its conclusion, the majority 
overruled Austin and partially overruled McConnell, which had permitted limits on corporate 
independent expenditures.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 915.  Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia 
Sotomayor concurred with the majority in sustaining the disclosure provisions.  Id. at 931 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  Although “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the 
ability to speak, . . . they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ or ‘prevent anyone 
from speaking.’”  Id. at 914 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
     BCRA section 311 requires televised electioneering communications that are not funded by 
candidates to include a disclaimer identifying the person or entity “responsible for the content of 
this advertising.”  BCRA, sec. 311, § 318(d)(2), 116 Stat. at 106 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 411d (2006)).  The required disclaimer must be made “in a clearly spoken manner,” displayed 
in a “clearly readable manner” for at least four seconds, and state that a candidate or a candidate’s 
committee has not authorized the ad.  Id.  Such disclaimers must be made by any person spending 
more than $10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year, and they must 
identify the person making the expenditure, the expenditure amount, the election in question, and 
the names of certain contributors.  BCRA, sec. 207, § 304(f), 116 Stat. at 88 (codified as amended 
at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)). The Court rejected Citizens United’s claim that the disclosure requirements 
“must be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy,” thereby 
seeking to exclude issue ads, which do not necessarily advocate for a candidate, from the 
requirements.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915. 
 60. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (“The First Amendment protects political speech; and 
disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper 
way.  This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight 
to different speakers and messages.”).  Shortly after Citizens United, the Court reaffirmed its 
endorsement of disclosure in Doe v. Reed, in which it upheld a state law allowing public 
disclosure of the names of those who signed a petition in favor of Proposition 8, a referendum 
concerning gay marriage.  130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010).  The Court reiterated the importance of 
the state’s interest in “‘protect[ing] the integrity and reliability of the initiative process . . . .’”  Id. 
at 2819 (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Fund, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999)). 
 61. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)).  In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s disclosure rules regarding express advocacy on the grounds that disclosure deters 
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informed choices in the political marketplace.’”62  The Court concluded that 
disclosure would be particularly effective at informing the electorate today 
because modern technology increases the speed and accessibility of 
disclosure.63 
B.  Post-Citizens United: Attempts to Cabin Campaign Reform 
Lower court decisions after Citizens United continued the trend toward 
cabining campaign-finance reform,64 and later developments cast doubt on the 
viability of Justice Kennedy’s political vision “of a free exchange of ideas in a 
democratic marketplace, coupled with complete and instantaneous disclosure 
of campaign contributions and expenditures over the Internet.”65   
On the state front, opponents of campaign-finance reform began to target 
and challenge state disclosure laws.66  On the administrative front, the FEC 
                                                                                                                 
corruption, provides information to voters, and aids in the enforcement of other campaign-finance 
laws.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18–76. 
 62. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 197 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913).  This informational 
interest permits disclosure requirements even if the advertisement merely contains a request to 
perform a commercial transaction because “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking 
about a candidate shortly before an election.”  Id. at 915. 
 63. For the Court’s discussion of the role of modern technology, see id. at 916 (“With the 
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure . . . can provide . . . the information needed to hold 
corporations and elected officials accountable . . . . Shareholders can determine whether their 
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens 
can see whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.” (quoting 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259)). 
 64. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
contributions to PACs that themselves only make independent expenditures to advocate or oppose 
the election of federal candidates cannot be limited on an anti-corruption rationale because 
Citizens United established that “independent expenditures do not corrupt or give the appearance 
of corruption as a matter of law,” to entities that only engage in independent expenditures).  The 
contributions permitted under SpeechNow “will greatly expand the resources available to [such 
political committees] and is likely to result in an increased role for them in elections.”  Briffault, 
supra note 5, at 660–61.  Notably, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected SpeechNow’s challenge to 
the reporting requirements at issue.  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 697.  The FEC codified 
SpeechNow.org by sanctioning the super PAC, which can raise funds without constraint from 
contribution limits because it is an independent-expenditure entity.  See Kang, supra note 5 
(manuscript at 24) (citing FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2010-09 (July 22, 2010)). 
     More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, upon a motion for 
reconsideration of its previous ruling dismissing a charge for violating the ban on direct 
contributions of corporate money to candidates, relied on Citizens United to find the ban 
unconstitutional as applied under the facts.  United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85(JCC), 
2011 WL 2268063, at *2–6 (E.D. Va. June 7, 2011) (extending the Citizens United’s  
holding—that independent expenditures do not corrupt—to direct contributions to candidates). 
 65. Hasen, supra note 14. 
 66. See PR Watcher, Center for Media and Democracy Submits Amicus Brief Defending 
Campaign Disclosure Rules, PRWATCH (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/03 
/10325/center-media-and-democracy-submits-amicus-brief-defending-campaign-disclosure-rul 
(noting a Koch-funded group’s challenge, brought in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to new 
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deadlocked along partisan lines in response to an attempt by the three 
Democratic commissioners to adopt stricter disclosure rules.67  The  
agency—once criticized as “the most dysfunctional and inoperative agency in 
Washington”68—even interpreted existing disclosure rules narrowly.69   
As for outside groups, loopholes and limitations in existing election 
disclosure rules enabled strategic institutional arrangements resulting in a 
patchwork of political groups that were able to campaign and advertise with 
“dark money.”70 
                                                                                                                 
disclosure rules Wisconsin passed in the wake of Citizens United); Washington Post: Citizens 
United Decision Reverberates in Courts Across Country, DEMOCRACY 21 (May 22, 2011), 
http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BAC81D4FF-0476-4E28-B9B1-
7619D271A334%7D&DE=%7BCEAE65A4-BE66-40C3-A92F-CD54BAA4F7D6%7D 
(reporting that James Bopp, the legal architect of the Citizens United challenge, and his 
colleagues are litigating between twenty-five and thirty cases across the country, including 
challenges to state disclosure rules); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending 
Rules for Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, at A11 (noting Bopp’s explicit 
acknowledgement of his goal to dismantle disclosure rules).  But see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has 
the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and 
Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1084 (2011) (“Overwhelmingly, lower courts are 
upholding state disclosure laws [so long as] the laws capture more than tiny spenders  
and  . . . parties can assert an as-applied harassment exception to otherwise applauded disclosure 
laws.” (footnote omitted)); Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real-legacy-of-
citizens-united-case.html (noting that lower courts “embraced the ruling” in Citizens United and 
relied on it when rebutting attacks against disclosure laws). 
 67. David G. Savage & Kim Geiger, Secret Campaign Ad Financing in Offing as FEC Is 
Deadlocked, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/28/nation/la-na-
election-commission-deadlock-20110228; Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is As Good As Dead, 
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence 
/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as_dead.html. 
 68. Savage & Geiger, supra note 67 (quoting Fred Wertheimer, who was involved in the 
creation of the FEC); see also Hasen, supra note 67 (referring to the FEC “as good as dead” in 
light of the deadlock, which is “business as usual” for the agency). 
 69. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24–25 & n.128); see also TAYLOR LINCOLN & 
CRAIG HOLMAN, PUB. CITIZEN, FADING DISCLOSURE: INCREASING NUMBER OF 
ELECTIONEERING GROUPS KEEP DONORS’ IDENTITIES SECRET 4–5 (2010), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/Disclosure-report-final.pdf (discussing the FEC’s disclosure exceptions, including the 
agency’s interpretation of its rules to require disclosure only if donors earmarked their money for 
specific electioneering communications at the time of contribution).  Recently, the FEC 
unanimously approved federal-candidate and officeholder solicitations for independent, 
expenditure-only Political Action Committees (PACs).  See Lisa Rosenberg, Semi-Soft Money 
Prevails at the FEC, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 30, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://sunlight 
foundation.com/blog/2011/06/30/semi-soft-money-prevails-at-the-fec/ (“[C]andidates and elected 
officials may only ask for contributions of $5,000 or less from individuals, but the Super PACs 
are free to take unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations and labor unions.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Andy Kroll, Unmasking Dark Money Is Good for Democracy—and for the 
Bottom Line, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/09/ 
citizens-united-dark-money-corporations-disclosure (defining “dark money” as money from 
anonymous fundraisers).  For a description of “campaign finance disclosure in a nutshell,” see 
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C.  The Citizens United Effect(s) 
Although the Citizens United decision is important standing alone, the case 
also served as a catalyst for increased public attention to the broader issue of 
campaign-finance deregulation and corporate campaign involvement.71  
Professor Richard Hasen pointed to several of its troublesome factors in 
summing up the current landscape of campaign-finance reform: “Citizens 
United has not only unleashed new money into the election process; actions by 
lower courts and the FEC, combined with an inadequate disclosure regime, 
have led to a system of largely undisclosed corporate, union, and individual 
campaign contributions flooding into elections.”72 
                                                                                                                 
TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 12, at 4–5 (describing some of the confusion about loopholes in 
campaign-finance disclosure). 
     Existing campaign-finance disclosure rules are limited in both comprehensiveness and 
effectiveness.  Even entities clearly subject to reporting and disclosure requirements need not 
provide timely information; often, they do not provide details of last-minute pre-election spending 
until thirty days post-election.  GARRETT, supra note 42, at 18.  FEC analysis often causes 
significant subsequent delays to public disclosure, meaning that sometimes “final” data are not 
publicly available for some time after elections.  Id.  Moreover, because there are exemptions to 
electronic filing requirements, the public does not have convenient digital access to the full scope 
of historically filed information.  Id. 
     There are also loopholes in the FECA disclosure requirements that enable groups to be 
exempt.  See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing the categories of groups to which the 
disclosure requirements do not apply).  Some organizations registered under § 501(c)(4) through 
(6) of the Internal Revenue Code are not subject to campaign-finance disclosure requirements, so 
long as their primary purpose is not politics.  Id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).  However, this 
limitation does not prohibit all political activities.  Despite the primary-purpose limit, for 
example, the IRS has permitted 501(c)(4) social-service organizations to make political 
expenditures.  See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24–25) (citing Donald B. Tobin, Political 
Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole?”, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 
41 (2007)).  Similarly, trade associations registered under § 501(c)(6), such as the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, are not prohibited from political activities, and such trade associations have spent 
significant amounts of money on issue advertising during political campaigns.  See infra notes 
157–58 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 643, 650 (noting that although “WRTL did much of the 
real work of legally enabling corporate electioneering,” “Citizens United has gotten the public’s 
attention as the decision that opened up federal and many state elections to corporate ads 
concerning candidates”); Marian Wang, As Political Groups Push Envelope, FEC Gridlock Gives 
‘De Facto Green Light,’ PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://www.propublica.org 
/article/as-political-donors-push-envelope-fec-gridlock-gives-de-facto-green-light/single 
(discussing the polarization between Republican and Democratic groups). 
 72. See Hasen, supra note 14; see also, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25) (“[P]ost-Citizens 
United, these outside groups that engage in forthright and extensive campaigning, in the form of 
independent expenditures, operate entirely outside campaign finance regulation as it had existed 
for more than thirty years since Buckley.”); Richard L. Hasen, After the Other Shoe Drops, AM. 
INT. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1141 (discussing 
three post-Citizens United rulings that “have contributed to the precipitous decline in our 
campaign finance laws”). 
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In his first State of the Union address, President Obama spoke for many 
when he criticized the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision and predicted 
a tsunami of electioneering expenditures by corporate and special interests: 
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week, the 
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the 
floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to 
spend without limit in our elections. . . . I don’t think American 
elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, 
or worse, by foreign entities. . . . They should be decided by the 
American people.  And I’d urge Democrats and Republicans to pass 
a bill that helps to correct some of these problems.73  
Academics, too, expressed concern that Citizens United would not only lead 
to corporate dominance of political discourse,74 but also to an increase in quid 
pro quo corruption.75  These arguments all raise the empirical question of what 
effect Citizens United has had and will continue to have on elections.76   
1.  Data Regarding, and Notable Aspects of, the 2010 Elections 
Any attempt to describe the Citizens United effect empirically is limited by 
the scarcity of data.77  Because only one election cycle has passed since 
Citizens United, and a non-presidential contest at that, empirical predictions 
are risky.  Nevertheless, at least five aspects of the 2010 elections are notable. 
First, each 2010 election study shows that campaign advertising as a whole 
significantly increased, making 2010 a “record-breaking” year.78  Roughly  
                                                 
 73. Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 
2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
 74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 5, at 596; Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 11) (explaining 
corporate support for restrictions on corporate electioneering as resulting from a concern about “a 
form of extortion against deep-pocket corporations by . . . legislators”); Timothy Werner, The 
Sound, the Fury, and the Nonevent: Business Power and Market Reactions to the Citizens United 
Decision, 39 AM. POL. RES. 118, 124–25 (2011). 
 76. This Part focuses only on the question of Citizens United’s effect on elections.  It does 
not situate the decision in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment.  Although  
campaign-finance-reform proponents concluded that Citizens United tilts the balance between 
free expression and electoral integrity too far in the direction of the former, free speech and media 
interests celebrated the Court’s strong affirmation of a libertarian interpretation of the First 
Amendment.  See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 143–45 (explaining that the Citizens United opinions 
reflected a division in the Court between those who view the First Amendment as primarily 
endorsing speech as liberty and those who see it as primarily promoting speech as equality). 
 77. GARRETT, supra note 42, at 17–18 (discussing current availability of campaign-funding 
data). 
 78. See Erika Franklin Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Advertising Trends in 2010, 8 FORUM, 
2010, at 2.  According to Professors Erika Franklin Fowler and Travis Ridout, congressional 
battles led to a more than thirty-percent increase in television ad airings at an estimated cost of 
$735 million, which constitutes a sixty-one-percent increase over 2008 spending.  Id.  
Gubernatorial advertising was also “intense”; in thirty-seven gubernatorial races, 1.3 million ads 
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$4 billion was spent on federal races in 2010, which amounts to almost twice 
the cost of the 2006 midterm elections.79  Local television in 2010, a midterm 
election, garnered between $2 billion and $3 billion from political advertisers, 
approaching twice the amount spent on adds during 2008, a presidential 
election year.80  Political advertising “is soaring and is expected to grow in the 
future.”81  In fact, political advertising may be one of the few remaining 
sources that still generate significant profits for local broadcasters.82  
Following Citizens United, an estimated $400 million in additional political 
advertising was generated in 2010.83  This is not, of course, proof that Citizens 
United caused the increased spending;84 rather, it is important as a measure of 
the size of the problem to be addressed. 
Second, the evidence indicates that the number of new advocacy groups, 
such as super political action committees (super PACs), has mushroomed since 
2010.85  Although nominally independent from candidates, many of these 
                                                                                                                 
aired at an estimated cost of $697 million.  Id.  The total volume and cost of advertising for House 
and Senate races each increased by about fifty percent.  Id. at 3; Election Stats: 2010, 
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010 (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2011). 
 79. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 26–27). 
 80. STEVEN WALDMAN, WORKING GRP. ON INFO. NEEDS OF CMTYS., THE INFORMATION 
NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND  
AGE 75–76 (2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/The_Information_ 
Needs_of_Communities.pdf; see also Joel Connelly, Karl Rove, Koch Brothers—on Your TV, in 
Your Mailbox, SEATTLEPI (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/article/Karl-
Rove-Koch-Brothers-on-your-TV-in-your-1045421.php (reporting that “$47 million worth of TV 
spots aired on local TV stations in the 2010 ‘off-year’ election”). 
 81. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 75. 
 82. See Michael Malone, PEJ Study: 2010 Was a Good Year for Stations, Grim Trends  
and All, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/465205-PEJ_Study_2010_Was_a_Good_Year_For_ 
Stations_Grim_Trends_and_All.php (noting that the increase in total revenue for stations in 2010 
was driven by “around $2.2 billion in political [with] 73% of the political spend [going to] TV 
stations”). 
 83. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 75 (citing a Borrell Associates estimate). 
 84. The literature does not appear to contain a careful statistical analysis of the many 
variables that would have to be addressed to make a persuasive causation claim.  Because the data 
discussed represent all broadcast advertising during the election, including ads aired during 
periods outside the BCRA regulatory framework, determining causation would require, at a 
minimum, disaggregating and refining the data for comparative purposes.  Moreover, important 
developments other than Citizens United occurred around the 2010 elections.  A study of the 
increased spending would have to address whether some of the hike was driven by the Tea Party, 
which became a new and vocal electoral participant during this period.  The spending increase 
could also have been due to the breakdown in disclosure requirements rather than the Citizens 
United decision.  I am very grateful to Professor Robinson for these points. 
 85. See Dan Eggen, New Breed of ‘Super PACs,’ Other Independent Groups Could Define 
2012 Campaign, WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-breed-
of-super-pacs-other-independent-groups-could-define-2012-ampaign/2011/06/29/gHQAo47FyH 
_story.html (“Dozens of super PACs and nonprofit groups have sprung up over the past  
year . . . .”); Dave Levinthal, 2011 Sees Super PAC Explosion, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:26 
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groups are able to coordinate informally and signal their campaign strategies.86  
They are also becoming more professional than ever before.87  Not to be 
outdone by influential Republican advocacy groups like American Crossroads 
and Crossroads GPS, both associated with Karl Rove, Democrats also began 
generating entities to support Democratic candidates.88  Reportedly, although 
Democrats had widely criticized Citizens United when the decision was issued, 
Democratic activists now agree that Democratic advocacy groups must be 
more involved in the 2012 elections.89  Despite President Obama’s criticism of 
                                                                                                                 
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65310.html (noting that super PACs have been 
“forming at a rate of about one per day”); see also Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27) (“The 
biggest change in campaign finance in 2010 was the involvement of outside groups.”); Barker & 
Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the various types of groups, such as 501(c)(4) tax-exempt 
organizations, 527 groups, and super PACs). 
 86. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25–26) (questioning the independence of such 
groups); Blumenthal, supra note 25 (noting that super PACs backing specific candidates are 
“routinely run by former staffers or close associates of the candidates,” and that although they are 
“technically not allowed to coordinate with campaigns or parties, . . . candidates can get involved 
in the fundraising”); Dan Froomkin, Candidate-Specific Super PACs Offer End Run For Maxed-
Out Donors: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/10/04/candidate-specific-super-pacs-donors_n_994260.html (noting that “candidate-
specific super PACs are being used to end-run traditional campaign contribution limits” and 
quoting the view of the president of Democracy 21 that “[t]he presidential candidate super PAC 
exists for one reason: to serve as an arm of the presidential campaign for big-money donors to 
launder unlimited contributions”). 
 87. Reid Wilson, Outside Groups Deflate Obama’s Bully Pulpit, ATLANTIC, July 7, 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/07/outside-groups-deflate-obamas-bullypulpit/ 
241569/#. 
 88. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11; see also Jack Gillum, Democratic Group Founded 
by Former Obama Aides Raises $5 Million to Counter GOP-Leaning Ads, STAR TRIB., July 31, 
2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/126485298.html (discussing the creation of a 
Democratic outside group to parry Republican groups); Eduardo Porter, Editorial, How the Big 
Money Finds a Way In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
09/18/opinion/sunday/how-the-big-money-finds-a-way-in.html (discussing Democrats’ donations 
to an independent group called Priorities USA Action). 
 89. Michael Luo, Effort to Set Up Liberal Counterweight to G.O.P. Groups Begins, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A18–19 (describing “prominent Democratic political operative” David 
Brock’s attempts to “raise money for Democratic-oriented media efforts” through a new 
organization, American Bridge, as well as Media Matters Action Network, Brock’s other 
nonprofit organization, “which tracks conservative politicians and advocacy organizations”); see 
also Gerken, supra note 17, at 1157 (“[T]he parties will find a way to even things out.  I would be 
stunned if the Democrats don’t catch up substantially on this front [corporate independent 
spending] next year.”); Jim Rutenberg, New Liberals Offer Donors a Cash Cloak, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2011, at A3 (discussing the importance of liberal groups’ involvement in coordinating an 
attack against conservative groups); Julian Brookes, Why the 2012 Election Will Be the Most 
Expensive Ever, ROLLING STONE (June 7, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com 
/politics/blogs/national-affairs/why-the-2012-election-will-be-the-most-expensive-ever-20110607 
(identifying new Democratic political groups and discussing outside groups’ potential impact on 
the high anticipated expenses of the 2012 election); Steven Greenhouse, A Campaign Finance 
Ruling Turned to Labor’s Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com 
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Citizens United and outside support groups in the 2008 election campaign, 
even the White House has signaled a change in the administration’s position,90 
and conservative groups have attacked this “about-face.”91   
Third, although some researchers suggest that the overall increase in 2010 
campaign expenditures may be the most significant result of Citizens United,92 
other observers have concluded baldly that “Citizens United led to even greater 
spending by corporate-funded outside groups than political observers 
expected.”93  A Congressional Research Service report suggests that “new 
donors and groups with access to previously restricted funds may be a potent 
force in future campaigns.”94  Although overall independent-group advertising 
in the 2010 elections might not have been unprecedented in the history of 
television politics, it was certainly extensive, with one source asserting that 
outside groups spent almost $300 million.95  Empirical studies from the 
independent Wesleyan Media Project reveal significant increases in  
interest-group advertising, particularly in House races.96  Moreover, the most 
expensive and most competitive races experienced extensive increases in 
                                                                                                                 
/2011/09/26/us/politics/a-campaign-finance-ruling-turned-to-laborsadvantage.html?ref=campaign 
finance (describing labor unions’ response to Citizens United). 
 90. Luo, supra note 89, at A19 (“White House officials have signaled in recent weeks that 
the Obama administration would not object to Democratic-leaning outside groups getting 
involved in the 2012 elections. . . . But they have also indicated that they would prefer that the 
names of donors be disclosed.”). 
 91. Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Knocks Obama for Campaign Finance Hypocrisy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/30/ 
citizens-united-knocks-obama-campaign-finance_n_887557.html?new=screen.html. 
 92. Raymond J. La Raja, Will Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to 
Corporations? 3 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642175 (concluding that although Citizens United will likely 
increase business-group independent spending, particularly on behalf of Republican candidates, it 
will also create a spending “arms race” and increase election-related spending by all groups). 
 93. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1; see also Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2011) (asserting that money spent by Republican outside groups 
“yielded” success).  But see Gerken, supra note 17, at 1157 (“[W]e don’t really know whether 
Citizens United has opened the corporate floodgates.”). 
 94. GARRETT, supra note 42, at 15. 
 95. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27) (citing Congressional Campaigns: Half of 
Outside Spending in Campaigns Came from Groups Not Revealing Donors, BNA MONEY & POL. 
REP., Nov. 12, 2010); see also Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Party Spending Doubled 
in 2010 But Did Not Dictate the Results (Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter CFI Press Release], available 
at http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-11-05/Non-Party_Spending_Doubled_But_Did_Not 
_Dictate_Results.aspx (discussing the increase in independent expenditures). 
 96. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 2–3 (“Independent groups saw the biggest jump in 
both the volume of ads paid for and the estimated cost of such advertising . . . increas[ing] their 
share of total advertising in House races from around 5 percent in 2008 to over 13 percent in 
2010, while the share of ads sponsored by candidates declined by almost 7 percentage points.”).  
Although the “jump [was] not as dramatic” for Senate as for House races, both the volume and 
cost of independent-sponsored ads noticeably increased.  Id. at 3. 
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independent-ad spending.97  The extent of independent spending varied 
depending on the race; however, it exceeded twenty-three percent in several 
media markets, and in at least one instance in a gubernatorial fight, interest 
groups sponsored more ads than either of the candidates.98  Additionally, 
outside interest groups’ participation was largely concentrated, according to 
some.99  Public Citizen pointed out that only ten groups were responsible for 
more than forty-seven percent of the outside money spent on advertising in 
2010.100  Despite all the data on increased independent spending, determining 
the effect of third-party group advertising on electoral results in the 2010 
elections has been difficult.101  
Fourth, Wesleyan Media Project researchers found a shift in the character of 
independent political ads.  Notably, overall political advertising in the 2010 
midterm elections was generally much more negative in tone than in the recent 
past, and independent ads were extensively negative.102  This stands in marked 
contrast to the history of independent ads in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
“when about three quarters of ads from interest groups were positive.”103  In 
sum, negativity has been on the rise this decade, and the evidence points 
toward an electoral environment dominated by interest groups with negative 
messages in the future.104 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 7 (noting that ads from independent groups accounted for over twenty percent of 
the ads in the post-September 1st period in the four most expensive House races and ranged 
greatly—from three to forty percent—in the most expensive Senate races). 
 98. Id.  In Wisconsin, interest groups accounted for forty-three percent of ads, which is 
more than either candidate for governor.  Id. at 8; see also Michael M. Franz, Erika Franklin 
Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Citizens United and Campaign Advertising in 2010, at 6 (2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 99. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 100. Id. (cataloguing, in order of decreasing expenditures, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
American Crossroads, American Action Network, Inc., Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies, 
American Future Fund, Americans for Job Security (AJS), SEIU COPE, American Federation of 
State County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, 60 Plus Association, and the National Rifle 
Association of America Political Victory Fund). 
 101. See Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles in House 
Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at P6; see also Michael M. Franz, The Citizens United 
Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?, 8 FORUM, 2010, at 1, 16; La Raja, supra note 92, at 23–25. 
 102. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 10–11.  In 2010, 53.5% of ads aired after August 
were “purely” negative, with another 20.5% consisting of “contrast ads” comparing the 
opponents, and only 26% being “purely positive.”  Id. at 10.  In addition, there was “a dramatic 
difference in ad tone depending on sponsor.”  Id. at 11 (finding party-sponsored ads to be the 
most negative (at ninety-six percent) and independent-group ads to be eighty-seven percent “pure 
attack ads”). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; Nicholas Confessore, Without ‘Super PAC’ Numbers, Campaign Filings Present an 
Incomplete Picture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/politics 
/campaign-finance-filings-present-an-incomplete-picture.html (discussing strategic uses of super 
PACs that support individual candidates to run negative ads while the candidates themselves 
focus on positive messages). 
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Fifth, these empirical findings, although significant in themselves, are even 
more consequential given the rampant non-disclosure of donors by 
independent outside groups.  Some groups structured under the Internal 
Revenue Code can participate in politics so long as such participation is not 
their primary purpose, but are not required to reveal their donors.105  According 
to one source, groups that do not disclose their contributors spent an estimated 
$138 million of the $300 million total spent in 2010.106  The Center for 
Responsive Politics reports that over forty-five percent of outside spending, not 
including party committee spending, did not disclose donors.107  Of the top ten 
outside spending groups identified by Public Citizen, seven, which accounted 
for almost seventy-four percent of the total expenditures, did not disclose their 
donors.108  With respect to PACs, which are formally required to disclose their 
donors, some fail to comply, presumably because they are confident that the 
FEC’s enforcement efforts will be inefficient, ineffective, and ultimately just a 
cost of doing business.109  Furthermore, even with groups that do comply, 
disclosures generally are not publicly available without some significant time 
lags.110  The usefulness of these disclosures, even if timely, is undermined 
when the donors are structured as nonprofit organizations exempt from 
disclosure, such as 501(c)(4)s, which leads to the mere illusion of disclosure 
and informational dead ends.111  Presumably, numerous practical reasons exist 
for electioneering groups not to disclose their donors, including privacy and 
the desire to keep their political commitments secret.112  In addition, however, 
concealed donations allow groups to “make corporate-funded effort appear to 
be grassroots.”113 
                                                 
 105. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing and highlighting certain 501(c) 
organizations as “[t]he invisibles,” such as Americans for Prosperity, a supporter of the Tea Party 
whose cofounder is one of the billionaire Koch brothers, who are “credited with pioneering some 
of the bolder new campaign fundraising tactics”). 
 106. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9 
(claiming that over forty percent of the money spent by outside groups came from ten entities). 
 107. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside 
spending/index.php?cycle=2010&view=A&chart=N (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). 
 108. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
 109. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing fines paid by 527 groups (PACs) for 
sham issue ads after the 2004 election); cf. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names 
Remain Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at A1, A19 (describing FEC’s and 
IRS’s lack of enforcement). 
 110. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (“[B]ecause of time lags in reporting, months can go 
by before the identities of million-dollar donors are revealed; some weren’t disclosed until after 
the 2010 midterm elections.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (describing why groups prefer to donate anonymously—sometimes to “shield 
corporations from blowback when supporting controversial causes”). 
 113. Id.; see also Confessore, supra note 104 (explaining that because most super PACs will 
be required to disclose their contribution and expenditure reports for the first time only on 
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Notably, undisclosed donor spending by outside groups greatly increased in 
the 2010 elections, with one study showing that the percentage of such 
spending rose from one percent to forty-seven percent since the 2006 midterm 
elections.114  Nearly all groups making electioneering communications in the 
2004 and 2006 elections disclosed the identities of their donors.115  By 
contrast, the percentage of groups disclosing their electioneering 
communications dropped to 49.3% in the 2008 election cycle and 31.8% in the 
2010 cycle, as of September 2nd.116  Groups that failed to disclose any donor 
information in the 2010 election cycle collectively spent roughly double the 
grand total spent by outside groups in the 2006 cycle.117  The apparent trend 
shows increases both in spending and non-disclosure. 
Tracking down outside groups’ donor lists becomes difficult if they do not 
disclose the information adequately.118  Although “enterprising journalists” 
have “tried to fulfill the role of following the money when possible,”119 their 
efforts to unearth information have been unable to substitute reliably for 
information fully disclosed by the groups themselves.120   
                                                                                                                 
January 31, 2012, a complete picture of the spending on the presidential race will not be available 
until after the election). 
 114. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens 
-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html (reporting on a Center for 
Responsive Politics study). 
 115. LINCOLN & HOLMAN, supra note 69, at 1. 
 116. Id.  Although groups making independent expenditures made more disclosures in 2010, 
the percentage was still much lower compared to past elections. TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN, 
DISCLOSURE ECLIPSE: NEARLY HALF OF OUTSIDE GROUPS KEPT DONORS SECRET IN 2010; TOP 
10 GROUPS REVEALED SOURCES OF ONLY ONE IN FOUR DOLLARS SPENT 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Eclipsed-Disclosure11182010.pdf; see also PUB. CITIZEN, 
supra note 3, at 10–11 (noting the significant decrease in disclosure by groups making 
electioneering communications in 2008 after the decision in WRTL). 
 117. LINCOLN, supra note 116, at 3. 
 118. Hasen, supra note 14 (highlighting one investigator’s experience looking into an outside 
group’s donors, which led him to “P.O. boxes and unanswered emails”); see also Barker & Wang, 
supra note 11 (discussing the practice of hiding true donors by funneling contributions to super 
PACS through 501(c)(4)s, which are not required to disclose their donors). 
 119. Hasen, supra note 14; see also Mike McIntyre, The Secret Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
2, 2010, at 1, 6 (describing a reporter’s attempt to track down the members of the “Coalition to 
Protect Seniors”); Liz Cox Barrett, NYT Noses Around, Still Knows Nothing, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/nyt_noses_around_ 
still_knows_n.php. 
 120. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 119, at 1, 6 (“At any rate, it is clearly going to take a lot 
more [for journalists] to see through an organization that is about as transparent as a dirty 
diaper.”). 
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2.  Drawing Conclusions About the Citizens United Effect on the 2010 
Elections 
The data from the 2010 election cycle raise questions as to the effect of 
Citizens United on electoral results and expenditure patterns.  The first 
question is whether the expenditure patterns post-Citizens United had direct 
effects on electoral outcomes.  Some observers concluded that outside groups’ 
spending had a significant impact on election results.121  However, others have 
found to the contrary.122  Because the current political science literature fails to 
provide definitive answers, determining the influence of interest-group ads on 
voters choice is very tricky.123  One political scientist concluded that 
“[e]mpirical evidence of any systematic impact of corporate campaign 
spending on electoral outcomes is weak or mixed at best.”124  Yet others in the 
field observed a shift “toward the position that there are moderate campaign 
effects on voter knowledge, preference, and even behavior.”125 
A Wesleyan Media Project study shows that Republicans in the 2010 
midterm elections “outperformed most of the election forecasting models built 
on factors external to campaigns.”126 Political scientists attempting to isolate 
                                                 
 121. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12 (basing this conclusion on the fact that, in 
sixty of the seventy-five congressional contests involving a change in partisan power, outside 
group spending favored the victor, and in the six such Senate races, supporters of the victors 
outspent the loser by an average of $2.7 million). 
 122. See, e.g., CFI Press Release, supra note 95 (examining House and Senate races before 
concluding that “non-party spending doubled in 2010 but did not dictate the results”). 
 123. See Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and 
Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (2010) (noting the dearth of 
understanding about the relationships among campaign financing, campaign activities, and 
political outcomes in the legal literature). 
 124. Susan Clark Muntean, Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-
Citizens United Era, 13 BUS. & POL., no. 1, 2010 at 1.  The complexity of connection between 
campaign contributions and political influence does not preclude the possibility that political 
advertising messages have at least some influence on voter decisions.  See Sheff, supra note 123, 
at 154–54 (discussing the potential effect of political advertising). 
 125. Sheff, supra note 123, at 152 (footnote omitted).  Professor Jeremy Sheff recounts that 
Campaign messages do appear to increase voter information, particularly among voters 
with the least background political knowledge—the “civic slackers” benefit most in 
informational terms.  Campaign ads also appear to affect voter attitudes toward 
candidates.  In particular, political advertising appears to have the ability to implant 
emotional or affective attitudes toward its sponsors and subjects, though the positive or 
negative tenor of the ads can determine the polarity of these attitudes.  Significantly, 
repeated exposure to a candidate’s campaign advertisements appears to moderately but 
consistently strengthen positive attitudes toward the candidate, though the tone of the 
advertisement may influence its effects. . . . [I]t is far less clear whether or how these 
effects translate into different voting behaviors or political  
outcomes. . . .[Nevertheless,] empirical research . . . is moving . . . toward a more 
rigorous demonstration of aggregate spending effects.  However, it should be noted that 
the size of these effects, while statistically significant, is relatively small . . . . 
Id. at 152–55 (footnotes omitted). 
 126. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 1. 
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the effect of independent-group ad spending in 2010 suggest “the potential for 
interest group advertising to have been decisive in several races across the 
country, shifting the balance from one in which viewers saw more  
pro-Democratic ads on their television screens to one in which viewers saw 
more pro-Republican ads aired.”127  
It might be concluded, from the overall data, that the Citizens United effect, 
although measurable, was not of overwhelming significance.  However, that 
view would not adequately account for the broader consequences of 
independent-expenditure deregulation.  Although disagreement exists 
concerning the effect of the decision on electoral outcomes, Citizens United 
“has profoundly affected the nation’s political landscape.”128 
With regard to the overall increase in campaign ad spending, for example, 
there is a question whether such spending by third-party groups led to 
message-repetition effects on voters’ political views.129  In light of 2010’s rise 
in political advertising, it is likely that “many voters, whether they liked it or 
not, were undoubtedly exposed to more campaign information than in previous 
election cycles.”130  Although some political scientists draw the conclusion that 
such voters were “more likely to make informed choices at the ballot box,”131 
others emphasize the degree to which the great majority of voters rely on 
heuristic cues to prompt their votes rather than absorbing and analyzing 
substantive issue information.132  Repetition enhances voter responses to 
heuristic cues, which permits groups with the ability to repeat campaign 
messages to influence elections regardless of the truthfulness of their 
messages.133  Failure to disclose ad sponsorships and sponsor groups’ 
ideological affiliations may further exacerbate the cognitive problem for 
voters.134  Furthermore, because repetition of messages apparently leads people 
                                                 
 127. Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8. 
 128. MacColl, supra note 114. 
 129. See Sheff, supra note 123, at 160–61. 
 130. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 14. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 123, at 158–60; Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral 
Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 687–91 (2010) (using behavioral science to address the impact of 
campaign messages on voters); see also Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: 
Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1141, 1157–58 (2003) (explaining that voters use interest-group endorsements as heuristic cues in 
issue elections). 
 133. Sheff, supra note 123, at 160–63 (explaining that repetition of campaign messages has 
been found to increase the susceptibility of uninformed voters to believing false information, a 
phenomenon experimental psychologists have found to be an “illusory truth effect,” where 
repetition of a proposition strengthens the impression that it is true and widely believed to be true, 
regardless of its actual truth). 
 134. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1158–59 (describing the impact of difficulties voters 
encounter when trying to discern the political affiliations of interest groups with purposefully 
obscure names); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9 (contending that almost eighty percent 
2011] Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform 119 
to believe in the credibility of their source, voters may be more likely to 
attribute veiled ads to credible sources if the ads are repeated.135  Therefore, 
voters might assume the credibility of the nominal sponsor and all of its ads, 
and have no reason to assess the credibility of the ad’s true sponsor.136  This 
misdirected assumption of credibility can have significant consequences in 
today’s recommendation-based Facebook culture, in which a single voter’s 
views can be greatly amplified by repetition across many affinity networks. 
By allowing corporations to advocate expressly for or against particular 
candidates, rather than masking such advocacy in issue-oriented language, 
Citizens United may have enhanced the effectiveness of political messages by 
making them easier to decode.137  Although one could argue that voters are 
able to discern which candidates are being implicitly recommended even in 
“sham” issue ads—those communications purporting merely to ask voters to 
contact a candidate about an issue138—the voting cue is nevertheless easier to 
pick up when it is explicit.139 
As demonstrated in the midterm elections, interest groups were able to get 
involved early and “shape the playing field.”140  Whatever the reality, the 
                                                                                                                 
of the outside-group spending in the 2010 elections “was spent by groups that accepted 
contributions larger than $5000 . . . or that did not reveal any information about the sources of 
their money”). 
 135. Sheff, supra note 123, at 161–62; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The 
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 831–32 (describing the 
“availability heuristic,” which “means that individuals are likely to believe something if it is 
repeated often enough”). 
 136. See Lidsky, supra note 135, at 828–33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing 
the findings of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, which explain that people make 
decisions with bounded rationality and rely on heuristics or “mental shortcuts”); Sheff, supra note 
123, at 161–162; cf. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 997–98 (2005) (“[M]essages derive their persuasive powers not only from 
their content and the quality of their supporting argumentation. . . . Individuals process persuasive 
messages by taking into account a variety of factors, including source, message, recipient, and 
context.  The degree to which a message, or the beliefs or attitudes expressed therein, finds 
acceptance will vary significantly depending on who delivers the message, who receives it, and 
the context in which the communication occurs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 137. Marisa Guthrie, Campaign Finance Ruling Could Spell Political-Ad Windfall, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/4 
45390-Campaign_Finance_Ruling_Could_Spell_Political_Ad_Windfall.php?rssid=20069. 
 138. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and 
Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Disclosure Laws, 16 
CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 66 (2011) (distinguishing “sham issue ads (ads that avoid[] the[] magic 
words [of vote for or against], but were nonetheless intended to influence the election) from 
genuine issue ads (ads that express no opinion on a public issue)” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 139. See Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8; see also Walker Wilson, supra note 
132, at 689 (describing how many voters tend to rely on scant information and cursory analysis of 
that information). 
 140. Luo & Palmer, supra note 101, at P6 (quoting a strategist for a Republican-oriented 
group); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 2 (“[W]inning candidates were helped more (or 
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publicity given Citizens United may have led to a public perception that 
“interest group ads were a decisive factor in the overall outcome.”141  
Researchers with the Wesleyan Media Project conclude, very preliminarily and 
with methodological caveats, that “interest group advertising may be 
influential both by influencing the overall outcome but also in shaping 
perceptions of the race.”142  Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Citizens 
United effect is that some Republicans ironically agreed with reformist critics 
that the ability to raise unlimited contributions, coupled with early 
involvement, proved to be quite influential.143  The influence on people’s 
perceptions is significant not only for its possible effects on voters’ future 
electoral decisions, but because it is likely to increase the power of interest 
groups and lobbyists in Congress.144 
The inflated spending for negative ads by outside groups in 2010 may have 
yet another effect.145  Research shows that attack ads generate voter 
disaffection, even as they provide policy information.146  Negativity of political 
ads is apparently likely to increase cynicism, especially among the non-aligned 
voters whom both sides aim to persuade.147 
                                                                                                                 
harmed less) by outside spending than their opponents in 80 percent of the congressional races in 
which power changed hands from Democratic to Republican control or vice versa.”). 
 141. Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8. 
 142. Id. at 17. 
 143. See, e.g., Luo & Palmer, supra note 101, at P6 (quoting advocate groups). 
 144. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12–16; see also Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” 
Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39 (“The Court has given lobbyists . . . a nuclear 
weapon.”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html (“A 
lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company, labor union or interest 
group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election. . . . The decision 
seeks to let voters choose for themselves among a multitude of voices and ideas when they go to 
the polls, but it will also increase the power of organized interest groups at the expense of 
candidates and political parties.”); cf. PUB. CITIZEN, CAUSE FOR CONCERN: MORE THAN 40% OF 
HILL STAFFERS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC CITIZEN SURVEY SAY LOBBYISTS WIELD MORE POWER 
BECAUSE OF CITIZENS UNITED 3 (2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Cause-
for-Concern.pdf (discussing congressional staffers’ fear of retaliation against politicians who 
displease lobbyists); Gerken, supra note 17, at 1165–68 (suggesting that the next front for 
campaign-finance reform focus on lobbying). 
 145. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 14. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  Admittedly, there is disagreement in the empirical literature regarding the precise 
effects of negative advertising.  See Luciana Carraro & Luigi Castelli, The Implicit and Explicit 
Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: Is the Source Really Blamed?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 617, 
618–19 (2010) (discussing some of the different views). 
     If the 2010 election cycle simply had reflected an increase in the number of negative ads in the 
wake of Citizens United, without material change in the ratio of positive to negative ads, then the 
increased negativity could have been attributed to increased spending for ads overall, rather than 
any additional Citizens United effect.  Cf. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 10 (observing that 
claims of increased negativity follow every election).  Notably, however, the Wesleyan Media 
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3.  Corporate Interest (or Disinterest) in Excessive Political Spending 
Supporters of Citizens United and campaign-finance deregulation in general 
use the 2010 election data to argue that corporate money did not “flood” the 
election and that the hysterical predictions of corporate electoral speech 
causing harm were proven wrong.148  Analysts have explained that 
corporations lack incentives to engage in large-scale, one-sided political 
advertising as a result of Citizens United because such efforts would risk 
alienating their customers and other constituencies.149  Instead, these analysts 
expect corporations to follow “prudentially pusillanimous policies,”150 thereby 
shying away from political statements through hefty contributions.151  The 
additional fear of sparking a “spending arms race,” in which competing 
                                                                                                                 
Project’s empirical evidence suggests that increased spending resulted in an increase in the 
relative percentage of negative to positive ads after Citizens United.  Id. 
 148. See, e.g., Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 5. 
 149. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big 
Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 655–59 (2011); 
see also Kang, supra note 5 (noting that “corporate money, as far as we can tell, accounted for 
only a small percentage of federal campaign spending in 2010”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 144 (“In 
practice, major publicly held corporations like Microsoft or General Electric are unlikely to spend 
large sums of money on campaign commercials, for fear of alienating investors, customers and 
other public officials.”).  But see Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and 
Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 
633–34 (2010) (noting uncertainty in whether corporations will use their rights under Citizens 
United to “flood the airwaves,” but commenting that the prospect is troubling). 
     During the 2010 election season, New York City’s public advocate reportedly elicited 
promises from a significant number of major corporations that they would publicly pledge 
“campaign-finance austerity” and not ramp up their political spending.  Suzy Khimm, Bill de 
Blasio: Citizens United Avenger, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:00 AM PDT), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/bill-de-blasio-citizens-united-avenger. 
 150. Epstein, supra note 149, at 653; Wert, Gaddie & Bullock, supra note 5, at 726–27 
(noting the risks involved in undertaking political action); Guthrie, supra note 137 (quoting a 
media analyst questioning whether “you’re going to see big corporations plunking down a bunch 
of money for political advertising”). 
     Target, for example, contributed to an independent group that aired ads in support of an  
anti-gay gubernatorial candidate, inciting a call to boycott its stores and precipitating a public 
apology by the firm’s CEO.  Epstein, supra note 149, at 657–68.  Many point to Target’s story as 
evidence that a corporation’s potentially controversial political spending could be inhibited even 
in the post-Citizens United environment.  Id.  Indeed, at least one source suggests that Target did 
not immediately recover from the political-donation scandal.  Suzy Khimm, Is Target Still Paying 
the Price for Citizens United?, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:56 AM PDT), 
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/09/target-paying-price-citizens-united. 
     To the extent that corporations’ likely approaches to ad expenditures can be predicted from 
their political-contribution histories, it is notable that for-profit corporations typically contribute 
to both Democrats and Republicans.  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance 
Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 324 (describing the corporate “hedging” strategy of 
contributing money to both sides). 
 151. Epstein, supra note 149, at 657 (“[C]orporations want to spend their money where it 
matters to them: on particular legislation where they hope to gain influence while flying below 
the radar.”). 
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advocacy groups would arguably lobby corporations for funding, might also 
discourage corporations from ramping up their political spending.152  Indeed, 
according to some public-choice theorists, corporations might prefer 
campaign-finance regulation to a deregulated environment, in which legislators 
might extort their financial participation.153 
Although these generalizations are plausible, in reality, corporations have 
long spent money on political races, and increases in corporate political 
expenditures are expected in the post-Citizens United era.154  Moreover, the 
spending behavior of family-owned or founder-led private companies may 
differ from the expected behavior of widely held public firms.155  Even if 
                                                 
 152. See Khimm, supra note 150.  But see MONICA YOUN, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y, 
CITIZENS UNITED: THE AFTERMATH 3–7 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default 
/files/ACS_Issue_Brief_Youn_Citizens_United.pdf (arguing that Citizens United encourages 
corporations to engage in a corporate influence-bidding arms race, in which reluctant corporations 
involve themselves in electoral politics “to maintain access to and avoid retribution from elected 
officials” by contributing more than competing corporations). 
 153. Cf. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, 
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 46–59 (1997) (discussing the potential for political extortion of 
corporations). 
 154. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 647–50 (noting the ways in which corporations 
“deploy[ed] considerable amounts of money in elections” even before Citizens United).  For 
example, although many political contests involve large amounts of money, there are many 
congressional races that are neither highly publicized nor heavily funded. See Congressional 
Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/races/index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 
2011).  There are also local and state elections, in which corporations with particular legislative 
agendas could expect their expenditures to have more effect than on the national stage.  
Additionally, although corporations may be more likely to spend their money lobbying for or 
against legislation of particular relevance to their corporate interests, rather than spending 
significant capital on elections concerned with issues in which they do not have a “distinctive 
position,”  Epstein, supra note 149, at 657, those two categories are not always distinct.  In 
addition, a recent application of game theory to corporate political expenditures supports the 
intuitive sense that corporations will spend more money on independent expenditures post-
Citizens United.  See Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1127–32 (2011) (concluding, based on an 
application of the classic game-theory prisoner’s dilemma scenario, that “Citizens United has 
established an environment that exacerbates the pressure on corporations to participate politically 
through independent expenditures” by effectively coercing rational corporations into making 
political expenditures so that they maintain a comparative advantage in political influence over 
other corporations).  This conclusion, of course, is predicated on a number of assumptions, 
including the premise that corporations all compete, and do not collude, for political influence. 
 155. See Luo & Strom, supra note 109, at A19 (noting that in contrast to “the big name 
companies remaining” on the sidelines, small- to medium-size, privately held companies “are 
jumping in,” albeit mostly through 501(c) organizations).  Scholarship concerning corporate 
political donations has largely focused on publicly held companies, thereby neglecting some of 
the largest political contributors.  Muntean, supra note 124, at 2.  A recent study of pre-Citizens 
United corporate contributions to political organizations, not limited to publicly held firms, found 
a “robust relationship between principal-owner presence and political activity,” suggesting that 
family or founder-controlled firms are more likely to make political contributions.  Id. at 5.  
Professor Susan Muntean identifies multiple private entities making political contributions, such 
as Koch Industries, Marmon Group, United Dairy Farmers, A.G. Spanos, Avalon Capital Group, 
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corporations ultimately decline to air political ads, the mere ability to do so is 
undoubtedly a powerful weapon, the use of which would be virtually 
impossible to discover.156 
Most importantly, corporations are likely to contribute money indirectly for 
political advertising through trade associations, such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, so long as their contributions are not publicly disclosed.157  This 
anonymity helps to neutralize corporate concerns about alienating not only 
their customers, but also shareholders who might object to the contributions.158  
Thus, data suggesting that corporations reported only a relatively small amount 
of independent expenditures in 2010 federal races do not disprove the 
significant effect of Citizens United and campaign-finance deregulation.159 
4.  Spending Predictions for the 2012 Presidential Election Cycle 
The 2012 presidential contest will be an important testing ground for the 
changes in campaign-finance regulation captured by the metaphoric Citizens 
                                                                                                                 
Amway, and various hedge funds.  Id. at 2.  She speculates that such entities are more politically 
active because they “are pursuing a longer term and more proactive relational strategy with the 
political parties, while independently managed firms and their executives pursue a reactionary, 
post hoc or transactional CPA [corporate political action] strategy.”  Id. at 5.  Such a strategy can 
also explain indirect contributions to independent political groups; Muntean argues that “the 
strategy of making independent expenditures to influence public opinion suggests that  
principal-owners are selecting a constituency-building strategy and an entrepreneurial approach to 
political action.  Id. at 9. 
 156. See YOUN, supra note 152, at 7. 
 157. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 144 (“[W]ealthy individuals and companies might 
contribute to trade associations, groups like the Chamber of Commerce or the National Rifle 
Associations, or other third parties that could run commercials.”); see also TORRES-SPELLISCY, 
supra note 12, at 3 (noting that corporations avoid direct political spending by contributing to 
intermediaries, such as 501(c) organizations); Briffault, supra note 5, at 645 (discussing the need 
for obtaining records of not only the “spender of record,” but also the entities contributing to the 
organizations in order to have effective disclosure); Ron A. Schotland, The Post-Citizens United 
Fantasy-Land, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 753 (2011) (“Corporate actors have 
traditionally used trade associations and charitable associations as vehicles to shape political 
debate and engage in advocacy.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 138, at 89–91. 
 158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  Information from companies that disclose 
their political spending is suggestive of the possibilities.  The Los Angeles Times reports that 
PACs operated by Prudential Financial, for example, gave only $218,230 to candidates and other 
committees in 2010, but contributed more than $2.2 million for lobbying and other political 
purposes to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other trade groups.  Noam N. Levey & Kim 
Geiger, Much Corporate Political Spending Stays Hidden, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/23/nation/la-na-money-politics-survey-20110424 (noting that 
a “[c]ompany giving to trade associations for political campaigns can dwarf direct donations to 
candidates”). 
 159. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text; see also Dan Eggen, Surge in PACs at 
the Last, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A4 (reporting on the increase in the registering of PACs 
in the days leading up to the election, “dumping tens of millions of dollars into House and Senate 
races, and in many cases, avoiding the need to tell voters who is funding their activities”).  These 
last-minute activities make it exceedingly difficult for candidates to respond effectively before 
election day.  Id. 
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United effect.160  Given that political-ad spending is typically higher in 
presidential election cycles than in midterm elections, groups are likely to 
engage in “blockbuster” spending in 2012.161  For example, Crossroads GPS 
and American Crossroads apparently plan to raise $120 million in support of 
the Republican party.162  Over one hundred super PACs are registered to 
date,163 and they are poised to spend millions more than the $80 million spent 
by super PACs in the 2010 contests.164  In fact, outside groups began running 
ads for the 2012 cycle in December 2010, just weeks after the midterm 
elections.165  Many of the new super PACs are candidate-specific entities.166  
Furthermore, such blockbuster spending is likely to include many campaign 
messages funded by organizations that are not required to disclose their 
donors.167  In June 2011, the Center for Responsive Politics identified five 
super PACs that disclosed that all, or a vast majority, of their funding came 
                                                 
 160. See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 89 (discussing the amount of money likely to be spent for 
the 2012 election in light of Citizens United’s effects); Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (detailing 
the increased fundraising and spending by independent groups in anticipation of the 2012 
election). 
 161. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9; Porter, supra note 88; see also Marian Wang, FEC 
Data Show Big Jump in Spending by Super PACs and Outside Groups, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 9, 
2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/fec-data-show-rise-of-super-pacs-and-outside-spending.  
The Center for Responsive Politics has tracked close to $6 million in spending by outside groups 
already for the 2012 cycle.  2012 Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets 
.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=O. 
 162. See Blumenthal, supra note 25.  Another source previously reported that the super PACs 
planned to raise half—$120 million—of the currently circulating planned figure. Connelly, supra 
note 80 (“If the Rove group reaches its target . . . the Crossroads committees will be the biggest 
financial players in 2012 outside presidential candidates themselves.”). 
 163. Spencer MacColl, Super PAC Registrations Accelerate, Favor Conservatives, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 17, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/super-
pac-registrations-accelerate.html. 
 164. Barker & Wang, supra note 11; see also Nicholas Confessore, Super PAC Plans Major 
Primary Campaign for Perry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/us 
/politics/07donate.html?ref=campaignfinance (noting that a new super PAC called “Make Us 
Great Again” plans to spend up to $55 million to help Rick Perry win the Republican presidential 
nomination). 
 165. See, e.g., Wilson supra note 87 (noting that Crossroads ran its first 2012 advertisement, 
supporting the extension of Bush tax cuts, in December 2010 and that it had run three rounds of 
advertising by the second week of February 2011).  Crossroads GPS spent $700,000 in Florida on 
an anti-Obama ad this summer and planned on spending $20 million in July and August.  Alex 
Leary, In 2012 Elections, Expect More Attack Ads with the Rise of Super PACs, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/article1181968.ece. 
 166. See Confessore, supra note 164; Confessore, supra note 104 (noting that almost all of 
the 2012 presidential candidates are supported by super PACs); Elite Donors Do Double Duty: 
Presidential Super PACs Attract Wealthy Donors Who Have Maxed Out to Candidates, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/10/elite-
donors-do-double-duty-for-super-pacs.html. 
 167. See LINCOLN & HOLMAN, supra note 69, at 1 (noting that the percentage of groups 
reporting the donors who funded their electronic communications has greatly decreased over the 
past decade, dropping from 97.9% in 2004 to 31.8% in 2010); Blumenthal, supra note 25. 
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from non-profit organizations themselves not subject to disclosure 
requirements.168  Further obscuring the source of funding, many super PACs 
operate under unassuming names such as “Concerned Taxpayers of America,” 
“Citizens for a Working America,” and “We Love USA,” which do not reveal 
their actual political commitments.169  If the trends of non-disclosure and 
negativity continue, the 2012 presidential election season may feature more 
money, more competitive and negative speech, more opportunities for 
corporations to contribute silently to intermediary groups, and more  
anodyne-sounding organizations with undisclosed affiliations.170   
D.  Attempts to Mitigate the “Citizens United Effect” 
In response to Citizens United, proponents of campaign reform turned to 
legislation both at the federal and state level, complaints to the IRS, 
administrative and judicial challenges against the FEC, White House 
involvement, and grassroots public advocacy.  Some organizations and 
legislators even proposed a constitutional amendment limiting the free-speech 
protection of for-profit corporations.171  Conversely, campaign-finance-reform 
opponents sought to challenge disclosure legislation judicially and politically, 
and resisted administrative attempts to circumvent the effects of the Citizens 
United decision.172 
                                                 
 168. Barker & Wang, supra note 11. 
 169. Id.; see also YOUN, supra note 152, at 15 (describing misleading names); Michael 
Beckel, Would a PAC By Any Other Name Sound As Sweet?, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 29, 2011, 
4:25 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/09/a-pac-by-any-other-name.html (noting that 
“names touting America and Americans are among the most common, as well as the words 
‘citizens,’ ‘action,’ and ‘freedom’”). 
 170. See supra Part I.C–E. 
 171. For example, the advocacy organization Public Citizen submitted testimony suggesting 
a constitutional amendment to a congressional committee hearing on campaign-finance reform 
after Citizens United.  Letter from Robert Weissman, President, Pub. Citizen, to Robert Brady, 
Chairman, Comm. on House Admin., U.S. House of Representatives 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), available 
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Final%20testimony%20on%20CU.pdf; see also PUB. 
CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 2–3 (noting that Public Citizen collected roughly 750,006 signatures in 
support of a constitutional amendment).  Representatives Donna Edwards and John Conyers, Jr. 
introduced a similar constitutional amendment resolution in the House of Representatives.  H.R.J. 
Res. 74, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010).  Similarly, Senators Christopher Dodd and Tom Udall proposed 
a constitutional amendment in response to Citizens United.  S.J. Res. 29, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); 
see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY 
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR 
CONGRESS 3 (2010) (noting other proposals for constitutional amendments).  See generally 
Senator Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2010). 
 172. Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4–5 (noting the opposition to the failed DISCLOSE 
Act and to any executive order mandating disclosure, and characterizing disclosure proposals as 
“[o]verruling Citizens United with Chicago-[s]tyle [p]olitics”). 
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The principal pro-reform tactic post-Citizens United centers on donor 
disclosure.173  Professor Hasen was not alone when he warned that the need for 
an adequate disclosure policy is “urgent” in light of recent post-Citizens United 
developments.174  Responding to the lack of transparency in many of the 2010 
third-party advocacy ads,175 the public called for stricter laws requiring 
disclosure of the names of those funding independent advocacy groups.176   
Accordingly, legislatures, at both the federal and the state levels, attempted 
to avert the predicted Citizens United effect by passing legislation requiring 
increased transparency in third-party ad funding.177  Justice Kennedy’s rousing 
encomium to disclosure quieted concerns about the susceptibility of disclosure 
                                                 
 173. See infra notes 174–76; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Voting With Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1011, 1011 (2003) (“[T]he campaign finance reform eliciting nearly uniform support has 
been disclosure of the source and amount of campaign contributions and expenditures.”).  
Another reform proposal made after Citizens United required shareholder approval of corporate 
political spending.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: 
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 (2010) (citing Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, 
H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. § 4(a)).  Reformers have also discussed eliminating contribution limits 
under FECA.  See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 167–80.  Additionally, Representative Thomas 
Perriello proposed legislation prohibiting independent expenditures by foreign corporations.  See 
Save Our Democracy from Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H.R. 4523, 111th Cong. 
 174. Rick Hasen, President’s Statement on Passage of DISCLOSE Act in House Committee, 
ELECTION L. BLOG (May 20, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=14873; see also 
Schotland, supra note 157, at 755–56 (discussing the need to update federal and state disclosure 
requirements); Sullivan, supra note 5, at 172–74; Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: 
Public Access and Accountability After Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1056 (2011) 
(advocating state and federal increases in disclosure requirements); Winik, supra note 149, at 651 
(proposing more disclosure requirements). 
 175. Peter Overby, Who Writes the Check? Group Wants Voters to Know, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/22/134746513/who-writes-the-check-group-
wants-voters-to-know (reporting that Media Access Project, a public advocacy organization, 
requested stricter disclosure rules from the FCC after many independent groups in the 2010 
elections hid their donors behind vague entity names).  One commonly cited example is the entity 
called the “Concerned Taxpayers of America,” whose name suggests a large group, but whose 
$450,000 of television ads in two congressional races was secretly bankrolled by only two 
contributors whose identities were not publicly disclosed.  Id.; Dan Eggen, Concerned Taxpayers 
Group Is Powered by Only Two Donors, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2010, at A6.  Similarly, a single 
donor contributed $1 million for campaign advertising under the name “Ending Spending Fund.”  
Dan Eggen, supra note 159, at A4.  This phenomenon was not exclusive to Republican 
supporters; the advertisements purchased by “Iowans for Responsible Government” attacking 
Republican Terry Branstad was, in fact, funded by a $370,000 contribution from the Democratic 
Governors Association.  MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 2.  One of the major sponsors of 
political-committee advertising in 2010 was Crossroads GPS, but nowhere in its advertisements 
did the entity disclose that it was cofounded by Karl Rove.  See Connelly, supra note 80.  
Crossroads GPS and American Crossroads apparently plan to raise $120 million to defeat 
President Obama and capture the Senate for Republicans.  Id. (“If the Rove Group reaches its 
target . . . the Crossroads committees will be the biggest financial players in 2012 outside 
presidential candidates themselves.”). 
 176. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 17–19 (examining public-opinion polls, which show 
overwhelming support for stricter disclosure rules). 
 177. Id. at 24–26, 29–31. 
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rules to constitutional attack and opened the door for such legislation.178  In 
2010, Congress considered nine bills in response to Citizens United.179  
However, such legislation ultimately failed to reduce the decision’s impacts.  
For example, the House narrowly passed the DISCLOSE Act,180 which would 
have increased disclosure,181 but it was filibustered in the Senate.182  This 
history suggests that congressional action is therefore unlikely in 2011.183   
Moreover, at the state level, an early 2011 report by the National Conference 
of State Legislatures noted that eleven states amended their election laws to 
enhance disclosure in reaction to Citizens United.184  Advocacy groups are 
litigating dozens of lawsuits challenging such statutes, which will lead, at a 
minimum, to controversy, delay, and uncertainty.185  Advocacy groups also 
made claims that some third-party organizations that produced election-related 
advertising violated IRS rules,186 but the IRS rejected the opportunity to 
                                                 
 178. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 66, at 1079–82. 
 179. Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign 
Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1545 (2011). 
 180. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7 (“[T]he 
House of Representatives passed H.R. 5175, with amendments on June 24, 2010 by a 219-206 
vote.”). “DISCLOSE” is an acronym for “Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on 
Spending in Elections.”  H.R. 5175, § 1(a). 
 181. H.R. 5175, §§ 201–203, 211–215, 221, 231, 301; see also R. SAM GARRETT, L. PAIGE 
WHITAKER & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41264, THE DISCLOSE ACT (H.R. 
5175): OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1–22 (2010) (providing an overview of the proposed 
DISCLOSE Act). 
 182. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7.  The Senate denied cloture on S. 3628, the 
companion bill to H.R. 5175, by a 57-41 vote on July 27, 2010, and by a 59-39 vote on 
September 23, 2010.  Id.  The 111th Congress recessed without any further action on the 
DISCLOSE Act.  Id.; see Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan & Kent Wayland, Campaign 
Disclosure, Privacy, and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 968 (2011); 
Schotland, supra note 157, at 758–60 & n.32 (providing a critique of the DISCLOSE Act). 
 183. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7; see also Hasen, supra note 14 (concluding that there 
is “virtually no chance that the current Congress will pass a viable disclosure bill absent some 
new scandal”).  Although the DISCLOSE Act contained controversial provisions in addition to 
donor disclosure requirements, so that a pared-down version of the legislation, requiring only 
donor disclosure, might fare better, there has been a breakdown in the prior bipartisan support for 
campaign disclosure.  See GARRETT, WHITAKER & LUNDER, supra note 181, at 10–12. 
 184. Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan 4, 2011), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607; see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 29 
(stating that at least sixteen states have passed legislation in to the wake of Citizens United); 
TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 12, at 5–7 (indicating that seventeen states adopted statutes 
regulating electioneering communications since 2002, and calling on states to improve their 
disclosure laws). 
 185. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7. 
 186. Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., IRS Urged to Review Crossroads GPS Tax Status: 
501(c)(4) Status Questioned for Anonymously Funded Attack Ad Vehicle (Oct. 5,  
2010), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=1119:10-5-2010-irs-urged-to-review-crossroads-gps-tax-status-501c4-status-
questioned-for-anonymously-funded-attack-ad-vehicle-&catid=63&Itemid=61 (reporting their 
claim that Crossroads GPS operated in violation of 501(c)(4)).  In addition, legal academics 
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investigate the claim that Crossroads GPS violated the requirements for its  
tax-exempt status.187  
In addition to legislative disclosure initiatives, critics of Citizens United 
focused their attention on administrative and executive-branch responses.  For 
example, Congressman Chris Van Hollen filed both a federal action against the 
FEC to challenge the agency’s implementation of statutory disclosure rules, 
and an FEC petition to commence a new disclosure rulemaking.188  However, 
Republican FEC Commissioners “are still blocking efforts to ensure effective 
disclosure,”189 thereby deadlocking the FEC politically.190  Pending lawsuits 
against the FEC also will take time and likely will only enhance preexisting 
election-law requirements.   
The White House has also been involved in seeking mitigation.  In April 
2010, a draft White House Executive Order circulated in the press, which, if 
signed, would require companies applying for government contracts to disclose 
donations to advocacy groups involved in election activities.191  The order has 
                                                                                                                 
petitioned the SEC to adopt disclosure rules for political expenditures, with newspaper editorial 
support.  See, e.g., Editorial, Serving Shareholders and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/opinion/serving-shareholders-and-democracy.html?ref= 
campaignfinance. 
 187. See IRS Calls Off Gift Tax Investigation of Donors to Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS, 
TAXPROF BLOG (July 7, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/07/irs-calls-.html 
(announcing that the IRS will not continue its investigation into the applicability of the gift tax to 
contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations, apparently due to Republican lawmaker pressure); Sean 
Parnell, IRS Won’t Tax Donations to 501(c)(4) Groups, CTR. COMPETITIVE POL. (July 7, 2011, 
4:23 PM), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/detail/irs-wont-tax-donations-to-501c4-groups 
(deciding that prior donations to 501(c)(4) organizations are not subject to IRS gift taxes); 
Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Drops Audits of Political Donors, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B1 (noting 
that the IRS has ceased to pursue gift taxes stemming from contributions to 501(c)(4) groups); see 
also Democracy 21 and Campaign Legal Center Challenge Legality of IRS Regulations as 
Failing to Properly Limit Campaign Activity by 501(c)(4) Organizations, DEMOCRACY 21 (July 
27, 2011), http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7B91FCB139-CC82-
4DDD-AE4E-3A81E6427C7F%7D&DE=%7BD68E818D-632A-4F25-B4E3-979BD1139FA4% 
7D (asserting that the IRS regulates all groups qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 401(c)(4) 
to “make far more campaign expenditures than is allowed by law”); supra notes 71, 105 
(clarifying that 501(c)(4)s are not subject to disclosure requirements). 
 188. See Alex Knott, Van Hollen Sues FEC for More Disclosure, ROLL CALL (Apr. 21, 2011, 
2:24 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/van_hollen_sues_fec_for_more_disclosure-205082-
1.html; Kenneth P. Vogel, Federal Election Commission Sued to Disclose Anonymous Donors, 
POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:17 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53534.html. 
 189. Hasen, supra note 14. 
 190. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7. 
 191. Paul Blumenthal, Draft Executive Order on Outside Spending Disclosure Would Have 
Sweeping Reach, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2011, 9:00 AM),  http://sunlightfoundation.com 
/blog/2011/04/22/draft-executive-order-on-outside-spending-disclosure-would-have-sweeping-
reach/.  But see Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 1–10 (critiquing the executive order). 
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proven very controversial,192 and it may ultimately be seen as too politically 
costly.193 
Thus far, these multi-pronged efforts to mitigate Citizens United have had 
limited success.  Given the impending 2012 presidential election, a more 
expansive examination of alternative avenues for reform would be prudent. 
II.  THE FCC ALTERNATIVE 
Communications law and FCC rules could produce a more fruitful response 
to the Citizens United effect,194 both because other efforts have faltered, and 
principally because television is still the medium of communication for 
political advertising today.195  In June 2011, FCC Commissioner Michael 
Copps stated: 
I continue to believe that the sooner we can ensure fuller disclosure 
of political advertising sponsorship, the better off our democracy will 
be.  Voters have a right to know who is really behind all those glossy 
and sometimes wildly misleading ads we see on TV. Concealing 
from voters that an ad brought to us by “Citizens for a More 
Beautiful America” is really sponsored by a cabal of chemical 
companies polluting the water we drink is not just non-disclosure—it 
is deception aimed at buying elections.  We need to fix this—and the 
FCC has an active role to play.  I suggest the Commission tee up an 
item in the next two months that moves us toward meaningful 
disclosure of political advertising.196 
                                                 
 192. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 10–11 (describing the controversy and noting that the 
House passed two otherwise-unrelated House bills to prevent executive agencies from 
conditioning government-contract grants on required political-spending disclosure). 
 193. Sam Stein, Obama Administration Drafts Executive Order on Contractor Donation 
Transparency, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 
11/04/19/obama-administration-drafts-order_n_851228.html. 
 194. For a discussion of Citizens United’s potential impact on FCC regulations (rather than 
the use of FCC rules to promote the underlying vision of Citizens United), see generally Elizabeth 
Elices, Citizens United and the Future of FCC Content Regulation, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 51 (2010). See also Wang, supra note 71 (discussing the partisan deadlock in the FEC and its 
failure to regulate super PACs). 
 195. See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing the role of broadcast and 
cable television in political advertising); see also Kevin Downey, In Political Spending, All 
Markets Not Equal, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 2, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/arti 
cle/2010/03/03/40321/in-political-spending-all-markets-not-equal (estimating that television 
political-advertising expenditures would exceed $2.7 billion in 2010). 
 196. Press Release, Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of 
Michael J. Copps on Release of FCC Staff Report “The Technology and Information Needs of 
Communities” (June 9, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases 
/Daily_Business/2011/db0609/DOC-307421A1.pdf. 
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In addition to the FCC’s sponsorship-disclosure rules, communications 
regulation contains an antidiscrimination rule and limits on broadcaster 
immunity for the content of political ads.197 
A.  The Regulation of Political Speech on Radio, Broadcast Television, and 
Cable 
The regulation of political speech on radio and television has three 
components of relevance to this inquiry: the sponsorship-identification 
requirement, the equal opportunities rule, and the reasonable-access 
provision.198 
1.  Sponsorship Identification 
Since Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, broadcasters have been 
subject to sponsorship-identification requirements. 199  Section 317 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, the current legislation governing such 
requirements, requires that:  
[a]ll matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, 
or any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or 
promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, 
from any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be 
announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such 
person.200  
All sponsored programming on television and radio is subject to this 
requirement.201  The FCC applied similar rules to cable operator-originated 
                                                 
 197. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006). 
 198. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 25, 296. 
 199. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 19, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170.  The Radio Act 
required stations to “afford equal opportunities” to candidates for public office and required 
broadcast disclosure of sponsors.  Radio Act §§ 18–19.  The rationale behind the sponsorship 
provision, as described by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, was to prohibit radio 
stations from disguising advertisements as program content.  Richard Kielbowicz & Linda 
Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship 
Identification Regulations, 1927–1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 334 (2004) (“[Rep. Emanuel 
Celler] unsuccessfully pressed for an amendment that would require stations to label such 
broadcast content as ‘advertising,’ not simply as ‘paid for’ or ‘furnished by’ an interested party.” 
(citing 67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926)). 
 200. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 317, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006)).  Section 508 makes nondisclosure of sponsorship by 
broadcast employees, program suppliers, and sponsors a crime.  Communications Act 
Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, sec. 8(b), § 508, 74 Stat. 889, 896 (codified as amended 
at 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2006)); see Ellen Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (2006). 
 201. See Communications Act of 1934 §§ 2–3 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 
153) (2006)).  Although few changes have been made to the statutory requirement since the 
1940s, the “payola” scandals in the 1950s led to an uptick in broadcaster obligations to disclose 
sponsored programming.  See Goodman, supra note 200, at 99.  Recently, the issue of 
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programming in 1969.202 
The FCC adopted regulations to implement section 317.203  The regulations 
require not only that sponsorship be revealed, but that broadcasters 
fully and fairly disclose[] the true identity of the person or persons, 
or corporation, committee, association or other unincorporated 
group, or other entity by whom or on whose behalf such payment is 
made or promised, or from whom or on whose behalf such services 
or other valuable consideration is received . . . .204 
Additionally, section 73.1212(b) of the agency’s regulations requires 
broadcast licensees to “exercise reasonable diligence to obtain . . . information 
to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by this section.”205  
With respect to political commercials, the regulations require on-air 
sponsorship identification, as well as identification of the sponsoring entity’s 
top leadership in the broadcast station’s publicly available file.206   
2.  Equal Opportunities 
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 provides that if a 
broadcaster permits a legally qualified political candidate to “use” its station, it 
must provide equal opportunities to that candidate’s opponents.207  Although 
the statute does not define the term “use,” the agency has interpreted the word 
to include “any presentation or appearance that features a candidate’s voice or 
image.”208  This equal opportunities provision is commonly referred to as the 
“equal time” rule. 209   
                                                                                                                 
sponsorship identification has been addressed in the context of embedded advertising.  Id. at 89–
90; see WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 280. 
 202. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1615 (2009); WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 296. 
 203. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2010) (tracking the language of section 317(a)(1) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 very closely). 
 204. Id. § 73.1212(e). 
 205. Id. § 73.1212(b). 
 206. Id. § 73.1212(e). 
 207. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (“If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally 
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal 
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 208. Colin Vandell, Note, Words Signifying Nothing? The Evolution of § 315(a) in an Age of 
Deregulation and Its Effect on Television News Coverage of Presidential Elections, 27 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 443, 447 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DON R. PEMBER, 
MASS MEDIA LAW 603 (McGraw-Hill 1999)). 
 209. See id. at 444.  There are constraints on the equal opportunities provision, however.  It is 
state law, not FCC rules, that is used to determine whether a candidate is legally qualified.  47 
C.F.R. § 73.1940(a)(2).  Moreover, even if a broadcaster has equal-time obligations in a particular 
political race, it is not required to provide exactly the same amount or class of time as was given 
the original use; it is enough that the original user’s opponents are provided “equal opportunities.”  
See infra notes 218–19. 
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The provision originated in Congress in the 1920s as its members expressed 
concern over the amount of electoral influence potentially wielded by radio 
stations and networks.210  The fear that radio stations would “charge one man 
an exorbitant price [or arbitrarily exclude him] and permit another man to 
broadcast free or at a nominal price” led Congress to include section 18—the 
predecessor of section 315(a)—in the Radio Act of 1927.211  Historically, 
Congress was concerned with neutralizing the “kind of political advantage a 
discriminatory network can confer.”212 
Section 315 only applies to the political candidate’s use of broadcast stations 
and does not discuss advertising in support of a candidate by independent 
entities.213  In 1970, the FCC addressed this statutory gap by adopting what 
came to be called the “Zapple doctrine,” or the “quasi-equal opportunities 
rule.”214  In response to a request for an interpretive ruling by Nicholas Zapple, 
Communications Counsel to the Senate Committee on Commerce, regarding 
“the applicability of the fairness doctrine to situations where supporters of a 
political candidate purchase broadcast time,” the FCC opined that the fairness 
doctrine would be “plainly applicable” to circumstances in which a candidate’s 
supporters purchase airtime.215  According to the FCC, a station selling airtime 
to a candidate’s spokesperson or supporter to discuss campaign issues could 
not reasonably refuse to sell similar airtime to the spokesperson in support of 
another candidate absent unusual circumstances, because allowing a candidate 
to air his or her position on a given issue is tantamount to broadcasting one 
side, and therefore, the opposing candidates are “the logical spokesmen for 
presenting contrasting views.”216  However, the Zapple doctrine did not require 
the opponent’s supporters to be provided with free airtime to respond to the 
original advertising—a reasonable opportunity to purchase equal time was 
adequate.217  The FCC reiterated its support for the general principle that a 
broadcaster’s inability to find paid sponsorship of the opposing view should 
not defeat the public’s right to know; however, the agency determined that this  
 
                                                 
 210. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 446 (citing 67 CONG. REC. 5483 (1926)). 
 211. Id. 
 212. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 23–24 
(2010). 
 213. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006). 
 214. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970) (discussing whether broadcast stations had 
obligations to provide equal opportunities for political messages by candidate supporters and 
opponents, as well as candidates themselves); see Ann Kramer Ricchiuto, The End for Equal 
Time?: Revealing the Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 281 n.95 
(2005). 
 215. Nicholas Zapple, Comm’ns Counsel, Comm. on Commerce, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 707 
(1970). 
 216. Id. at 708. 
 217. Id. 
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general principle “should not have applicability in the direct political arena.”218  
The FCC simply held that the station would be obligated to permit the 
purchase of equal opportunities.219 
Section 315, as currently codified, has exceptions as well.220  As a result of 
congressional amendment in 1959, § 315 states: 
Appearances by a legally qualified candidate on any—(1) bona fide 
newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news 
documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the 
presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news 
documentary), or (4) on the spot coverage of bona fide news events 
(including but not limited to political conventions and activities 
incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting 
station . . . .221 
                                                 
 218. Id.  The agency reasoned that 
[w]hen spokesmen or supporters of candidates A half purchased time, it is our view that 
it would be inappropriate to require licensees to in effect subsidize the campaign of an 
opposing candidate by providing candidate B’s spokesmen or supporters with free time 
(e.g., the chairman of the national committee of a major party purchases time to urge 
the election of his candidate, and his counterpart then requests free time for program on 
behalf of his candidate).  Any such requirement would be an unwarranted and 
inappropriate intrusion of the fairness doctrine into the area of political campaign 
financing. To implement this view, we would carve out the same area as in the case of 
our personal attack rules, i.e., there would be no obligation to provide free time to 
authorized spokesmen of or those associated with legally qualified candidate B in a 
situation such as your point where candidate A, his authorized spokesmen or those 
associated with him, have purchased time. 
Id.; see also Cullman Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963). 
 219. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d at 707. 
 220. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 88-274, sec. 1, § 315(c), 73 Stat. 557, 557 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)–(4) (2006)). 
 221. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).  Section 315(b), as currently codified, also constrains what charges 
broadcast stations can impose on political advertising.  Id. § 315(b).  During the forty-five days 
before a primary and sixty days before a general election, broadcast stations must offer political 
candidates airtime at the station’s lowest unit rate.  Id.  The statute does not define “lowest unit 
rate.”  See id. § 315(c).  Although the FCC’s enforcement of § 315(b) has been sporadic, the 
agency has accused stations of manipulating ad-sale practices to avoid bona fide compliance with 
the lowest-unit-rate requirement.  Seth Grossman, Note, Creating Competitive and Informative 
Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 355–57, 377 (2004). 
     In addition to the equal opportunities rule, the Communications Act of 1934 gives candidates 
for federal office a limited right of access to the air.  See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).  Section 312(a)(7) 
authorizes the FCC to revoke the license of any broadcaster who willfully or repeatedly fails to 
offer a federal candidate the reasonable opportunity to purchase reasonable amounts of airtime for 
political advertising.  Id.  Section 312(a)(7) specifically states that the FCC may revoke any 
station license for “for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit 
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station . . . by a legally 
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.”  Id.  Although the FCC 
has declined to provide formal guidelines defining this provision, it is clear that broadcasters are 
required to engage in bona fide individualized negotiations with the candidates over airtime 
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Communications law does not explicitly address the question of whether the 
Communications Act provisions and FCC rules may serve to limit the 
threatening effects posed by independent-group political advertising permitted 
by the Citizens United series of decisions.  This Article contends that: 1) the 
FCC has the authority to read § 317 as requiring disclosure of major funders of 
independent groups airing political advertising, and 2) the FCC should not 
hesitate to apply a quasi-equal opportunities rule akin to the Zapple doctrine.  
Although the issue is not free from doubt, there is no clear prohibition to the 
analysis suggested in this Article.   
B.  Disclosure Obligations Under § 317 
The potential for misleading voters is a major concern associated with post-
Citizens United independent-group advertising.222  For example, if voters 
believe that a neutral, expert group made statements in a given advertisement, 
they are likely to find that advertisement more credible than a message created 
by a clearly identified special-interest group.  Because of this concern, 
observers have called for disclosure as an antidote to troublesome advocacy 
advertising by unaccountable speakers.223  Without adequate disclosure, voters 
                                                                                                                 
requests.  Stations cannot impose blanket prohibitions on selling time to federal candidates in any 
day-part, or category of programming, or for any length of time.  Codification of Commission’s 
Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 681 (1991).  The requirement to negotiate 
applies even with when federal candidates request to purchase airtime in lengths typically not 
sold by the station. 
     The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal-candidate reasonable-access 
provision under the First Amendment in CBS, Inc. v. FCC.  453 U.S. 367 (1981) (“Section 
312(a)(7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that an important resource—the airwaves—
will be used in the public interest.  We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by the 
Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal 
candidates, the public, and broadcasters.”).  Although the Court affirmed broadcaster editorial 
discretion in that case and accepted the possibility that a realistic prospect of program disruption 
could properly lead to rejection of a candidate’s request, the actual practice affirmed by the Court 
on the facts suggests that federal-candidate requests for airtime should virtually always be 
accommodated under § 312(a)(7). 
 222. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10. 
 223. See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 37 (“One approach would be to increase the 
transparency of ‘special interest’ spending by more rigorous disclosure legislation, in hopes of 
exposing more vividly who is in fact benefiting and, perhaps, by embarrassing the 
beneficiaries.”).  The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo listed the three rationales for campaign 
disclosure requirements: 
     First, disclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the 
voters in evaluating those who seek federal office . . . . 
     Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of 
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of  
publicity . . . . 
     Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure 
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations 
of the contribution limitations described above. 
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are being “deprive[d] . . . of important cues they need to make informed 
decisions of how to vote.”224  Additionally, inadequate disclosure “also creates 
the conditions for actual corruption of elected officials.”225  Given that Citizens 
United set the new baseline for corporate funding of election speech, 
disclosure becomes more important than ever.226 
This analysis poses the question: could § 317’s sponsorship-identification 
provisions reasonably be read to require major funders of groups airing 
political advocacy ads to be identified?  MAP’s petition, which was submitted 
to the FCC on March 22, 2011, asked the agency to revise its sponsorship rules 
to require such disclosure explicitly.227  The group observed that a large 
increase in express and issue-advocacy spending followed Citizens United 
because “[e]xisting campaign-finance and IRS regulations allow organizations 
which are often hollow shells for one or a few organizations or individuals to 
purchase commercials without identifying the source of their funding.”228  
According to the group, this practice is contrary to current FCC sponsorship-
identification rules interpreting § 317, which nominally require disclosure of 
the sponsor’s “true identify.”229 
Therefore, the group argues that because “the statutory objective of 
informing the electorate about who is the “true” sponsor of political messages 
is not being met,” the FCC should revise its political sponsorship-identification 
regulations.230 
1.  The History and Scope of § 317 
Postal regulations mark the genesis of broadcasting sponsorship disclosure 
rules.  In 1912, Congress enacted the Newspaper Publicity Act, a law requiring 
newspaper and magazine publishers receiving second-class mail privileges to 
identify paid advertisements231 and to publish the names of the publishers’ 
                                                                                                                 
424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Recent Case, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Ninth Circuit Holds Montana Election 
Contribution Disclosure Requirements Unconstitutional as Applied to De Minimis 
Contributions—Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 
1021 (9th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2010) (applying the three rationales in the 
ballot-related context). 
 224. Hasen, supra note 14. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Edward Wyatt, The Caucus, A Plea for More Disclosure on Political Ads, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/a-plea-for-more-
disclosure-on-political-ads/ (discussing disclosure advocates’ pleas to the FCC for assistance in 
strengthening rules following Citizens United). 
 227. See MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 1. 
 228. Id. at 2. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Goodman, supra note 200, at 98 (citing Act of Aug. 29, 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539, 554 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1734 (2006))) (explaining that the legislation required 
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owners and stockholders twice a year.232  Congress apparently exported this 
requirement to broadcasting, including it in the Radio Act of 1927 and the 
Communications Act of 1934.233  Because commercial advertisers sponsored 
much of the early programming and clearly identified themselves, the 
sponsorship-identification rules garnered little attention at the dawn of radio 
regulation.234  Over time, as spot-advertising began to overcome advertiser 
sponsorship of entire programs, the FCC became concerned that listeners 
“know when the program ends and the advertisement begins,”235 and therefore 
issued rules implementing the sponsorship-identification provision of section 
317 of the 1934 Act.236  The quiz show and payola scandals of the 1950s 
caused Congress to amend section 317 to extend the sponsorship-disclosure 
requirement to station employees and criminalize non-disclosure.237  In recent 
years, the FCC’s discussion of sponsorship-identification rules has related 
principally to “sponsored news stories” and “video news releases.”238   
A dearth of legislative history complicates attempts to ascertain Congress’s 
intent in adopting the sponsorship-identification provisions in the 1927 and 
1934 Acts.239  Nevertheless, the history of the sponsorship-identification 
                                                                                                                 
publishers to provide “reading notices” identifying paid ads).  See generally Richard B. 
Kielbowicz, Postal Subsidies for the Press and the Business of Mass Culture, 1880-1920, 64 BUS. 
HIST. REV. 64 (1990) (providing a historical summary of postal advertising).  Congress enacted 
the Newspaper Publicity Act as a rider to the 1912 postal appropriations bill.  Id. at 481. 
 232. Kielbowicz, supra 231, at 482. 
 233. Goodman, supra note 200, at 98. 
 234. See id. 
 235. Id. at 98–99 (quoting FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
BROADCAST LICENSEES 47 (Arno Press, Inc. reprt. ed. 1974) (1946)).  This was consistent with 
the Hutchins Commission on the Freedom of the Press recommendation that “sales talk should be 
plainly labeled as such.”  Id. at 99 n.97 (quoting COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE 
AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 64 (1947)). 
 236. Id. (citing Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 199, at 341–42). 
 237. Id. at 99. 
 238. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 279–80.  A “sponsored news story” occurs when a 
broadcaster agrees with a sponsor to air a news piece promoting the sponsor, but fails to disclose 
to the public that the story resulted from such a sponsorship agreement.  Id.  A “video news 
release” is a piece created by a sponsor to resemble a news story and aired by the broadcaster 
without disclosure of how the piece was produced.  Id.  The FCC also calls for sponsorship 
identification in “embedded advertising” and “product placement” contexts.  Id. at 280; see also 
Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the Battle Over the Regulation of Video News 
Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 366–67 (2008) (criticizing the FCC’s treatment of 
video news releases). 
 239. As part of the congressional discussion before the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, 
Congressman Emanuel Celler inserted the following statement into the Congressional Record: 
Many broadcasting stations have developed paid-for propaganda and advertising.  This 
is being done in a most deceptive and disguised manner. 
     It is illegal for newspapers or magazines to publish advertising without letting their 
readers know that the matter is paid for and is advertising.  The reason for this was to 
avoid the foisting of disguised advertising matter “as reading notices” or news.  The 
law was adopted to avoid this public imposition and deception. 
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requirements suggests a concern about deception.240  Indeed, the principle that 
viewers not be deceived or mislead unites all the circumstances in which the 
FCC refers to sponsorship identification. 
The FCC has repeatedly expressed the view that the public has a “right to 
know whether the broadcast material has been paid for and by whom.”241  In 
the early days of radio, many expressed distrust of advertising.242  Indeed, early 
on, many argued against radio becoming a commercial, advertising-based 
medium.243  In addition to concerns with avoiding vulgar commercialism and 
promoting programming not limited to the requirements of the market, the 
opponents of advertising feared that it would deceive and mislead listeners.244  
According to the FCC, “[p]aramount to an informed opinion and wisdom of 
choice . . . is the public’s need to know the identity of those persons or groups 
                                                                                                                 
     Broadcasting of paid-for or indirect advertising without a statement that the matter 
broadcast has been paid for is no less deceptive and an imposition. 
67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926). 
 240. The history of the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912, from which the original 
sponsorship-identification requirement for radio was apparently derived, shows that periodicals 
had to identify their owners and stockholders to “address[] the concern that some publications 
were secretly controlled by interests who used their columns to influence public opinion.”  
Kielbowicz, supra 231, at 482.  The statute’s “reader notice” requirement compelled periodicals 
to label paid-for material that could be mistaken for stories as “advertisements” in order to stymie 
“the widespread practice of disguising advertising as news stories or editorials.”  Id.  Both of 
these provisions were clearly aimed to prevent readers from being misled. 
     Professor Ellen Goodman identifies “three basic critiques [of undisclosed sponsorship]: that 
undisclosed sponsorship harms media competition, that it overcommercializes media content, and 
that it deceives audiences.”  Goodman, supra note 200, at 99–100.  To this list, she adds the harm 
of stealth marketing to “the public sphere and the integrity of public discourse.”  Id. at 100.  The 
last two factors seem most relevant to the context of non-disclosure in the political arena. 
 241. Goodman, supra note 200, at 110 & n.158 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv., 41 Rad. Reg. 2d 
(P&F) 877, 878 (1977)). 
 242. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS 338 (2004) (quoting one contemporary publication as declaring that “‘the 
family circle is not a public space and advertising has no business intruding there unless it is 
invited.’”). 
 243. See id. (“Radio advertising, it was universally agreed, was highly undesirable.”).  
Nevertheless, the ability to reach a large audience at home with a repetitive message overcame 
this initial reluctance.  Id. at 354–55.  Sponsors and stations, which, in the 1920s, had “delicately 
refrained from explicit commercials or sales talks and allowed only ‘indirect’ advertisements,” 
had “given [themselves] wholly over to commercialism” and direct advertisements by the 1930s.  
Id.; see also ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928–1935, at 5 (1993) 
(providing “a revisionist interpretation of American broadcasting history, one that regards the 
emerging status quo [of corporate, commercial, advertiser-supported radio] as the product of an 
intense and multifaceted political fight with obvious winners and losers, not as the ‘natural’ 
American system or as the product of consensus”). 
 244. See Goodman, supra note 200, at 110 n.158 (citing Broadcast Material Sponsorship 
Identification, 25 Fed. Reg. 2406, 2406 (Mar. 16, 1960) (characterizing a station’s failure to 
provide a notification that program material was aired in exchange for consideration as 
“deception”)). 
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who elicit the public’s support.”245  The agency’s recognition that audience 
members are “‘entitl[ed] to know by whom they are being persuaded’”246 is 
most persuasively explained as “directly related to a fear of deception.”247  
Although the statutory language of § 317 does not directly address how 
much sponsorship disclosure should be made in advertising, the goal of 
avoiding deception can serve as a useful guidepost for the FCC’s standard.248  
In 2002, the agency explained that because the sponsorship-identification 
requirement is “based on the principle that the public has a right to know 
whether the broadcast material has been paid for and by whom,” the provision 
“mandates that “the audience be clearly informed that it is hearing and viewing 
matter which has been paid for when such is the case, and that the person 
paying for the broadcast of the matter be clearly identified.”249   
Historically, the FCC has been particularly sensitive to the importance of 
sponsorship identification in the context of political advertising.250  In 1991, 
the FCC characterized the additional public-file requirements for political 
assignments as “designed to make information about their sponsors more 
available to the public.”251  This illustrates the FCC’s recognition that 
disclosure of political-sponsor information had increasingly become a 
necessity for the public.  The Commission has insisted on “full and fair” 
disclosure of sponsors’ identities since the 1940s.252  According to a 1963 
public notice from the FCC, a station disclaimer stating that an advertisement 
was a paid political announcement is per se insufficient to adhere to 
sponsorship-identification rules.253  Instead, the rules require that the 
                                                 
 245. Id. at 110 n.159 (quoting Sponsorship Identification Rules, 34 F.C.C. 829, 849 (1963)). 
 246. Id. (quoting Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 141 
(1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975)).  
 247. Id. at 110.  Professor Goodman situates this audience right “in the wreck of the payola 
and quiz show scandals.”  Id. 
 248. See id. (noting that the FCC’s “fear of deception” dictates much of its language 
interpreting this law). 
 249. Advertising Council Request for Declaratory Ruling or Waiver Concerning Sponsorship 
Identification Rules Advertising Council, 17 FCC Rcd. 22,616, 22,620–21 (2002) (order 
responding to request for declaratory ruling). 
 250. See generally Identification of Sponsors, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,817 (Oct. 25, 1944). 
 251. Codification of the Commission’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 686 
(1991) (responding to many complaints regarding the radio stations’ failure to identify sponsors 
in compliance with § 317). 
 252. During the 1944 campaign season, for example, the FCC noted the need for regulations 
implementing § 317 in response to “numerous complaints . . . concerning the failure of radio 
stations to identify the sponsors of political spot announcements.”  Identification of Sponsors, 9 
Fed. Reg. at 12,817.  The current rule is only slightly modified from the rule adopted in 1944.  
See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 88–90 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
431–456 (2006)). 
 253. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified, 
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975). 
2011] Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform 139 
identification “fully and fairly disclose the true identity of the person or 
persons by whom or in whose behalf payment was made.”254 
In its petition for rulemaking, MAP contended that the FCC has a “long 
history of directing stations to pierce the veil of the nominal sponsor.”255  For 
example, as far back as 1946, the FCC required broadcasters to “take all 
reasonable measures” to fully comply with identification rules, and explained 
that “[i]f a speaker desires to purchase time at a cost apparently 
disproportionate to his personal ability to pay, a licensee should make an 
investigation of the source of funds to be used for payment.”256  The FCC has 
long endorsed the principle that broadcasters have a duty to use “reasonable 
diligence” in discovering the funding behind sponsorship to make that 
information public.257  In 1992, the agency provided even more detailed 
instructions for candidate commercials, and required that the sponsor “of 
televised political advertisements . . . be identified with letters sized to at least 
four percent of the vertical picture height and displayed for a minimum of a 
few seconds.”258  In addition to on-air sponsorship identification, the FCC has 
imposed an additional obligation upon stations since 1944 to include  
sponsor-identifying information in the station’s public files with respect to 
political advertising.259  In a 1963 public notice, the Commission explicitly 
stated: 
If payment is made by an agent, and the station has knowledge 
thereof, the announcement shall identify the person in whose behalf 
such agent is acting.  If the sponsor is a corporation, committee, 
association or other group, the required announcement shall contain 
the name of such group; moreover, the station broadcasting any 
matter on behalf of such group shall require that a list of the chief 
officers, members of the executive committee or members of the 
board of directors of the sponsoring organization be made available 
upon demand for public inspection at the studios or general offices of 
one of the stations in each community in which the program is 
broadcast.  In the event of a network originated broadcast, the 
records required by the Commission’s Rules shall be made available 
                                                 
 254. Id. (emphasis added). 
 255. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 5.  Other examples include the FCC’s reminder to 
stations in 1950 that they had to make “adequate announcements when political broadcasts are 
made.” Identification on Broadcast Station, 40 F.C.C. 2, 3 (1950). 
 256. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 1 (quoting Albuquerque Broadcasting Company, 40 
F.C.C. 1 (1946)). 
 257. See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 280. 
 258. Codification of the Commission’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 1616, 
1616 (1992). 
 259. Compare Announcement of Sponsored Programs, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,734 (Dec. 12, 1944), 
with 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2010). 
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upon demand for public inspection at the studios or general offices of 
the originating station.”260 
The extensive regulatory history during which the FCC expressed an 
unwavering commitment to a fully informed electorate suggests that the 
agency could justify implementing an enhanced sponsorship-identification 
requirement.261  The argument for donor disclosure in political ads today is the 
same as the argument for commercial-advertising disclosure in the 1927 and 
                                                 
 260. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified, 
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975). 
 261. See supra notes 239–63.  Although the evidence is sparse, the FCC may have shifted 
toward a narrower approach to § 317 in the 1970s.  For example, VOTER, an unpublished opinion 
issued by the FCC’s staff in 1979, stated that licensees could satisfy their obligations under the  
§ 317 sponsorship-identification requirement so long as the sponsoring organization claimed that 
it had editorial control of the program, regardless of who paid for it.  VOTER, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P 
& F) 350, 352 (1979); see also Paul Loveday, 87 F.C.C. 2d 492, 497 (1981) (reiterating VOTER’s 
focus on the identity of the person with editorial control). 
     In Loveday, the FCC considered whether broadcast stations should have identified the tobacco 
industry as sponsors of political advertisements attributed to “Californians Against Regulatory 
Excess” (CARE), which advertised against a state proposition to create smoking and  
non-smoking areas in indoor, public places.  Paul Loveday, 87 F.C.C. 2d at 493.  The FCC 
concluded that the stations did not violate the sponsorship provisions of the Communications Act 
or the rules and that they were not required to investigate more diligently Loveday’s claims that 
the tobacco industry was the true sponsor.  Id. at 497 (“To hold otherwise would require this 
agency to investigate the nature of political committees organized to support or oppose an 
election matter (e.g., whether or not corporate formalities were adhered to), to second-guess 
broadcast station licensees’ judgments and to rule on the basis of hindsight, rather than reviewing 
licensees’ decisions to determine if they acted reasonably and in good faith.”).  The D.C. Circuit, 
affirming the FCC’s decision, concluded that “the licensees were not required to inquire further 
into the actual sponsorship of the political advertisements. Indeed, we have substantial doubt that 
the Commission could require licensees to do more.”  Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1445 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). 
     This focus solely on editorial control, however, is not a fully considered FCC interpretation; 
rather, it is a thinly supported staff reading that does not adequately reflect the statutory focus on 
the payer’s identity.  Neither the statute nor the agency’s regulations identify the sponsor as the 
person or entity exercising editorial control over the advertisement.  The statute targets 
identification of who paid for “all matter broadcast . . . for which any money . . . is directly or 
indirectly paid.”  47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2006).  Historically, the FCC’s interpretation also 
focused on identification of the payer.  In 1958, for example, in discussing a particular station’s  
§ 317 violation, the Commission characterized as “of particular significance . . . the requirement 
of accurate and complete identification of the person or group paying for or furnishing material in 
connection with a discussion of political matters.”  Violation of Section 317 of the 
Communications Act, KSTP, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 12, 14 (1958).  Similarly, in a 1963 ruling, the 
commission described the sponsorship-identification provision as requiring that the broadcaster 
disclose “the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose behalf payment was 
made.”  Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified, 
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975).  In addition to lacking either a statutory referent or FCC 
regulatory precedent, the focus on editorial control is far less objectively verifiable than 
identifying who paid for the ad.  There is no reason for the FCC to continue relying on this 
misguided and apparently idiosyncratic interpretation. 
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1934 Acts—namely, a concern with deceiving the public.262  Intentional 
concealment to achieve a particular result undermines the ideal of voting 
competence.263  The argument for donor disclosure is not based on a vague and 
general preference for transparency in electoral structures; rather, it is based on 
the goal of empowering voters to understand what might otherwise be 
affirmatively misleading.264   
Nevertheless, opponents to broader disclosure might argue that the 
requirement to identify who paid for political advertising does not necessarily 
entail full transparency of the identities of all, or even the major, donors to 
independent organizations airing advocacy advertising.265  Such opponents of a 
broad interpretation of § 317 might claim that the only disclosure authorized 
by statute relates to the paying entity’s name.266  On this view, the statutory 
sponsorship-identification obligation would be satisfied so long as the public is 
advised of the formal identity of a political ad’s sponsor.267  If viewers seek to 
find out more about the sponsoring entity, they can do so directly. 
However, this formal reading is unsatisfactory and not statutorily required.  
The statute does not define the word “paid.”268  To the extent that the FCC’s 
implementing regulations since the 1940s have required broadcasters to “fully 
and fairly disclose the true identity” of the sponsor, the agency has implicitly 
supported the view that the public deserves to know the identity of the true 
movers behind front organizations.269  One potential objection to this position 
is that disclosing the sponsor’s true identity does not necessarily mean 
disclosing the identities of its financial funders and supporters.270  Although 
the FCC’s regulations require stations’ public files to contain a list of the 
sponsoring entity’s leadership,271 objectors might claim that the leadership 
group is not necessarily coextensive with the major funders of the nominal 
                                                 
 262. Goodman, supra note 200, at 108 (discussing the problem of stealth marketing in 
creating deception). 
 263. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1155. 
 264. Goodman, supra note 200, at 111–12.  In addition to averting deception, a mandatory 
requirement of donor disclosure under § 317 promotes the broader interest in public discourse.  
Id. at 112–30.  Professor Goodman argues that the anti-deception interest has limits “in a media 
environment of pervasive skepticism” with “savvy” consumers whose skepticism limits their 
credulousness.  Id. at 111–12. 
 265. Cf. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing the argument that disclosure of the 
entity with editorial control over the ads is adequate). 
 266. Id. (emphasizing the statutory language requiring disclosure of the entity responsible for 
payment). 
 267. Id. at 7. 
 268. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006). 
 269. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e) (2010). 
 270. See, e.g., Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (explaining that super PACs may get the 
majority of their funding from “affiliated nonprofits that are not required to reveal their donors”). 
 271. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e); Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 
141, 150 (1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975). 
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sponsor.272  On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to exclude major 
donors to third-party advocacy groups from being considered “true” 
sponsors.273  Even if they are not the only “true” sponsors, the fact that the 
organizations would not be able to air the sponsored material without their 
funding, suggests they should be included in the category.  Because a donor to 
an organization may not necessarily support every statement made by that 
organization, it might be argued that a closer link should be demonstrated 
between the donor and the advertisement itself in order to characterize the 
donor as a true sponsor.  However, such a limitation would eliminate the 
important voting cue that the donor supports an organization that, in turn, is 
responsible for the election ads at issue.   
The interpretation suggested here is not precluded by any statutory 
impediments.  The FCC might be influenced to adopt such a reading by the 
strong public consensus in support of donor disclosure.274  In any event, the 
availability of this option might influence the political atmosphere, regardless 
of what the FCC ultimately decides to do in response to MAP’s petition for 
rulemaking.   
2.  Constitutionality and Desirability of Donor-Disclosure Requirements 
The desirability of recourse to FCC regulation should also be considered as a 
policy matter, and disclosure regimes like those advocated here should be 
evaluated to determine whether they are consistent with the First Amendment 
and likely to be workable and beneficial.   
                                                 
 272. Cf. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 7–8 (recommending enhanced disclosure rules 
requiring disclosure of major contributors in addition to sponsorship).  MAP called on the FCC to 
revise its sponsorship-identification rules to require on-air disclosure of the “actual sponsor, i.e., 
the source of the funds for the commercials.”  Id.  With respect to “front groups” and institutional 
sponsors funded by several sources, MAP called for on-air identification of any donor providing 
at least twenty-five percent of the funding for television commercials and one-third of the funding 
for radio ads.  Id. at 7 & n.11.  The petition also called on the FCC to amend its rules “to require 
that stations keep on file, along with a listing of the nominal sponsor of a political ad and its 
leadership, all who contribute 10% or more to the funding of the nominal sponsor.”  Id. at 8.  The 
petition also requested the FCC to “strengthen section 73.1212(b)” because the current provision 
“lacks any tool to assess compliance with the duty.”  Id.  Such strengthening would “require 
broadcasters to obtain sworn statements from political advertisers [as] to their largest sources of 
funding and place them . . . in the station’s public file.”  Id.  It is beyond the scope of this Article 
to comment on the specific numerical requirements suggested by MAP, although the twenty-five-
percent figure does not appear unreasonable.  Certainly, if the FCC agrees to undertake this 
petition for rulemaking, many comments will be received with regard to the specific provisions. 
 273. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11. 
 274. John Eggerton, Survey Says: Put Contributors On Air, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Sept. 
16, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/457220-Survey_Says_ 
Put_Contributors_On_Air.php (reporting that sixty-eight percent of respondents to a poll by the 
Center for Competitive Politics responded that “they favored making the heads and largest donors 
appear in campaign ads to take responsibility for them”). 
2011] Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform 143 
a.  Constitutionality 
An FCC sponsorship-identification rule requiring entities sponsoring 
election-related advertising to disclose direct and indirect sponsors would 
likely pass constitutional muster.  In the electoral context, the Supreme Court, 
has consistently recognized voter-informational and corruption-deterrence 
interests since the iconic Buckley v. Valeo.275  Indeed, as previously noted, 
Citizens United itself strongly endorses disclosure as the flip side of unfettered 
corporate electoral speech.276  In Citizens United, eight members of the Court 
agreed that “disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the speech of corporate 
entities in a proper way.  This transparency enables the electorate to make 
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”277  According to all but Justice Clarence Thomas, transparency 
concerning donors “help[s] citizens make informed choices in the political 
marketplace.”278  Revealing political affiliations also allows voters to 
determine whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed 
interests.”279  
Election-law scholars as well have consistently argued in favor of expanded 
disclosure because publicity may reduce corruption and enhance 
accountability.280  Donor disclosure is also likely to help increase voter 
competence by serving as a useful cue to voters who would not otherwise 
conduct additional research before voting.281  Disclosure can give voters useful 
                                                 
 275. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 
(1976) (per curiam). 
 276. See supra Part I.A. 
 277. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; see supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 278. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003), 
overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913).  In McConnell, the Court emphasized the 
informational value of source disclosure: 
BCRA’s disclosure provision requires . . . organizations to reveal their identities so that 
the public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements 
influencing certain elections. . . . Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run 
these advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like: “The 
Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change” (funded by business organizations 
opposed to organized labor), “Citizens for Better Medicare” (funded by the 
pharmaceutical industry), “Republicans for Clean Air” (funded by brothers Charles and 
Sam Wyly). 
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196–97. 
 279. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 280. See Johnson, Regan & Wayland, supra note 182, at 965–67. 
 281. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1012–13 (arguing in favor of election-related disclosure 
requirements because they increase voter competence); see also Sheff, supra note 123, at 159 
(discussing the incidence of low-information voters); supra notes 129–36. 
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shortcuts by allowing them to rely on information identifying candidate 
support groups and revealing the groups’ intensity of support.282 
Nevertheless, although McConnell upheld the BCRA’s disclosure and 
disclaimer provisions,283 the Court in Citizens United recognized that a group 
could bring as-applied challenges upon a showing of a “reasonable 
probability” that disclosure of its contributors’ names would “subject them to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private 
parties.”284  Given that the Court did not find threats, harassment, or reprisal 
despite worrisome examples cited by amici in Citizens United,285 the Court 
may require a high reasonable-probability threshold.286  Nevertheless, this still 
leaves a viable avenue for litigation by groups resisting disclosure. 
Additionally, because effective corporate disclosure rules are likely to entail 
“detailed requirements,”287 they might clash with the Court’s expressed 
constitutional concerns in Citizens United about the complexity of  
campaign-finance law.288  Thus, despite the Court’s affirmation of the value of 
disclosure, “Citizens United may make it possible for opponents of disclosure 
simply to rely on the administrative burden of keeping records, filing reports, 
and abiding by certain organizational requirements.”289  To the extent that 
                                                 
 282. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026–27.  To be sure, compelled disclosure has been 
subject to heightened scrutiny, particularly in the context of political expression.  In McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, held that in the context 
of anonymous pamphleteering, the First Amendment protects anonymous speech.  514 U.S. 334, 
357 (1995) (striking down a state statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature on First Amendment grounds).  Nevertheless, disclosure in the donor context has 
received less stringent constitutional scrutiny than disclosure of speaker identity in the 
pamphleteering context.  See E. Rebecca Gantt, Note, Toward Recognition of a Monetary 
Threshold in Campaign Finance Disclosure Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 385, 399–400 (2011) 
(discussing levels of scrutiny and describing other scholars’ attempts to distinguish McIntyre 
from disclosure cases).  Notably, the Court in McConnell and Citizens United upheld BCRA 
disclosure requirements without reference to McIntyre.  See William McGeveran, Mrs. 
McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
859, 861–62 (2011).  In any event, the Court in McIntyre found important that a private 
individual, whose signature would not have added much information to the content of the 
communication, wrote the anonymous handbill at issue.  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49.  The 
Court also recognized that anonymity itself is an important cue, which can perhaps lead the 
recipient of an anonymous communications to be skeptical.  See id. at 348 n.11.  In the context of 
electioneering communications by benignly named interest groups, voters would not have the 
informational cue triggering skepticism that anonymity would itself provide. 
 283. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. 
 284. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198). 
 285. Id. at 916. 
 286. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 66, at 1099; see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 
passim (2010); Gantt, supra note 282, at 412–13 (explaining that the evidentiary standard for 
showing the prospect of reprisals “is so high that it essentially requires a showing of a pattern of 
retaliation and harassment that has already occurred”). 
 287. Briffault, supra note 5, at 669. 
 288. Id. at 663. 
 289. Id. at 669–70. 
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disclosure regulations are burdensome and subject to court’s searching 
scrutiny, Citizens United ironically could become the basis for “constitutional 
challenges to the administrative requirements entailed in disclosure.”290   
b.  Policy 
Doctrinal issues aside, fundamental policy questions arise regarding the 
application of § 317 and the Zapple doctrine to mitigate Citizens United.291  
The fundamental policy question addresses the underlying value of disclosure 
itself: is disclosure an effective mechanism?  If not, additional disclosure 
requirements might be an undesirable compromise of significant First 
Amendment values in support of illusory regulatory goals. 
As critics have reminded, disclosure is not an unmitigated good292—too 
much can overwhelm and distract the hearer.293  According to skeptics, donor 
disclosure fails to improve voter competence in many contexts294 and could 
cause cascades of undesirable information cascades.295  Critics might question 
the bona fides of disclosure proponents and suggest that calls for mandatory 
                                                 
 290. Id. at 670; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 268 
(2000) (“Disclosure laws have the best chance of passing constitutional muster if they contain 
clear standards for disclosure that are not overly burdensome.”). 
 291. For a discussion of § 317 and the Zapple doctrine, see supra Part II. 
 292. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011) (critiquing mandated disclosure in the commercial context). 
 293. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1025 (“Not only is it not the case, given voters’ 
capabilities, that more information is always a good thing, but too much information can 
overwhelm the ability of average Americans to process and understand information and may 
result in their tuning out data that could provide helpful cues.”); see also Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, supra note 292, at 686–87 (discussing the “overload” effect of overly complex 
disclosures and the “accumulation” problem of too many disclosures); Richard Briffault, 
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 299–301 (2010) (“[M]assive disclosure 
. . . threatens to inundate us in a sea of useless data, while potentially distracting attention from 
the big donors whose funds play a more meaningful role in understanding a candidate . . . .”).  See 
generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010) 
(reviewing some of the negative aspects of disclosure). 
 294. Arguably, even if disclosure is focused more on providing heuristic shortcuts, rather 
than enabling voters to engage in well-researched analyses, there may be extensive variation in 
the effectiveness of the cues provided, as well as limits to the enhancement of low-information 
voters’ political knowledge through heuristic cues.  See Sheff, supra note 123, at 152 (“The 
growing consensus is that, although heuristic cues can assist low-information voters in bringing 
their political decisionmaking closer to that of fully informed voters, persistent deviations 
remain.”).  A critic of full disclosure might assert that we should only expect voters to receive 
effective cueing effects from donors with clearly branded messages and politically active 
celebrities, which allows voters to discover their association with a candidate or an issue.  See 
David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 133, 155–56 (2009). 
 295. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1046 (discussing this possibility but concluding that 
“disclosure of group support for candidates seems unlikely to significantly increase the number of 
undesirable cascades and may actually forestall some from occurring”). 
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donor disclosure are little but attempts to suppress political speech and 
association.296  They might also posit that such disclosure would have the 
unintended consequence of corrupting candidates.297  More broadly, it is 
unclear whether effective disclosure rules would suffice to resolve the much 
deeper problems associated with our excessively complex campaign-finance 
system.298  Some could fear that even good donor-disclosure rules would 
merely provide an illusion of improvement while hiding increasing electoral 
inequality.299 
Despite these questions, this Article concludes that, on balance, mandatory 
disclosure of donor information for political advertising through FCC rules is 
desirable.  Despite the risk of too much information leading to voter 
disengagement, the news media, parties, and advocacy groups can serve as 
intermediaries to collect, cull, and explain information for voters.300  Certainly 
some information cascades can be avoided by the increased availability of 
further credible information.301  In any event, donor-identification information 
is easily processed, especially if it associates the message with an identifiable 
political, ideological, or economic brand.302  Although heuristic cues cannot 
                                                 
 296. See Alexandre Couture Gagnon & Filip Palda, The Price of Transparency: Do 
Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Discourage Political Participation by Citizens’ Groups?, 
146 PUB. CHOICE  353, 353–74 (2011).  Critics might suspect that mandatory disclosure rules 
could lead to extensive silencing, even if they would not engender the degree of harassment that 
would trigger the standard articulated in Citizens United.  Indeed, some critics have already 
characterized calls for enhanced donor disclosure as strategic Democratic attempts to deter 
conservative speech.  See, e.g., Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 5; see also James Bopp, Jr. & 
Jared Haynie, Citizens Divided on Citizens United:Campaign Finance Reform and the First 
Amendment: The Tyranny of “Reform and Transparency”: A Plea to the Supreme Court to 
Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and Disclosure” Holding, 16 NEXUS 3, 19 
(2010) (making a parallel between disclosure requirements for election advertising and Nazi laws 
requiring Jews to wear identifying armbands). 
 297. See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 75 (2010) (discussing the “unintended effect” of enabling political 
candidates to trace the origin of their financial support). 
 298. See Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign 
Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1128–31 (2011). 
 299. See id. at 1545–47. 
 300. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1025–26 (“[I]nformation is usually filtered through 
intermediaries like the press before it reaches average citizens, so worries about overload can be 
overstated.”); Briffault, supra note 293, at 299–300. 
 301. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026 (arguing that “targeting disclosure requirements to 
the information most likely to improve voter competence is sensible”). 
 302. See id. at 1026–27 (“For group support to serve as a heuristic, at least three conditions 
must be met.  First, voters must correctly associate the group with a particular ideology or policy 
position that allows them to draw inferences about the candidate’s ideology and likely behavior in 
office.  Second, the information conveyed by the group’s support must be credible.  In other 
words, the voters must be able to trust that the group really does support the candidate and is not 
acting strategically to send a false signal.  Third, voters must be able to learn of the group’s 
support; it must be publicized, preferably at a time when it will affect voters’ decisions.”). 
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completely substitute for extensive political knowledge and full information, 
they are “a pragmatic shortcut that both improves voter competence and 
preserves voters’ evaluative autonomy.”303  Even if all donors do not 
necessarily support each of the organization’s statements, disclosure of their 
support conveys information about both the donor’s and the group’s general 
ideological commitments;304 this is particularly true when the donor provides 
significant financial support.  The extent of giving can serve as a  
common-sense measure of the donor’s commitment to the group.305  Given that 
some donors will be identified through voluntary or media disclosure, 
mandatory disclosure requirements would even the playing field for voters so 
that the availability of relevant information would not depend “on the vagaries 
of political competition for disclosure.”306  Despite some social scientists’ 
suggestions that disclosure requirements inhibit groups’ political involvement 
for fear of prosecution for alleged violations of reporting requirements,307 the 
number of political groups seems to be increasing.308 
Finally, disclosure, which contextualizes the heuristic cues that  
low-information voters may glean from political advertising, surely serves the 
goal of reducing the gaps between uninformed voters and fully informed 
voters.309  In today’s political climate, donor-disclosure rules are defensive, 
rather than offensive, requirements aimed at preventing organizations that 
endorse or criticize candidates from hiding their ideological commitments in 
order to give a neutral or benign impression.310  These “notorious” groups 
“strongly resist publicity . . . [and] work diligently to hide their campaign 
spending from disclosure.”311  Groups use “stealth PACs” and “veiled political 
actors” to evade FEC disclosure requirements.312  Examples of attempts to 
send voter “mis-cues” abound in connection with both initiatives and candidate 
                                                                                                                 
     As for the claim that donor disclosure can reveal the identities of major donors to candidates 
and thereby increase the possibility of quid pro quo corruption, today’s practices of partial 
disclosure are arguably more likely to lead to corruption than a general disclosure mandate. 
 303. Kang, supra note 132, at 1160. 
 304. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026–29. 
 305. Id. at 1037; see Kang, supra note 132, at 1181. 
 306. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1031–32. 
 307. See, e.g., Gagnon & Palda, supra note 296, at 369, 373. 
 308. See Brookes, supra note 89 (discussing the increase in new entities and comparing the 
current trend to the midterm elections); supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1164–65. 
 310. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1033–35. 
 311. Id. at 1035; cf. Jonathan C. Zellner, Note, Artificial Grassroots Advocacy and the 
Constitutionality of Legislative Identification and Control Measures, 43 CONN. L. REV. 357, 361 
(2010) (discussing “Astroturf” lobbying, which constitutes lobbying campaigns pretending to 
result from grass-roots activity despite actually being strategic enterprises sponsored by  
special-interest groups). 
 312. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1035. 
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elections.313  A neutral or benign-sounding sponsor name lulls the voter into 
suspending her skepticism and believing the advertised claims.314  In these 
circumstances, mandated donor disclosure does nothing more than set the 
record straight and provide an accurate way for voters to assess the credibility 
of what the aired advertisements tell them.315  In effect, such requirements 
function to make voter cues as accurate and credible as possible.316  Viewed in 
this light, an FCC requirement that political advertisers disclose their major 
sponsors is little more than a call to correct misleading cues in many election 
contests.317   
3.  What Should the FCC’s Disclosure Regulations Look Like? 
As Professor Richard Briffault noted in the more general context of 
campaign-finance disclosure rules, “effective disclosure of corporate campaign 
spending is likely to require complex and detailed rules.”318  Yet, to avoid 
constitutional problems, the rules must be constructed in a manner that avoids 
vagueness and overbreadth.319  This Article does not propose to draft such 
rules. Ideally, in doing so, the FCC should engage in a full-fledged rulemaking 
proceeding during which it would solicit the full range of opinions.320  Yet, 
with the 2012 election looming, a more expedited process might be prudent.321  
In exercising its discretion, some guideposts are available to the FCC.  The 
agency should keep in mind both what donor disclosure is designed to achieve, 
and the well-documented history of gaming and circumvention associated with 
existing campaign-finance disclosure requirements.322   
                                                 
 313. Id. at 1035–36 (providing the example of advertisements sponsored by the 
pharmaceutical industry under the guise of “a conduit organization with a name that sounded as 
though it was an organization of senior citizens”). 
 314. See id. at 1053–37. 
 315. See id. at 1037 (discussing the important effects of mandatory disclosure). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects 
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to speech of corporate 
entities in a proper way.  This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and 
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”); see also Garrett, supra note 173, at 
1037 (explaining that mandatory disclosure provides a “vital voting cue”). 
 318. Briffault, supra note 5, at 645 (“With many business corporations likely to channel their 
funds through other organizations, disclosure will have to address not merely the spender of 
record, but the corporations and other donors contributing to those organizations.”); accord 
Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and 
Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 987 (2011). 
 319. See Hasen, supra note 290, at 268–69. 
 320. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32589, THE FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 3 n.4 (2011) (describing the FCC’s rulemaking process). 
 321. See id. at 9 (recommending strict time limits on FCC processes, including rulemaking). 
 322. See Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The 
Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
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Professor Elizabeth Garrett suggests that mandatory disclosure rules should 
be designed to provide information “in a way that increases the chances that 
[voters] will encounter it during the course of their everyday activities . . . 
[and] should be tailored to provide only the information most necessary for 
voter competence.”323  Although voter access to such information is important, 
it is only one part of the equation.  As a practical matter, it is equally, if not 
more, important to ensure the ready availability of information for politically 
interested expert groups and organizations, which may serve as informational 
intermediaries for the voting public.324  For example, even if citizens do not 
have all of the detailed information about who is behind a group like Citizens 
United, making that information available to the media, non-partisan election-
watching entities and even political opponents in an easily usable form would 
help such groups further inform the public by revealing the political views 
behind the group’s ads.325  Thus, as the first imperative for a disclosure rule, 
the FCC should make the information available electronically.326  Lengthy 
disclosures embedded in short radio and television spots can confuse 
prospective voters with too much indigestible information.327  Instead, the FCC 
should consider references and links to outside websites during § 317 
announcements.328   
In addition, an FCC attempt to draft rules to achieve the Citizen United goal 
of an informed voting public must address at least three challenges.329  First, 
critics could respond that even if the FCC adopted a rule requiring disclosure 
of donors to non-candidate organizations buying airtime, donors could easily 
seek to circumvent disclosure by incorporating and hiding behind the corporate 
shield.330  If donors could simply circumvent the § 317 requirement by 
structuring the ad-purchasing groups and their donors as matryoshka 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 665, 687–88 (2002) (describing ways organizations have circumvented various disclosure 
rules). 
 323. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1042; see also Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled 
Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295 
(2005) (“Voters have limited time and attention, so they should be provided with information 
most crucial to improving their ability to vote consistently with their preferences.”).  See 
generally Noveck, supra note 297 (discussing the range of possible disclosure regimes focused on 
achieving anti-corruption effects). 
 324. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 298. 
 325. See id. at 298–99 (discussing the effect intermediary groups could have if provided with 
donor disclosures). 
 326. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (suggesting that the Internet will 
play an important role in providing prompt disclosure, which would be readily accessible for the 
public); Bingham, supra note 174, at 1061–62 (explaining a proposed FEC rule requiring the 
availability of funding information on online databases). 
 327. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1065 (noting that too much information can inhibit a 
viewer’s ability to comprehend the information). 
 328. See Bingham, supra note 174, at 1061–62. 
 329. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916. 
 330. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
150 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:97 
corporations or dissolving them shortly after running ads,331 structural 
flexibility permitted under non-FCC law could arguably hamper, if not negate, 
any FCC disclosure regime.  
Second, skeptics could argue that although a rule requiring disclosure of all 
donors would be unworkable and undesirable, a rule limiting disclosure to just 
some donors is necessarily arbitrary.332  On what basis is the FCC to set the 
donor disclosure level?  Identities of small donors are unlikely to function as 
relevant cues or increase voter competence because such insubstantial amounts 
are not generally informative, but excluding this category does not provide 
much of a limit.333  MAP’s rulemaking petition asks the FCC to amend its rules 
to require on-air disclosure in television ads of those donors giving twenty-five 
percent, for a maximum of four listed sponsors.334  In addition, MAP also 
proposes that the FCC require stations to keep in their public files a list 
identifying contributors of ten percent or more to the ad’s nominal sponsor.335  
                                                 
 331. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 296; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 138, at 87–89; 
see also Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $ 1 Million to Pro-Romney group, Then Dissolves, Records 
Offer No Clues Who Was Behind Mystery Company that Donated to ‘Super PAC’, MSNBC.COM 
(Aug. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/ns/politics-decision_2012/t/ 
firm-gives-million-pro-romney-group-then-dissolves/#.Tj2YTGH5NrY (describing one firm, W 
Spann LLC, that disappeared shortly after contributing $1 million to the Romney 2012 
presidential campaign, which left little evidence of donor information).  Subsequently, the donor 
behind the corporation’s contribution, a former partner of Romney’s in a private equity firm, 
came forward to identify himself.  See Dan Eggen, Mystery Pro-Romney Donor Revealed as 
Former Executive at Private Equity Firm, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2011, at A2. The donor, Edward 
Conard, had been a former partner of Mitt Romney’s in Bain Capital.  See Brad Hooker, Men 
Linked to Corporate Donations to Pro-Romney Super PAC Have Long History of Donating to 
Romney, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 13, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/0 
9/money-men-pro-romney-super PAC.html; see also Ronald Campbell, SuperPACs May  
Leave Official Campaigns in Dust, OC REGISTER.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 5:02 AM), http://articl 
es.ocregister.com/2011-09-19/news/30177265_1_romney-super-pac-priorities-usa-action-romney 
-campaign (discussing the affiliations of some super PACs with high-profile candidates). 
 332. See infra notes 342–47 and accompanying text. 
 333. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1042 (“The source and amount of small contributions 
and expenditures are not generally informative to voters, so a disclosure statute should exempt 
individuals and groups that spend insubstantial amounts in this arena.  This exception may be 
required for the law to pass certain constitutional tests, and it also enhances the effectiveness of 
the statute.” (footnote omitted)); see also Briffault, supra note 318, at 1004 (noting that U.S. 
“disclosure thresholds are . . . low by world standards” and that “[r]aising the disclosure threshold 
would protect the privacy of the most vulnerable political actors—small donors—with little or no 
harm to the public education function of disclosure”). 
 334. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 7.  The MAP petition suggested slightly different 
treatment of multiple sponsorships on radio broadcasts.  Id. at 7 n.11 (“MAP proposes that [the 
Commission] limit on-air disclosure to persons or entities providing one-third or more of the 
funding of a commercial message.  Where 10% or more of a commercial’s funding comes from 
one source, radio political ads could include a mandatory statement during the ad that ‘a list of 
sponsors is available in this station’s public file.’”). 
 335. Id. at 8.  The current rules require stations to maintain a publically available file listing 
of “the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of 
directors” of each entity paying for or furnishing political programming.  47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e) 
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These proposals attempt to balance three types of interests: interests in privacy, 
practicability, and promotion of accurate voter cues.336  Of course, although 
these proposals appear reasonable, they beg the question of why these 
particular limits, rather than other plausible options.  Any FCC rule must 
directly address this point. 
Third, donor disclosure might not exhaust the information necessary for 
voting in an informed manner.  Although it is often useful to identify financial 
support, there are many circumstances in which voters would benefit more 
from knowing the masterminds who operate advocacy organizations than from 
knowing their financial backers alone.337  The two categories are neither 
necessarily distinct nor necessarily coextensive.  For example, Republican 
strategist Karl Rove’s direction of Crossroads GPS and American Crossroads 
may be as important a voting cue as the identity of the groups’ major donors.338 
Responding to these challenges in reverse order, this Article proposes first 
that the FCC adopt rules requiring the disclosure of both direct and indirect 
major funders, as well as directors and principal officers of the nominal 
sponsor purchasing the air time.  This rule will enable voters to take 
appropriate cues from the source of funds as well as the advocacy group.339  
The FCC should require disclosure to prevent donors from hiding behind 
501(c) groups that do not have to disclose their donors.340  Further, the 
identities of those directing the operations of the nominal sponsor should be 
disclosed because their background and political connection could influence a 
voter’s interpretation of the ad.341  If the sponsor is not a corporation, then the 
agency should require disclosure of the principal decision-making individuals 
associated with the entity.342   
Second, the percentage chosen in the MAP petition as a threshold for donor 
disclosure is no more arbitrary than any other percentage that would lead to a 
                                                                                                                 
(2010); see also id. § 73.3526(b)(2) (requiring stations that have a website to make their files 
available online). 
 336. See Press Release, Media Access Project, Media Access Project to FCC: Mandate 
Disclosure of Political Broadcast Sponsors (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.media 
access.org/2011/03/media-access-project-to-fcc-mandate-disclosure-of-political-broadcast-
sponsors/. 
 337. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Rove the Bogeyman Is Back, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2010, 
4:32 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/members/forums/thread.cfm?catid=1&subcatid=2&threadid=4 
572980&adv=1 (discussing the effect on the public and political opponents caused by identifying 
Karl Rove as the backer of independent groups supporting Republican candidates); see also 
Garrett, supra note 173, at 1043 (“In most cases . . . support by individuals is not an effective 
heuristic because most well-known people do not have clear reputations for policy positions.”). 
 338. See Vogel, supra note 337. 
 339. See supra notes 336–38. 
 340. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (explaining how some groups currently can organize 
to prevent disclosure). 
 341. See supra notes 336–38. 
 342. See supra notes 336–38 and accompanying text. 
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consensus that such an amount is significant enough qualify a donor as a 
“major funder.”343  The FCC can make a reasonable choice of threshold 
percentage based on a balance of the relevant parties’ interests.344  The most 
pressing need for voters is effective disclosure, due to the constraints of limited 
time and attention.345  Broadcasters’ principal concerns are cost, ease of 
administration, and the desire to increase political advertising.346  The interests 
of donors include privacy and the desire to avoid harassment.347  Independent 
groups are likely concerned with maintaining their reputations so as to garner 
supporters and influence policymakers.348 
Finally, the claim that the proposed disclosure rules invite circumvention is 
no stronger in the FCC context than in any other disclosure-based reform.349  
Although the opportunities for circumvention may exist, there are also costs 
associated with circumventing such rules and hiding information.350  Failure to 
disclose may also raise credibility concerns because viewers will wonder what 
the group is hiding.351  Additionally, ideological organizations and their 
participants often face the conflicting desires of hiding their memberships from 
those who would disagree, while simultaneously publicizing their activities 
and donors to those in their ideological camp.352  Satisfying both goals 
becomes increasingly difficult, as organizational structures tilt toward secrecy.  
At the same time, organizations trying to increase their political profiles might 
feel that more transparency could strengthen influence.353  Furthermore, 
                                                 
 343. Cf. Editorial, The FCC Muzzle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, at A16 (“The petition also 
seems to have pulled the 25% and 10% disclosure thresholds out of the air, because it makes no 
attempt to justify them.”). 
 344. See supra note 336 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1012–13 (discussing the importance of making 
information that is necessary for decision making easily available to voters who are too busy to 
spend extended time learning about candidates). 
 346. See, e.g., Michael Corcoran & Stephen Maher, Media Don’t Bite the Ruling that Feeds 
Them, FAIR (Jan. 2011), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=4223. 
 347. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1043. 
 348. See id. at 1027–28 (discussing the desire of independent groups to have the public know 
who they support in order to encourage public supporters to become “due-paying members” and 
to use their reputations to influence policymakers). 
 349. See Garrett, supra note 322, at 686–88 (describing ways in which organizations 
circumvent various FCC and BCRA disclosure rules). 
 350. See, e.g., id. at 690 (“A candidate who discloses nothing does send an interesting signal 
about her credibility.”); Garrett, supra note 173, at 1027 (explaining advocacy groups’ incentive 
to publicize their views to attract supporters). 
 351. See Garrett, supra note 322, at 690. 
 352. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 297–99 (describing which organizations want to 
publish their membership and when they might work to hide their membership);  see also Garrett, 
supra note 173, at 1027. 
 353. Admittedly, donors could choose to tell a partisan leadership group of their involvement 
while still remaining undisclosed to the public.  See, e.g., Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (“‘Say I 
gave a million dollars to Crossroads GPS,’ said [Professor] Rick Hasen . . . ‘You can tell the 
whole Republican leadership that.  ProPublica can’t find it, but the people you are trying to 
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independent ideological groups that seek to engage in political advertising vary 
in their available resources and capacities.354  Strategies to evade disclosure 
that might be financially and otherwise viable for large, sophisticated groups 
might not be equally available to more modest organizations.355  Moreover, 
FCC sponsorship-identification rules configured to require corporate donors to 
reveal their directors, principal officers, and perhaps even major shareholders 
would likely reveal the organization’s principal movers.356 
4.  Voluntarily Adopted Disclosure Guidelines 
Nothing in the Communications Act or the FCC’s rules prohibits broadcast 
stations and cable operators themselves from implementing their own private 
rules requiring more explicit disclosure about the people and entities funding 
and operating independent, third-party organizations.357 
The main obstacle to stations voluntarily implementing their own disclosure 
rules is the concern that independent political-support groups might shun those 
stations requiring disclosure in favor of their less punctilious competitors.  Fear 
of competitive disadvantage and the loss of political-advertising revenue might 
cause stations to be less willing to adopt contractual requirements 
voluntarily.358  If, however, loss of competitive advantage is the only obstacle 
impeding voluntary disclosure rules, corporations might be induced to adopt 
them in exchange for rewards or benefits.  For example, the FCC and other 
organizations could give stations that have adopted voluntary disclosure rules 
an approval rating similar to a Good Housekeeping seal of approval, which 
could have positive reputational and economic value to the station and enhance 
the station’s or network’s brand.359  In light of the public’s expressed distaste 
                                                                                                                 
influence can find it.’”).  Nevertheless, people know that as soon as information is revealed to one 
party, it will quickly spread to others. 
 354. See, e.g., Luo & Palmer, supra note 101 (describing considerable differences in 
spending among various independent groups). 
 355. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing the levels of organization necessary to 
evade disclosure); see also Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 296 (describing the complexity 
required to obscure the other source of funding). 
 356. Sponsorship-identification rules grant broad authority to the FCC.  See Sponsorship 
Identification Rules, 34 F.C.C. 829, 849 (1963); Applicability of Sponsorship Identification 
Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 141 (1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975).  As a practical 
matter, and to the extent that control follows investment, identification of the major actors in the 
corporation would probably reveal important donors even if shareholder disclosure was not 
directly required.  Often, there will be an overlap between the directors and principal officers and 
the shareholders of these companies. 
 357. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006); see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 358. In fact, stations heavily rely on political advertisements for their revenue.  See, e.g., 
Corcoran & Maher, supra note 346 (“Political ads are expected to account for 11 percent of the 
total revenue for local broadcasters this year . . . .”); Malone, supra note 82. 
 359. See The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOODHOUSEKEEPER, http://www. 
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for negative advertising,360 some stations might opt for voluntary disclosure 
policies particularly if they were not alone in doing so.   
C.  Revival of a Zapple-Type Antidiscrimination Doctrine for Independent Ads 
In addition to forcing third-party disclosures, the FCC could apply a rule 
based on its dormant Zapple doctrine to post-Citizens United advertising 
expenditures.361  The FCC has the authority to adopt this quasi-equal 
opportunities rule, which could have a beneficial impact on disclosure, at least 
on the margins.362   
Because the FCC never repudiated the Zapple doctrine, it still exists 
unofficially, although it has rarely been asserted with success.363  Critics would 
argue that the possibility of an equal opportunities requirement for 
independent-group ads is doomed because the Zapple doctrine has its roots in 
the now-abandoned fairness doctrine.364  However, a revival of the fairness 
                                                                                                                 
goodhousekeeping.com/product-reviews/history/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).  The possibility that 
advertisers could move their business to other types of media does not necessarily mean that this 
kind of voluntary, industry-based “branding” approach would fail. 
 360. See Tom Denari, Why Attack Ads and Disney Movies Are So Darned Effective, ADAGE 
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://adage.com/article/small-agency-diary/attack-ads-disney-movies-darned-
effective/146579/; Do Negative Campaign Ads Work?, THISNATION.COM (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://thisnation.com/question/031.html (“[V]oters overwhelmingly dislike negative advertising 
and are troubled by its widespread use.”); Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Skeptical About What 
They See in Political Ads, GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/25093/americans 
-skeptical-about-what-they-see-political-ads.aspx (discussing the public’s distaste for negative 
advertising in political campaigns). 
 361. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Zapple doctrine). 
 362. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (granting the FCC the authority to require broadcasters to 
provide equal opportunity to opposing candidates). 
 363. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 455–56 (“The Zapple doctrine has survived, though 
successful complainants are rarely brought against networks for following it.”). 
 364. See id. at 456 (“Congress has never codified the Zapple rule, and so its future is in a 
much more precarious position after the fairness doctrine’s repeal . . . .”).  After much critique, 
the FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine in 1987.  Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 
5057 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  In August 2011, the FCC officially removed the fairness doctrine 
from its books.  John Eggerton, FCC Strikes Fairness Doctrine from Fed Rulebook, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article 
/472722-FCC_Strikes_Fairness_Doctrine_From_Fed_Rulebook.php. 
     Many years after the FCC abandoned the general fairness doctrine, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to repeal the personal-attack and political-editorializing 
rules, which were particular applications of the fairness doctrine.  See Radio-Television News 
Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Repeal or Modification of the Personal 
Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,643, 66,644 (Nov. 7, 2000) (revising 
sections 73 and 76 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations). 
     Calling for the revival of a regulatory doctrine associated with the fairness doctrine may be 
particularly dangerous as a political matter.  Perhaps because of the view that right-wing talk 
radio was able to develop only because of the demise of the fairness doctrine, conservatives are 
strongly opposed to a return of the doctrine.  See Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take ‘Fairness 
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doctrine is not a necessary prerequisite for the application of the Zapple-type 
antidiscrimination doctrine to independent expenditures.365  Commissioner 
Nicholas Johnson, in his concurring opinion in Zapple, chided the FCC’s 
decision as effectively “bring[ing] in ‘supporters’ of or ‘spokesmen’ for 
candidates through the back door of the fairness doctrine.”366  He saw “no legal 
reason why the Commission could not rule that sec. 315 (a) encompasses 
spokesmen for or supporters of political candidates as a logical extension of 
congressional intent.”367  This Article does not contend that § 315, in an 
expanded reading, should cover airtime purchases by independent groups; 
rather, it proposes that the FCC can and should apply antidiscrimination 
principles to airtime sales for non-candidate electoral speech under the 
ancillary authority granted to the FCC to effectuate the goals of § 315.   
                                                                                                                 
Doctrine’ Off the Books, FOXNEWS.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/ 
06/08/fcc-agrees-to-take-fairness-doctrine-off-books/. 
 365. The Zapple doctrine was associated with the now-defunct fairness doctrine only because 
the request for an interpretive ruling from which the Zapple doctrine was derived was specifically 
couched in terms of the fairness doctrine.  See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 707 (1970).  
Rather than an application of the fairness doctrine, the Zapple doctrine is, in fact, much closer to a 
determination of the outer parameters of the equal opportunities principle under the FCC’s 
ancillary jurisdiction.  See infra notes 373–80. 
     This is not inconsistent with the FCC’s recent rejection, under judicial duress, of its  
personal-attack and political-editorializing rules.  See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, 229 
F.3d at 272; Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 643.  The FCC’s now-eliminated political-editorializing rule had required broadcasters 
endorsing a candidate to notify the candidate’s opponents and offer them equal opportunities to 
respond to the endorsement. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1998).  The personal-attack rule required 
broadcasters to notify the victim of an on-air attack on her character or integrity and offer equal 
opportunities to the subject of the attack to respond.  47 C.F.R. § 73.1920.  Broadcasters 
challenged the personal-attack and political-editorializing rules after the fairness doctrine was 
struck down, but the challenges were stalled on the FCC docket for years prior to the Court of 
Appeals’s intervention. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, 184 F.2d at 877–78 (recanting the 
history of challenges to the personal-attack and political-editorializing rules). 
     Repeal of the political-editorializing and personal-attack rules should not necessarily imply the 
same outcome for the Zapple doctrine.  These rules were far more intrusive on editorial discretion 
than the quasi-equal opportunities doctrine.  The political-editorializing rule directly penalized 
broadcasters’ decisions to make political endorsements, and doubtless had a chilling effect on 
direct political speech by the broadcast licensee itself.  Similarly, the personal-attack rule imposed 
a potentially onerous and vague obligation to identify attacks and provide free response time.  In 
addition to these distinctions, it should be noted that the personal-attack and  
political-editorializing rules arose not out of § 315, but directly out of the fairness doctrine from 
the outset.  In fact, the famous case in which the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to the fairness doctrine—Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC—dealt with those rules 
rather than the general fairness-doctrine obligation.  See generally 395 U.S. 367 (1960). 
 366. Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d at 710 n.4. 
 367. Id. (charging that the majority failed to explain why “the Commission is apparently 
unwilling to enlarge sec.315(a), but willing to narrow the Cullman interpretation of the fairness 
doctrine. There may well be policy reasons for this approach; if so, I would have preferred that 
they appear in the majority’s letter”). 
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The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, recognized by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., provided that the FCC should have 
the authority to regulate in a manner “reasonably ancillary to the effective 
performance of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television 
broadcasting.”368  Given the FCC’s express statutory authority to regulate 
political advertisements under § 315, the FCC can reasonably read the 
ancillary-jurisdiction doctrine to permit the adoption of regulations that adapt 
the statutory antidiscrimination regime to the realities of modern political 
advertising.369  Although the dangers of an expansive ancillary jurisdiction 
doctrine are evident, adoption of an antidiscrimination rule akin to Zapple’s 
                                                 
 368. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (interpreting the 1968 
incarnation of 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)).  Under this grant of authority, the FCC commenced its 
regulation of cable television two decades before Congress enacted the Cable Communications 
Act of 1984.  Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority 
over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 
403, 436–39 (1982); see also Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98–549, 98 Stat. 2779.  
Title I of the Act also gives the FCC authority to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and 
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the 
execution of its functions.”  47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).  This provision is often referred to as the 
“necessary and proper” clause of the Act.  John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: 
A Unified Theory of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585, 596 & n.53 
(2009).  The extent of the agency’s ancillary authority is also part of the current discussion on 
FCC’s authority to regulate the Internet.  See, e.g., id. at 587; James B. Speta, The Shaky 
Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 107 (2010) 
[hereinafter Speta, Shaky Foundations].  More specifically, with regard to radio and television, 
the preamble to section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides that the standard for 
FCC action is  “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”  Communications Act of 1934, §303, 
47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).  Section 303(r) of the current statute authorizes the FCC to “[m]ake such 
rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as 
may be necessary.”  Id. § 303(r).  Section 315(d) provides that “[t]he Commission shall prescribe 
appropriate rules and regulations to carry out” its statutory authority.  Id. § 315(d). 
     For further discussions of the Commission’s ancillary authority, see Susan P. Crawford, The 
Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873, 925–31 (2006); Joseph 
R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero to Plenary in Twenty-Five 
Years, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 113 passim (1985); Mark D. Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to 
Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DENV. U. L. REV. 477 
passim (1976); Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra, passim; James B. Speta, FCC Authority to 
Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 22–30 (2003) 
[hereinafter Speta, FCC Authority]; Speta, Shaky Foundations, supra, at 107; Philip J. Weiser, 
Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 50–51 (2003). 
 369. 47 U.S.C. § 315(d).  Perhaps the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was not mentioned in 
Zapple because its recognition by the Supreme Court in the 1968 Southwestern Cable decision 
was so recent at that time.  See supra note 368 and accompanying text.  In addition, the Zapple 
ruling was issued in response to a request specifically phrased in fairness-doctrine terms.  See 
Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d at 707.  Because the fairness doctrine was still in force and could easily 
resolve the questions posed, and because (as pointed out by Commissioner Nicholas Johnson in 
his concurrence) the FCC had previously taken the position that § 315(a) did not apply to airtime 
purchases by candidate supporters, the FCC may not have thought it necessary to revisit § 315(a) 
or invoke the new doctrine of ancillary authority.  See supra notes 363, 366–67 and 
accompanying text. 
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quasi-equal opportunities is a far less aggressive exercise of regulatory power 
than others the FCC has previously justified under the mantle of ancillary 
authority.370   
                                                 
 370. To be sure, the ancillary-jurisdiction doctrine is controversial and its boundaries unclear.  
See, e.g., Blevins, supra note 368, at 587 (“Analyzing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has been 
an exercise in confusion.”).  Some have criticized the doctrine as “vague and incoherent,” 
whereas others have warned of its “virtually limitless” scope.  Id.  Professor (and former FCC 
Commissioner) Glen Robinson views the FCC’s use of the doctrine to regulate cable as a seminal 
example of the agency “creat[ing] its mandate out of thin air.”  Glen O. Robinson, Regulating 
Communications: Stories from the First Hundred Years, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 303, 308–09 (2010). 
     Regardless of one’s view of the extent of the FCC’s residual authority to regulate technologies 
not clearly subject to the Act in the absence of explicit statutory jurisdiction, application of 
ancillary authority to the narrow context of political ads should be far less troublesome.  In the 
context of political advertising, the FCC would be regulating areas in which it has much more 
express statutory authority, and with regard to technologies, it is expressly authorized to regulate 
in the public interest, convenience, and necessity.  See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 368, 
at 454–55 (proposing that “the Commission’s jurisdiction extends to entities that (1) own, 
operate, or use interstate wire or radio communications facilities; and (2) thereby engage in 
activities that have a substantial impact on the Commission’s ability to carry out its statutory 
obligations”).  In other words, a Zapple-like equal opportunities regime for third-party political 
advertising is arguably “sufficiently close to the underlying jurisdictional hook” to fit a traditional 
account of when courts uphold FCC exercises of ancillary jurisdiction.  See Blevins, supra note 
368, at 607 (describing and criticizing the traditional account).  For an early judicial recognition 
of the FCC’s “expansive powers” to regulate under the Communications Act of 1934, see Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (approving the FCC’s broad “chain 
broadcasting” rules, which were designed to curb monopolistic network power, even though the 
agency did not have direct statutory authority over broadcast networks). 
     Of course, reasonable minds could disagree as to the closeness of the relationship between 
direct statutory authority and any given exercise of FCC ancillary authority.  See Blevins, supra 
note 368, at 607–08 (“What exactly makes a given regulatory scheme ‘close’ to the underlying 
statutory authority?  Are there any objectively verifiable ways to assess it?”).  Critics of the 
approach suggested here could also claim that the FCC should not be able to adopt regulations 
under its ancillary authority that could be said to undermine the legislative intent behind the direct 
statutory hook.  In addition, those who seek to limit the exercise of ancillary authority to 
situations in which regulation will promote market competition might be concerned that a Zapple-
type rule would extend ancillary jurisdiction improperly to promote controversial non-economic 
goals.  Id. at 617–18, 627–28. 
     These objections should not, however, preclude a quasi-equal opportunities rule grounded on 
ancillary jurisdiction.  Political broadcasting is one area in which there should be little 
disagreement that the goals of the explicit statutory provisions would be closely promoted by a 
well-crafted and reasonable Zapple-type rule.  Congress saw “radio’s potential importance as a 
medium of communication of political ideas [and] . . . sought to foster its broadest possible 
utilization.”  Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959).  
Moreover, if independent third-party ads are likely to flood radio and television during elections, 
the FCC needs the power to prevent partisan distortions in such ads so that they do not undermine 
the goals of § 315.  If cable regulation was properly justified under the FCC’s ancillary 
jurisdiction because of cable’s impact on broadcasting, then surely the FCC should have the 
authority to regulate non-candidate ads possibly affecting the role of candidate equal 
opportunities in the electoral scheme.  See infra note 385 (noting that neither the legislative 
history nor the text of § 315 establish whether a Zapple rule would be inconsistent with § 315).  
Courts have affirmed exercises of FCC ancillary authority in circumstances of clearer tension.  
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Indeed, there is a direct relationship between ensuring rough equivalence in 
independent political ads and effectuating the congressional intent behind  
§ 315(a), which provides political opponents with equal opportunities to 
address the voters.371  Without a similar antidiscrimination principle applied to 
independent-group advertising, opposing independent advocates could well 
drown out the candidates whose speech is protected under § 315(a).372  The 
FCC surely has the authority to ensure that § 315(a) does not become an 
insignificant and irrelevant element in a political discourse. 
The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 envisioned a 
politics in which broadcasters would not stack the deck against candidates’ 
opportunities to speak to the voters.373  Today’s political reality—in contrast to 
that of 1927 and 1934—is that much election advertising is controlled not by 
parties or candidates, but by third-party, independent groups.374  The § 315 
antidiscrimination principle originated from legislators’ concerns about 
discriminatory sales of political-advertising time.375  Today, when independent 
advertising expenditures may well exceed candidate- and party-funded ads, it 
would be prudent to ensure that broadcast licensees do not unduly favor a 
particular side and thereby effectively eviscerate § 315(a).376  
                                                                                                                 
See Blevins, supra note 368, at 595–600.  Perhaps that is because too limiting a reading of the 
direct statutory authority would effectively eliminate ancillary authority.  Finally, whatever the 
merits in general of distinguishing between economic and noneconomic regulatory goals to 
justify the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, a reasonable attempt to prevent strategic political 
partisanship in the transmission of independent political ads would not likely be a controversial 
goal as such.  Disagreement would likely be limited to the particulars of the rules as adopted. 
 371. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). 
 372. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 373. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 446 (discussing the history of § 315(c)). 
 374. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the rapidly increasing rule of 
independent groups in recent years); see also Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (discussing the 
relationship between candidates and independent support groups).  On the other hand, it is true 
that such independent groups can informally coordinate with parties and candidates.  See Barker 
& Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the interplay between independent groups and parties and 
candidates); Hooker, supra note 331. 
 375. Herbert Hoover, then-Secretary of Commerce, testified before Congress in the 1920s 
that “[w]e can not allow any single person or group to place themselves in position where they 
can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the 
Government should ever be placed in the position of censoring this material.”  To Regulate Radio 
Communication: Hearing on H.R. 7357 Before H. Comm. on the Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 
68th Cong. 8 (1924) (statement of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce).  Many congressmen 
sought common-carrier status for broadcasters with respect to use of stations for political 
candidates and “discussion of any question affecting the public.”  Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973) (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,503 (1928)).  
Ultimately, the 1927 Act did not include common-carrier language, but it did include an amended 
equal opportunities provision, which has since been enacted in § 315.  Id. 
 376. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 31, at 204 (discussing increasing levels of independent 
advertising expenditures). 
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It is important for the FCC to provide a bulwark against partisan decisions 
by broadcasters with respect to advocacy ads.  Some critics of this assertion 
might argue that this kind of antidiscrimination rule is unnecessary, because 
private, profit-maximizing broadcast licensees, which are increasingly reliant 
on political advertising for their bottom lines, will not sacrifice profit at the 
altar of ideology.377  However, this is not entirely reassuring, as the history of 
broadcasting contains examples of political favoritism.378  Today, as well, 
entities like Fox Broadcasting give reason to fear electoral partisanship by at 
least some broadcasters.379  Moreover, industry accounts suggest that groups 
spurred by Citizens United may inundate broadcasters with requests for  
third-party political ads.380  If stations are faced with a scarcity of airtime 
available for political advertising during peak electoral periods, they will have 
to select from a number of competing advertisements and advertisers.  This 
might lead to at least some partisan effects, even if political partisanship is not 
the official policy of the station.381  If that is so, then a quasi-equal 
opportunities rule could help level the playing field among non-candidate 
electoral advertisers.382 
                                                 
 377. See supra note 358 (noting stations’ heavy reliance on political-advertising revenue). 
 378. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 44 (highlighting that concern over “politically interested 
media owners” and paternalistic concern for the public were factors that led to the adoption of  
§ 315(a)). 
 379. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take ‘Fairness Doctrine’ Off the Books, 
FOXNEWS.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/08/fcc-agrees-to-take-
fairness-doctrine-off-books/. 
 380. Reed-Huff, supra note 31, at 204 (citing Downey, supra note 195). 
 381. Cf. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Media Buying After Citizens United, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, 
June 2010, at 10 (discussing the increased competition among advertisers after Citizens United). 
 382. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.  Alternatively, the application of the 
Zapple doctrine arguably could have the negative effect of “tak[ing] [further] inventory away 
from the candidates.”  Cf. Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (arguing that because third-party groups 
are not guaranteed the stations’ lowest unit rates applicable to candidate advertising, broadcasters 
might prefer to sell airtime to them, thereby putting candidates “at a disadvantage because 
wealthy third party groups could lock in their ad buys early, before a candidate has raised the 
money to cover his or her media plan”).  On this view, imposing Zapple obligations on third-party 
advertising might create a scarcity of broadcast ad time for candidates, who might shift to non-
broadcast advertising venues, leaving broadcast television as the noisy battleground of third-party 
groups.  However, this is not likely to happen very soon.  First, broadcasters have statutory 
obligations to offer equal opportunities when § 315 applies and to provide reasonable access to 
federal candidates under § 312(a)(7).  See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (2006).  They logically 
must be conservative in their third-party airtime sales to make sure that they can meet candidate 
airtime requests.  Second, broadcast television and cable are still the most significant advertising 
venues.  Katharine Q. Seelye, About $2.6 Billion Spent on Political Ads in 2008, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 2, 2008, 4:15 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/about-26-billion-spent-
on-political-ads-in-2008/.  The Internet, although increasingly important, cannot yet compete with 
the traditional electronic media, so it is unrealistic to expect massive candidate flight from 
television. 
160 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:97 
This Article does not follow Commissioner Johnson’s lead in Zapple383 by 
arguing that requiring equal opportunities for a candidate’s supporters and 
opponents is a logical interpretation of § 315(a).  One simple reason is that 
reading independent third-party political advertising into § 315(a) would 
stretch the statutory language384 and legislative history.385  Another is that strict 
                                                 
 383. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 709–11 (1970) (Johnson, Comm’r, concurring). 
 384. See 47 U.S.C. § 315.  The statutory language limiting its application to “legally 
qualified candidates” constrains how expansively § 315(a) can reasonably be interpreted.  See id.  
It would not unduly stretch the statute to conclude that equal opportunities should apply not only 
to candidates, but also to the candidate’s authorized speakers.  In such circumstances, the 
authorized speaker would effectively be acting as a proxy for the candidate, and the statutory 
language could reasonably be considered to cover such speakers.  As for unauthorized supporters, 
the statute could be interpreted to include such independent speakers if the statutory terms 
“legally qualified candidates” could be read to refer not to candidates, but to candidacies.  Such a 
reading, however, conflicts with the § 315 language securing equal opportunities to “any person 
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 385. One argument for why the FCC should not seek to situate a Zapple-type doctrine in the 
equal opportunities provision itself is that in 1927 and 1934 Congress chose not to enact proposed 
bills that would have extended equal opportunities to candidate supporters and parties.  Although 
the legislative history provides no clear explanation of why Congress so limited equal 
opportunities, it could be argued that Congress, by its actions, effectively rejected Zapple-like 
protections.  See Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1950) 
(“[T]here are strong reasons for advocating . . . a broad construction [of § 315 to include 
broadcasts by candidate supporters].  When we turn to the legislative history of Section 315, 
however, we find this very question of including supporters of candidates within the purview of 
that section has been specifically considered and rejected by the Congress, which has made it 
perfectly clear that the section is intended to apply only to the personal use of broadcasting 
facilities by the candidates themselves.”). 
     Before the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, a significant number of congressmen objected to 
what they called private censorship by broadcasters and called for licensees to be regulated as 
common carriers, required to provide “equal service and equal treatment to all.”  Columbia 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1972) (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 
5482 (1926) (statement of Rep. Edwin Davis)).  A bill reported to the Senate by the Committee 
on Interstate Commerce specified that broadcasters could “make no discrimination as to the use 
of such broadcasting station” if they permitted their stations to be used “for the discussion of any 
question affecting the public.”  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-404, at 18 (1926)).  However, many 
others objected to broadcasters becoming common carriers “compelled to accept anything and 
everything that was offered.”  Id. (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (statement of Sen. Clarence 
Dill)).  Senator Clarence Dill, explaining the need for an amendment to the proposed legislation, 
stated the view that “[w]hen we recall that broadcasting today is purely voluntary, and the 
listener-in pays nothing for it, that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of building up his 
reputation, it seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a 
common carrier.”  Id.  Ultimately as passed, section 18 provided that: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any 
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all 
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the 
licensing authority shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect: 
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material 
broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No obligation is hereby imposed upon 
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. 
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Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170; see also 5 AMERICAN 
LANDMARK LEGISLATION: PRIMARY MATERIALS 419–52 (Irving J. Sloan, ed. 1977) (discussing 
the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934). 
     Before the passage of the 1934 Act as well, Congress sought to require licensees to give equal 
opportunities to candidate supporters and opponents “‘to permit equal opportunity for the 
presentation of both sides of public questions.’”  Mark R. Arbuckle, The Evolving 
“Communications Marketplace”: Rethinking Broadcast Fairness Two Decades After Syracuse 
Peace Council, 18 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 69, 72 (2008) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 72-2106, at 4 
(1933)).  In the 72nd Congress, the House and Senate both passed H.R. 7716, a bill to amend the 
Radio Act of 1927, which contained an amendment broadening section 18, “generally referred to 
as the ‘political section[,]’ [which was] designed to insure equality of treatment to candidates for 
public office, those speaking in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public office, or 
in the presentation of views on public questions.”  76 CONG. REC. 5038 (1933); see 5 AMERICAN 
LANDMARK LEGISLATION, supra, at 448.  Without explanation, President Herbert Hoover pocket-
vetoed this amendment in addition to numerous other pieces of legislation in 1933.  Arbuckle, 
supra, at 72; see also Turner Catledge, Congress Ends in Solemn Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 
1933, at D5.  In the next Congress, a bill including a proposed § 315 modeled on the expanded 
section 18 that had been pocket vetoed was again introduced in the Senate.  S. 3285, 73rd Cong. 
(1934).  Although the Senate passed the bill “extend[ing] the requirement of equality of treatment 
of political candidates to supporters and opponents of candidates, and public questions before the 
people for a vote,” differences between the Senate and House bills led to the appointment of a 
conference committee, whose report struck out this expanded equal opportunities provision.  
Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 3, 5 (1950); 5 AMERICAN LANDMARK 
LEGISLATION, supra, at 450–52.  Instead, it was decided that the new § 315 should mirror section 
18 of the Radio Act of 1927.  See 78 CONG. REC. 10,988 (1934) (reflecting the conferees’ report, 
without explanation, that “[t]he Senate provisions, which would have modified and extended the 
present law, is not included in the substitute”).  Ultimately, Congress passed § 315 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 without any reference to uses of broadcast stations by non-
candidates.  The Third Circuit read this legislative history as “clearly disclos[ing] the intention of 
the Congress with respect to a provision which otherwise might be regarded as ambiguous.”  
Felix, 186 F.2d at 5. 
     Nevertheless, an argument can be made that a Zapple-like quasi-equal opportunities FCC 
regulation would not, in fact, be inconsistent with congressional intent if we focus on the entire 
period at the dawn of radio regulation and the overall legislative debates.  First, there was strong 
legislative sentiment throughout the period for an expansion of the non-discrimination provision 
beyond candidates.  See Arbuckle, supra, at 72.  But for the President’s unexplained pocket veto 
of H.R. 7716 in 1933, an equal opportunities requirement extending to supporters and opponents 
of candidates would have amended section 18 of the Radio Act and become law.  Id. Although 
President Hoover did not explain the veto, it is unlikely to have resulted from the  
equal opportunities provision.  See id.  Thereafter, S. 3285, which passed in the Senate, expanded 
§ 315 by “extend[ing] the requirement of equality of treatment of political candidates to 
supporters and opponents of candidates, and public questions before the people for a vote.”  S. 
REP. NO. 72-564, at 10 (1932).  Available records do not explain the trimming of the provision by 
the conference committee, which resulted in the limited version appearing in the Communications 
Act of 1934.  At worst, then, the legislative history shows a controversial provision that missed 
becoming law by a hair’s breadth. 
     Second, congressional discussion throughout this period also demonstrates a concern that 
legislating equal opportunities for the discussion of public issues would lead broadcasters to avoid 
airing discussions of public issues.  67 CONG. REC. 12,504 (1926).  In a statement delivered 
during a Senate hearing on S. 2910 in 1934, an officer of the National Association of 
Broadcasters characterized “the inevitable effect” of the proposed § 315 as “tak[ing] away the 
usefulness of radio by driving political discussions off the air.”  A Bill to Provide for the 
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Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio, and for Other Purposes: 
Hearing on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Cong. 67 (1934) 
(statement of Henry Bellows, Officer of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter Hearing on 
S. 2910].  This may have been, in part, because of concerns about imposing expanded defamation 
liability on broadcasters.  Under one of the proposed bills, for example, broadcasters would not 
have any power of censorship over the political speech they aired, but they would not be granted 
the immunity against defamation liability later recognized in WDAY.  See 68 CONG. REC. 4152 
(1926) (statement of Sen. Robert Howell).  The larger the number of people who would have to 
be granted equal opportunities, the larger the threat of defamation liability for the stations.  It is 
because of this that the National Assocation of Broadcasters representative argued against S. 
2190: “It says, in effect, that since the present situation [liability without the right to censor under 
section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927] is intolerable, this bill [will] make it very much worse.”  
Hearing on S. 2910, supra, at 67; see also 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926) (Statement of Sen. Robert 
Howell).  If this is so, then the objecting congressmen were worried not about equal opportunities 
for political speech by candidate supporters as such, but by the expanded defamation liability 
such speakers would pose under a regime in which no immunity was statutorily provided.  
Hearing on S. 2910, supra, at 67; 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926) (statement of Sen. Robert Howell).  
In addition to concerns about defamation liability, broadcasters also expressed concern about the 
potentially expansive obligations to provide equal opportunities: “If I permit 1 person to speak 
over a station for 15 minutes in behalf of a candidate, then I must permit 50 other people to have 
the same amount of time each.  That is what you say but I take it that is not what you meant.”  To 
Amend the Radio Act of 1927: Hearing on H.R. 7716 Before the S. Comm. on the Interstate 
Commerce, 72nd Cong. 11 (1932) (statement of Henry Bellows, Officer of the Nat’l Ass’n of 
Broadcasters). 
     Third, none of the unsuccessful bills limited the expansion of equal opportunities just to 
supporters and opponents of candidates.  In rejecting those provisions, Congress was thus 
rejecting much more expansive regulation than simply broadcasts by candidate supporters or 
opponents.  The proposed bills effectively turned broadcasters into common carriers in the area of 
speech on matters of public concern.  See 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (1926) (Statement of Sen. 
Clarence Dill).  Many legislators, including Senator Dill, objected to the transformation of radio 
stations into common carriers.  Id.  Thus, it is not clear whether the application of equal 
opportunities only to supporters and opponents of candidates would necessarily have been seen as 
posing as great a threat. 
     Fourth, one commentator claims that “key legislators believed the 1927 Radio Act already 
required stations to provide fair access to non-candidates.  In their view, it was not necessary to 
add a fairness amendment since the Radio Act was left intact when it was transplanted into the 
1934 Act.”  Arbuckle, supra, at 73.  As documented in the legislative history, some commented 
that discrimination in political advertising had not been a significant problem prior to 1927, 
indicating a desire to limit the relevance of the issue.  See 68 CONG. REC. 3032, 3258 (1927) 
(statement of Sen. Clarence Dill).  There is also evidence that “many licensees have operated on 
the assumption that supporters are also included.  They have made equal time available to 
opposing supporters, parties and candidates.”  Jack H. Friedenthal & Richard J. Medalie, The 
Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 
72 HARV. L. REV. 445, 484–65 (1959); Note, Campaign Speeches on Radio and TV: Impartiality 
Via the Communications Act, 61 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1952) (footnote omitted).  They may have 
done so on the assumption that their public interest obligations and the FCC’s fairness doctrine 
required it.  Now that the fairness doctrine is no longer part of the FCC’s regulatory arsenal, it 
could be argued that it is necessary to assimilate speech by candidates’ supporters and opponents 
back into § 315. 
     Finally, the original drafters of radio law were open to statutory revision in light of experience.  
Given the “new and undeveloped” character of the radio industry, Senator Dill argued in 1926 
that Congress should not “put too many legislative shackles around the industry at this stage of its 
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application of the § 315 regime would be unworkable.  Even though 
broadcasters have been known to complain about “equal time” burdens in 
crowded electoral fields, it is easy enough to determine who should be 
considered a “legally qualified candidate” under § 315.386  However, the 
universe of groups and individuals potentially entitled to equal opportunities 
under an expanded definition of § 315(a) is both far greater and more 
uncertain.  Given the potentially innumerable equal opportunity requests that 
could be received in response to a single ad supporting or opposing a 
candidate, a broadened application of the equal opportunities provision could 
paralyze broadcasters and cable operators.  Indeed, in an election with many 
candidates and support groups, imagining circumstances in which a station 
would not be vulnerable to a claim that it had not provided strictly equal 
opportunities to all views would be very difficult.  Further, the legislative 
histories of the Communications Act and the Radio Act demonstrate a concern 
that requiring equal opportunities for the discussion of public issues would 
overburden broadcasters with demands for equal airtime because “public 
issue” can be interpreted very broadly.387  
Of course, neither the Communications Act nor the FCC’s rules prohibit 
broadcast licensees from either rejecting non-candidate political advertising or 
negotiating its revision.388  In Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. Democratic 
National Committee, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld broadcaster 
discretion to reject advocacy advertising.389  Thus, broadcasters could choose 
to reject an offensive or misleading political advertisement.390  Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                 
development.”  68 CONG. REC. 3028 (1927).  As broadcast interference called for legislation, but 
the two Houses could not agree, Senator Dill argued for passage of a compromise statute open to 
future revision.  Id.  In sum, Congress’s passage of equal opportunities provisions limited to 
candidates in 1927 and 1934 need not be read as an explicit rejection of a general 
antidiscrimination principle with regard to political advertising by candidates’ supporters and 
opponents. 
     Despite these arguments about the legislative history of the early radio statutes, this Article 
takes the position that there are policy advantages to grounding a Zapple-like doctrine on the 
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction rather than in the logic of § 315, regardless of Commissioner 
Johnson’s position in Zapple. 
 386. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (a)(1) (2010).  The regulation includes additional requirements for 
legal qualification as well.  Id. § 73.1940. 
 387. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 99, 106–07 (1973) 
(quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,509 (1926)).  Congress wanted to avoid setting up broadcasters as 
common carriers required to air everything that came their way “so long as the price was paid.”  
Id. at 106 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (1926)). 
 388. See id. at 122–23 (finding that the Act does not prohibit the FCC from allowing 
broadcasters to refuse to sell ad space to groups that desire to spend on an issue). 
 389. Id. at 94, 97, 132. 
 390. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive Political Speech from the 1970s to 2008: A 
Broadcaster’s Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241, 282–83 
(2008). 
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broadcast industry had a long history—particularly at the networks—of 
rejecting all advocacy advertising prior to the 1980s.391 
Television and radio have shifted radically.  Too much money is at stake in 
political advertising for stations to even consider rejecting many outside-group 
political ads.392  Economically beleaguered stations and networks are no longer 
squeamish about avoiding advocacy advertising.393  Although stations might 
still reject some kinds of political advertising as a moral matter,394 the large 
majority of commercial broadcasters and cable companies are likely to resist 
foregoing significant financial benefits in response to arguably moral 
objections.  As commercial enterprises with profit-maximizing officers and 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, these entities will face commercial 
imperative weighing heavily against moral scruples over395 harsh and arguably 
misleading political-advocacy advertising.396 
Short of a blanket rejection of all ads that might trigger expanded § 315 
obligations, how could a broadcaster avoid rejecting some ads to which  
equal opportunities obligations would attach in principle?  As a practical 
matter, a workable antidiscrimination rule in the context of non-candidate 
political advertising must give stations significant discretion to achieve a rough 
balance serving the public interest, rather than formal equality.397  A formal 
incorporation of outside ads into § 315 would not permit the exercise of 
broadcaster discretion once the station chose to air a third-party ad supporting 
or opposing a candidate and thereby automatically triggered the statutory equal 
opportunities requirement.398 
                                                 
 391. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 98–99 (describing CBS’s policy against 
accepting controversial advocacy advertising). 
 392. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (describing the recent increase in 
independent groups’ political-ad spending levels). 
 393. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text. 
 394. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 282–83. 
 395. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.  Admittedly, a Zapple-like 
antidiscrimination rule could lead stations to avoid highly partisan ads by outside groups, and 
thereby lead to an arguably unconstitutional chilling effect under the First Amendment.  Indeed, it 
might lead to a constitutional challenge to § 315 itself.  Although Supreme Court cases such as 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1960), implicitly confirm the constitutionality 
of the current version of § 315, query whether an interpretation that includes a quasi-equal 
opportunities component might not increase the burden on stations with limited airtime and lead 
to an overly conservative approach to the sale of airtime to outside groups.  The limited right of 
access under § 312(a)(7) could not offset such a chilling effect because of its limitation to federal 
candidates.  See supra note 221.  In addition, if the lowest-unit-rate provisions of § 315(b) were 
deemed applicable to the revived Zapple, then stations would doubtless complain about the 
financial burdens imposed by an expanded equal-time rule.  See supra note 221.  This is another 
reason not to call for formal incorporation. 
 397. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 282–83 (describing how broadcasters are “fiduciaries 
of the public trust” that make decisions on advertising to serve the public interest). 
 398. This is, of course, assuming that opponents of a candidate or the candidate’s support 
group or supporters of another candidate would seek equal opportunities for their messages. 
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Reading Zapple as incorporated formally through § 315 would also likely 
hamstring the FCC in any attempt to promote voluntary implementation of 
private, self-regulatory measures to control offensive and misleading political 
ads.399  Self-regulatory measures could include rejecting such ads, requiring 
additional documentation of truth regarding claims made, or negotiating 
changes in the ads.400  Stations may have some economic incentives to exercise 
editorial control over outside-group ads or reject the most inaccurate and 
misleading.  They may have concerns about reputational harm from association 
with excessively negative and false advertising, as commercial broadcasters 
develop business reputations that could be tarnished by excessive association 
with such fare.401  Although the principal object of voter discontent with 
offensive and false attack ads is likely to be the speaker, it stands to reason that 
station association with this kind of advertising would diminish the station’s 
credibility as well.  This is particularly true if the group responsible for the 
attack ad does not itself have a clearly established reputation.  In such 
circumstances, viewers might be more likely to question the station’s decision 
to air the ad rather than simply reacting to the speaker alone.  Stations may also 
have incentives to reduce potential litigation risk.  In the past, the FCC has 
taken the position that political advertising by supporters or opponents of 
candidates does not receive the immunity from defamation claims that is 
granted to candidates under § 315.402  If that is the rule, rational broadcasters 
                                                 
 399. There is also an argument that assimilation of the Zapple rule into § 315 might entail the 
application of the lowest-unit-rate discounted-time provision under § 315(b) where relevant.  See 
supra note 221 (discussing the lowest-unit-rate discount).  However, the Zapple doctrine does not 
require an extension of the lowest-unit-rate obligation.  There are good reasons for requiring 
airtime discounts for candidates themselves, so that they have the opportunity to address the 
voting public directly.  This rationale does not logically apply in the same way to outside groups 
supporting or opposing the candidate.  In any event, given the complexities in the way that 
stations sell airtime and the extent to which they profit from political advertising, even the 
extension of the lowest-unit-rate requirement to independent ads would not likely be deemed a 
significant burden by broadcasters. 
 400. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 283–85 (discussing the roles and responsibilities of 
broadcasters and the necessity of allowing broadcasters to blame the pros and cons of airing an 
ad). 
 401. See Christina H. Burrow, Thomas M. Clyde & Michael D. Rothberg, Negative Issue 
Advertisements: A Practical Matter, COMM. LAWYER, Summer 2004, at 7.  Although the speaker 
is likely to be the principal object of voter discontent with offensive, false attack ads, it is 
reasonable to expect that association with such advertising would diminish the station’s 
credibility, particularly if the group airing the ad does not have a clearly established reputation. 
 402. See, e.g., FCC Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, 1513 (1984) (citing Farmers Educ. 
& Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); Felix v. Westinghouse Radio 
Station, 186 F.2d 1 (1950)); Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 
F.C.C.2d 832, 874 (1970) (“Section 315 . . . is not a defense to an action for libel or slander 
arising out of broadcasts by non-candidates speaking in behalf of another’s candidacy.  Since 
section 315 does not prohibit the licensee from censoring such a broadcast, the licensee is not 
entitled to the protection of section 315.” (citing George F. Mahoney, 40 F.C.C. 336 (1962))); 
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concerned about litigation risk would have clear incentives to involve their 
legal departments in advertising review, to request more documentation of the 
truth of claims made, and to negotiate revisions toning down falsehoods in 
third-party advocacy ads.  A strict application of equal opportunities under  
§ 315 to such ads would significantly limit broadcaster choice and editorial 
control.403 
Even if the FCC can revive a Zapple-like non-discrimination obligation 
under its ancillary authority, does Zapple provide enough insulation from the 
potentially distorting effects of Citizens United?  If one of the most worrisome 
aspects of the decision is that it opened “the floodgates”404 to disproportionate 
amounts of corporate money overwhelming the political process, then it is 
unclear whether application of the quasi-equal opportunities doctrine could 
realistically reduce the threat of the spectacular expense of political 
campaigns.405  Because Zapple does not require broadcasters to subsidize the 
speech of less well-funded supporters to help equalize the messages heard by 
the audience, the practical effect of the doctrine in today’s environment of 
dominating independent-ad coffers is uncertain.406  
                                                                                                                 
FCC, Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 31 Fed. Reg. 6660, 6671 (Fed. 
Commc’ns Comm’n Apr. 27, 1966). 
 403. To be sure, § 315 contains a prohibition on censoring candidate messages, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed broadcasters’ immunity against defamation actions concerning those 
messages. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 529 (affirming broadcasters’ immunity against defamation actions 
when they broadcast ads by candidates without censoring candidates’ messages).  It is not  
self-evident that the immunity against defamation is inapplicable in Zapple cases.  Despite the 
FCC’s previously stated view, the Supreme Court’s argument in Farmers Education & 
Cooperative Union of American v. WDAY, Inc. could be read to apply to ads by supporters as well 
as candidates.  See id. at 529–30.  If the FCC were to adopt an antidiscrimination provision 
directly under the authority of § 315, courts might interpret the WDAY immunity as applicable 
regardless of prior FCC precedent.  Stations would be less concerned with defamation claims 
against them for airing libelous independent political ads.  Even so, of course, rational 
broadcasters should be concerned about reputational harm.  In any event, the Court’s articulated 
concerns about the chilling effect of broadcaster censorship of candidate speech in WDAY are not 
necessarily relevant to non-candidates’ speech, so courts considering the issue would not 
necessarily adopt this expansive reading of WDAY. 
 404. See Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 214 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 
968 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also John Eggerton, Obama Takes on Campaign-Ad 
Ruling in State of the Union, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 27, 2010, 10:32 PM), 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/446345-Obama_Takes_on_Campaign_Ad_Ruling_in 
_State_of_the_Union.php  (quoting President Obama’s statement that “[l]ast week, the Supreme 
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special  
interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our elections” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Guthrie, supra note 137 (quoting Representative Chris Van Hollen, 
stating that the decision “will open the floodgate, if left unchecked and unchallenged, to more and 
more special interest money” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 405. See Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (quoting the comment that if there is high demand for 
third-party ads, “it can be pretty expensive for independent expenditures and issue advocacy to go 
in and do television advertising” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 406. Cf. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 707, 708 (1970) (declining to require free rebuttal time). 
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Regardless of the merits of proposals designed to reduce the effect of wealth 
disparities in elections, currently no political will exists to require broadcasters 
to subsidize ads by less well-funded groups.407  Moreover, evidence from the 
2010 midterm election suggests that although an astronomical amount of 
money was spent on television advertising in support of the candidates, 
supporters of candidates from both parties were well funded.408  Additionally, 
corporations are not alone in contributing to political advertising, with labor 
unions taking an increased role.409  It is true, of course, that even if money 
might not have been a significantly differentiating factor between the titanic 
major players, minor party candidates and their supporters can be significantly 
hobbled by having less of it.410  Applying the Zapple doctrine admittedly does 
not address that problem.411  Nevertheless, there is sufficient benefit to 
deterring partisanship to justify reviving the doctrine, even if some real, 
unresolved problems remain in the political system.412   
III.  INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
A.  Why the FCC? 
A focus on the FCC as a means to regulate campaign finance naturally raises 
questions of institutional choice.  Television, as the premier venue for political 
advertising, is central to American political discourse,413 and the FCC is in a 
                                                 
 407. Cf. id. 
 408. See The Money Behind Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/big 
picture/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). 
 409. Suzy Khimm, The Citizens United Effect, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2010, 3:00 AM 
PDT), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/06/citizens-united-effect (“Just as predicted, 
campaign ads that would previously have been illegal are now airing in key midterm election 
races.  But the players funding those ads aren’t the ones you might expect.  It turns out that some 
of the first groups to exploit Citizens United aren’t corporations, but labor unions.”).  But see 
Corcoran & Maher, supra note 346 (taking exception with “the implication that labor unions 
benefited as much from the Citizens decision as corporations”). 
 410. Cf. Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (discussing the increased cost of political-advertising 
airspace after Citizens United and its effect on the ability of less well-funded actors to buy spots). 
 411. See id. (reporting on the predicted spike in television ad costs due to third-party 
involvements and how expensive ad space could harm candidates). 
 412. See supra Part II.C. 
 413. By television, I mean to refer to both broadcast and cable television.  Broadcast 
television is still the primary venue for political advertising.  See Andrea Morabito, The Cable 
Show 2011: Local TV Still ‘Nuclear Weapon’ of Election Ads, BROADCASTING & CABLE (June 
15, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/469757-The_Cable_Show_2011 
_Local_TV_Still_Nuclear_Weapon_of_Election_Ads.php (observing the dominance of broadcast 
television in election ad spending); see also Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 2 (“[T]he best 
evidence suggests that local cable does not represent a large population of the ads aired during 
congressional campaigns.”).  However, local cable has become more significant as a venue for 
political ads recently.  See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 108–09. 
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natural position to consider how to regulate television.414  Although online 
political advertising has become an important element in the campaign 
landscape,415 it is overshadowed by broadcast and cable television, which are 
far more central to political advertising as a whole.416   
The obvious benefit of calling for an FCC-based administrative solution is 
that it does not require congressional approval. Congress has already given the 
FCC a broad mandate for executing and enforcing electronic-media 
regulation.417  The statutory and regulatory tools for FCC intervention in this 
                                                 
 414. See supra Part II.A.  But see Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4 (criticizing the political 
expansion of FCC jurisdiction into regulation of political speech through MAP’s rulemaking 
petition). 
 415. See Travis N. Ridout, Erika Franklin Fowler & John Branstetter, Political Advertising in 
the 21st Century: The Rise of the YouTube Ad 13–17 (Aug. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642853; Kate Kaye, The State 
of Online Political Advertising,  YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ISP/Kate 
_Kaye.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2011). 
 416. See Ridout, Fowler & Branstetter, supra note 415, at 14.  Critics of FCC involvement 
have also called the possibility of agency action a “grab for new jurisdiction [by] tired old New 
Deal agency . . . approaching its eightieth birthday and . . . seeking new regulatory turf.”  Yoo & 
Marston, supra note 25, at 4.  To the extent that comments like this are attempts to paint the FCC 
as a self-interested regulatory agency arbitrarily involving itself into a debate to which it is 
irrelevant, they forget the FCC’s role in regulating the medium that is still most central to political 
advertising in the modern campaign.  See supra Part II.A. 
 417. See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).  Of course, adding another administrative entity into the 
mix may lead to institutional conflict, complexity, and confusion.  The 1974 amendments to 
FECA created the FEC and tasked it with overseeing the conduct of election campaigns and the 
voting system. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
§201(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1272 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)).  The FCC currently 
cooperates with the FEC. E.g., Political Programming, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/policy/political/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (noting the FCC 
compliance with “the requirement that the FCC compile, maintain, and provide to the public on 
its website any information the Federal Election Commission may require to carry out Section 
304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended”); see also Compliance with 
Laws Outside the FEC’s Jurisdiction, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/compliance_nonfec.shtml#communications (last updated 
2008) (providing direction to FCC and FTC regulations that cover certain political broadcast ads 
and telephone communications).  Will involvement of the FCC inappropriately undermine this 
structure?  With inconsistent approaches to funding disclosure, will the two agencies further 
contribute to campaign-finance complexity and incoherence?  The fact that different 
administrative agencies with different enabling statutes may simultaneously exercise jurisdiction 
over the same phenomena does not necessarily require one to concede to the other.  To the extent 
that involvement of the FCC fills in limitations and gaps in the FEC’s rules—and to the degree 
that FCC action can get around FEC dysfunction—the campaign system is likely to benefit.  
Overlapping administrative regulation is fairly common.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006) 
(granting the FCC rulemaking authority to combat deceptive practices in communication), with 
15 U.S.C. § 54 (authorizing the FTC to prevent deceptive practices that affect commerce). The 
FCC and the FTC have overlapping jurisdiction in the area of deceptive practices and that overlap 
does not appear to have resulted in significant policy incoherence.  Id.  There is no reason to 
believe the situation would be different with the FEC. 
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area are already in place.418  However, some critics challenge the legitimacy of 
FCC action by arguing that it is improper for the agency to read its existing 
precedents in a manner contrary to Congress’s rejection of the DISCLOSE 
Act.419  This argument is not persuasive because the DISCLOSE Act included 
provisions for more controversial campaign-disclosure reform.420  
Furthermore, both Republicans and Democrats have traditionally agreed on the 
desirability of disclosure in the election context.421  Moreover, interested 
parties can participate in an FCC proceeding and voice their views, which 
would generate much clearer signals to the FCC regarding desirable 
regulations than can be gained from a complex congressional failure to act.422  
Other opponents criticize possible FCC action as a Democratic tactic 
designed to suppress effective Republican advertising.423  Indeed, Professors 
John Yoo and David W. Marston describe all the disclosure-seeking responses 
to Citizens United as having “a single goal: to stifle the First Amendment 
speech rights of political opponents.”424  The fundamental problem with this 
characterization is that the proposed disclosure rules would apply equally to all 
political advertisers regardless of political-party affiliation.425 
Of course, an expansive reading of § 317 and a revival of the Zapple 
doctrine may not be consistent with the FCC’s current regulatory priorities.  
The agency may choose not to wade into the post-Citizens United political 
advertising controversy.  Even advocates of disclosure within the FCC might 
hesitate to act without some congressional support for fear of congressional 
                                                 
 418. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 419. See John Eggerton, Rep. Walden Will Go ‘Nuclear’ If FCC Adopts MAP Petition, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Apr. 1, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.broadcasting 
cable.com/article/466160-Rep_Walden_Will_Go_Nuclear_If_FCC_Adopts_MAP_Petition.php 
(noting that House Communications Subcommittee Chair Greg Walden saw the MAP petition “as 
an end-around after Congress did not pass tougher on-air disclosure laws backed primarily by 
Democrats”); see supra Part II.A (discussing the relevant regulatory provisions of the 
Communications Act of 1934). 
 420. See supra note 183.  The bill went much further than merely adding a donor-disclosure 
provision and was controversial for reasons far beyond donor disclosure.  GARRETT, WHITAKER 
& LUNDER, supra note 181, at 6–8.  That the bill did not reach consideration in the Senate says 
little both about overall congressional will regarding donor disclosure and about how the FCC 
should interpret its own policies adopted under different statutory schemes. 
 421. Noveck, supra note 297, at 75, 96 (“[I]ncreased reporting and disclosure of political 
contributions has seen widespread support from across the political spectrum.”). 
 422. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9224, 926–27 (2009); see also Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and 
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 525 
(1982) (discussing public participation leading to better development of policy). 
 423. See Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 2, 4 (“The FCC, of course, is an independent 
regulatory agency, but Genachowski bundled more than $500,000 for Obama’s 2008 presidential 
campaign and has visited the White House more than 80 times.”). 
 424. Id. at 2. 
 425. See id. at 4. 
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retaliation.426  There is a clear risk that the agency may paralyze the MAP 
initiative through inattention and delay.427  Forging ahead with such a 
controversial change could certainly cost the FCC political capital, and there is 
already pressure on the agency to stay out of the highly controversial area of 
campaign finance.428  Representative Greg Walden, chairman of the House 
Communications Subcommittee, explicitly warned the FCC that he would “go 
‘nuclear’” if the FCC used its sponsorship-identification rules to require 
disclosure of political-message sponsors in response to the MAP petition.429 
Nonetheless, there is support at the FCC for requiring increased disclosure.  
Commissioner Michael Copps has already publicly expressed his support, 
stating that “[i]f some group called ‘Citizens for Spacious Skies and Amber 
Waves of Grain’ is actually under-written by a chemical company that doesn’t 
want to clean up a toxic dump, viewers, listeners and voters should know 
this.”430  Commissioner Mignon Clyburn also expressed her support for 
increases in political-ad disclosure requirements.431  Additionally, a recent 
FCC staff report advocated a shift in the agency toward greater disclosure.432  
Continuing attention to the issue might prompt new actors to support FCC 
regulations increasing disclosure requirements.  Regardless of the ultimate 
outcome, it is clear that the FCC is an appropriate conduit for the realization of 
Justice Kennedy’s vision of an effective marketplace of political information in 
Citizens United.433 
B.  Beyond Disclosure: Whether the FCC Should Adopt Affirmative  
Political-Programming Requirements  
Critics of Citizens United who worry that wealthy advertisers will evade 
disclosure, dominate political discourse, and skew electoral results are unlikely 
to be satisfied with the procedural proposals thus far; however, they might look 
to the FCC for more affirmative solutions.  For example, Commissioner Copps 
has called on the agency to adopt a public-value test, including “meaningful 
                                                 
 426. See Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Reregulation: The Political 
Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152 (1981). 
 427. See Wyatt, supra note 226. 
 428. See, e.g., Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4; Eggerton, supra note 419. 
 429. Eggerton, supra note 419. 
 430. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps 
on the Importance of Disclosure for Political Advertisements (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov 
/document/copps-importance-disclosure-political-ads. 
 431. Wyatt, supra note 226. 
 432. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 347–48.  The Third Circuit’s recent rejection of a prior 
FCC attempt to deregulate some of its ownership rules may also reduce administrative timidity.  
Bill Carter, Court Overturns FCC Cross-Ownership Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B4.  
Admittedly, the Third Circuit’s opinion rests on narrow grounds. 
 433. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010). 
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commitments to news and public affairs programming,” to update the 
licensing-renewal system for radio and television licensees.434 
In keeping with that approach, the FCC might be tempted to adopt an 
affirmative requirement for political programming on broadcast television akin 
to the FCC’s current children’s educational television rules.435  If voters are 
“civic slackers” who could benefit from additional political education,436 and if 
the political education they are likely to receive from partisan, negative, and 
veiled ads is likely to skew the voting system,437 then broadcasters arguably 
should tap the extensive educational potential of the medium to improve 
political discourse.  Assuming that a flood of conflicting independent ads 
unduly confounds the public, does—or can—station-sponsored political 
programming enhance voters’ political information and serve as a 
contextualizing counterweight to partisan advertising?  Can the FCC intervene, 
within the bounds of the First Amendment?  Even if it is authorized to do so, 
should it?  
Many complain about the current picture of political programming on 
television.  They point to a marked decline in political programming on the 
broadcast airwaves438 and disparage cable political programming as polarizing 
                                                 
 434. Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Columbia 
University School of Journalism: Getting Media Right: A Call to Action 4 (Dec. 2, 2010), 
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/getting-media-right-call-action-fcc-commissioner-
michael-j-copps-columbia-university-school; see also WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 292–93 
(explaining Commissioner Copps’s proposal); Brian Stelter, A New Test Is Proposed in Licensing 
Radio Ad TV, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at B31. 
 435. See Copps, supra note 434, at 4.  See generally Lili Levi, A “Pay or Play” Experiment 
to Improve Children’s Educational Television, 62 FED. COM. L.J. 275 (2010) (discussing the 
FCC’s children’s E/I (educational/informational) programming requirements). 
 436. See Sheff, supra note 123, at 150–51 (“One robust and persistent finding validates the 
‘civic slacker’ view of the electorate.  It is generally recognized in social science circles that 
American voters tend not to be especially well informed . . . .”).  But cf. James A. Gardner,  
Anti-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery 
Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 702–04 (2011) (discussing how voters develop 
coping strategies to address “overabundance” of information, including selectively ignoring 
available information). 
 437. See supra Part I.B. 
 438. See, e.g., Broadcast Localism, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324, 1348–49 (2008).  In its inquiry into 
broadcast localism, the FCC reported that there was variation in the amount of political 
programming aired on broadcast stations and “sharp disagreement among commentators as to the 
broadcasters’ record in airing programming addressing political issues and the commission’s legal 
authority in the area.”  Id. at 1349.  Recounting its previous observations that although “some 
broadcasters have aired many hours of political programming and . . . several television networks 
have provided free airtime to candidates for president in recent elections,” the FCC Localism 
inquiry also referred to research indicating a decline in political programming.  Id. at 1348.  
Indeed, the FCC noted congressional testimony to the effect that “larger station group owners air 
less local campaign news than smaller and midsized station group owners.”  Id.; see also Seth 
Grossman, Note, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach 
to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 358 (2004) 
(asserting both reduction in and limited, “horse-race” focus of television campaign coverage). 
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infotainment.439  They argue that commercial broadcasters have not “cover[ed] 
the political news to the fullest degree” as intended when Congress adopted 
exemptions to the equal opportunities requirements of § 315 fifty years ago.440  
Despite these limitations, as well as critics’ commendable concerns about voter 
ignorance and disaffection, FCC adoption of “meaningful”441 programming 
requirements for political coverage would be troubling and unwise.   
An FCC-implemented affirmative political-programming requirement risks 
government intervention into broadcaster speech without any clear evidence of 
likely need or likely success.442  The rich media environment available today, 
including the web and social media, provides voters with the degree of political 
information they desire, in whatever customized form they choose.443  It is far 
                                                 
 439. See, e.g., Kevin Koe et al., Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of Cable News 
Programming, 58 J. COMM. 201–19 (2008); Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons 
from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 686–96 (2007) and sources cited therein; 
Ricchiuto, supra note 214, at 268; cf. Lauren Guggenheim, Nojin Kwak & Scott W. Campbell, 
Nontraditional News Negativity: The Relationship of Entertaining Political News Use to Political 
Cynicism and Mistrust, 23 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 287 (2011). 
 440. See Ricchiuto, supra note 214, at 268 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 14,451 (1959) 
(statement of Sen. Spessard Holland)).  The decline in broadcast political programming has 
occurred despite the FCC’s very liberal interpretations of the four exceptions to § 315 since the 
1980s.  Vandell, supra note 208, at 458–62.  Starting with the FCC’s decision to classify the Phil 
Donohue program as an exempt offering under § 315(a), the FCC has consistently expanded the 
range of programming exempt from equal opportunities obligations.  Id. at 459–62 & n.96; 
accord Michael Damien Holcomb, Congressional Intent Rebuffed: The Federal Communications 
Commission’s New Perspective on 47 U.S.C. § 315(A)(2), 34 SW. U. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2004); 
see also Telepictures Prod., Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 7168, 7169 (2008) (declaring more recently that 
the television program entitled TMZ, consisting of “entertainment news events,” should be 
considered an exempt bona fide newscast); Angelides for Governor Campaign, 21 FCC Rcd. 
11,919, 11,923 (2006) (finding the “news interview” segment of the Tonight Show with Jay Leno 
to qualify as an exempt bona fide news interview).  As the FCC explained, the news-interview 
segments of the Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Oprah, Howard Stern, the Sally Jessy Raphael 
Show, Jerry Springer, Politically Incorrect, and the 700 Club are now all considered exempt 
programs.  See id. at 19,922–27; Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the New Battle Over 
the Regulation of Video News Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 362 (2008).  Some 
have argued that this has opened the door to partisan licensee programming decisions with no 
FCC oversight and has particularly hurt minority or unsuccessful candidates.  See Akilah N. 
Folami, Freeing the Press From Editorial Discretion and Hegemony in Bona Fide News: Why the 
Revolution Must Be Televised, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 367, 368 (2011) (arguing that early 
interpretations of § 315 exemptions led to narrow political discourse). 
 441. See Copps, supra note 434, at 4. 
 442. See Gardner, supra note 436, at 705–04; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert: 
Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (1995) 
(coining the term “civic slob”). 
 443. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 893, 905 (1998); see also Gardner, supra note 436, at 702–09. 
      As for political junkies, arguably better and more immediately accessible information may be 
available to them elsewhere—in newspapers, magazines, web sites, and social media on the 
Internet.  See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 226.  Although Americans are consuming more media 
and have not abandoned traditional media, studies show fluctuation in the consumption of news.  
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from clear that broadcast programming aired to satisfy FCC requirements 
would provide any significant “value added” to what is already available in the 
overall media marketplace, at least without an unacceptable degree of quality 
oversight by the FCC.  Whatever the constitutionality, practicability, and 
wisdom of more indirect, incentive-oriented regulations designed to promote 
more and better political programming on television, a traditional, mandated 
programming requirement is a very bad idea. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Campaign-finance-reform advocates decry the Roberts Court’s use of the 
First Amendment to undercut attempts to level the electoral playing field.  
Although the possibility of involving the FCC in a response to these 
developments has received little notice, there is reason to believe that this 
alternative may generate a moderate and realistic approach to mitigating some 
of the troubling effects of the Court’s deregulatory campaign spending 
jurisprudence.  Reaching out to the FCC is neither illegitimate nor 
institutionally problematic. 
The FCC should: 1) interpret the sponsorship-identification provision of the 
Communications Act of 1934 to require disclosure of direct and indirect 
donors to, and directors and principal officers of, groups purchasing political 
airtime; and 2) adapt its moribund quasi-equal opportunities doctrine under 
Zapple to the current political-advertising landscape in order to prohibit 
broadcaster discrimination and partisanship in the sale of airtime to supporters 
of political candidates.  The FCC has the authority for both regulatory 
initiatives: disclosure under its sponsorship-identification authority and an  
anti-partisanship rule under its ancillary authority.  Additionally, broadcasters 
and cable systems could be induced to adopt ameliorative policies voluntarily.  
Brand-enhancing rewards systems could be used to influence the private 
adoption of enhanced disclosure rules. Similarly, if the FCC reaffirms its prior 
view that the statutory immunity against defamation suits for candidate speech 
does not apply to ads by supporters or opponents of candidates, then television 
stations will have potentially significant economic incentives to reject or 
negotiate edits in at least the most obviously false and misleading third-party 
ads.  There is nothing to prevent the FCC from reading its enabling statute and 
precedents consistently with these proposals, and such a reading would likely 
be deemed constitutional under the Roberts Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Naturally, skeptics who fear § 317’s vulnerability to gaming and evasion, 
who question the need for (and usefulness of) the Zapple doctrine, and who 
doubt the ability of voluntary responses to curb the Citizens United effect, and 
who despair of the television coverage of electoral politics today, might 
                                                                                                                 
Id.  However, “news junkies have more ways of finding news . . . [,] everyone else has more ways 
of avoiding it.”  Id. at 227. 
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recommend instead that the FCC adopt affirmative political-programming 
rules to promote democracy.  However, it would be misguided for the agency 
to require political-programming minima from regulated television entities.  
Instead of affirmative content control, FCC disclosure requirements and a 
policy of overall non-discrimination in airtime sales for independent political 
advertising are more likely to advance the goals of campaign-finance reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
